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Executive replacements have historically created fluctuations in the market value of a 
company and precipitated inappropriate investor reaction. However, the direction and 
statistical significance of relationships between executive turnover, market value, 
financial risk, and investor reaction among a census of highly performing firms was 
previously unexplored. The purpose of this study was to determine the extent of the 
relationship between CEO turnover and indicators of company performance. Theoretical 
foundation for this study was the efficient markets hypothesis. Hypotheses tests were 
designed to support an ex-post facto research methodology for pre-post comparison of 
volatility of financial metrics, which are indicators of market value (market value added), 
investor reaction (Tobin’s q), risk (beta), executive performance (economic value added 
and return on assets), and turnover frequency given CEO succession. Statistically 
significant differences in firm risk emerged from comparisons of highly performing firms 
exemplified in the foundational leadership text Good to Great. Approximately 45 % of 
firms sampled did not experience volatility of financial metrics, which supported the 
presence of a leadership legacy, or strategic management behavior which minimized 
financial risk. Contrary to prior studies, financial metrics sampled within an interval 
immediately surrounding the succession event were less indicative of significant financial 
risk as compared to metrics sampled over the entire tenure of executives. Implications for 
positive social change include reducing investor risk in selection of equity holdings; 
capital fairly directed to entities results in benefits for society including job creation, 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study  
Introduction 
An entity’s competitive advantage is manifested through extraordinary financial 
performance; informed decision-making, applied through the prowess of experienced 
leadership, sustains strategic competition. An executive leader’s “ability, preferences, 
operating policies, and ultimate decisions affect the firm through the projects the firm 
selects, its financial policy, and the corporate culture...[since] decisions differ across 
individuals, CEO changes can alter the course of the firm and its performance” (Clayton, 
Hartzell, & Rosenberg, 2005, p. 1779). Therefore, a personnel change at the chief 
executive level has an impact upon strategic operations, as discernable through the 
analysis of accounting and financial metrics, as well as security market participant 
reaction. Further, as fervent sales or purchase transactions occur in reaction to personnel 
succession, stockholders’ perceptions of management turnover often gives rise to trading 
activity, which may project unqualified volatility upon the corporation’s stock price, 
affecting market values of equity during the interval circumscribing the event date. 
Investors participating in the market environment may indecisively perceive the impact 
of the personnel change contingent within the risk context, and react by altering demand 
for equity in response. Accurate accounting metrics and financial analysis will eventually 
countermand spurious valuation effects of a market anomaly characterized by investor 
overreaction. Through information communicated within an entity’s official financial 
disclosures, including the Securities and Exchange Commission’s required Forms 10K 




valuation of stock prices given a change in personnel, accompanied by a change in 
strategy. As Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) acknowledged, “voluntary disclosure 
policies are integral to the earnings reporting process…disclosure beyond that mandated 
in regulatory filings…shape[s] the perceptions of market participants and other 
stakeholders” (p. 27). 
Upon sampling more than 1000 succession events accompanied by changes in 
financial performance, Cannella Jr. and Lubatkin (1993) said, “return and risk, however 
defined, are not highly correlated, suggesting that each represents a separate performance 
dimension” (p. 779). Whereas financial return is a manifestation of the outcome of 
decision-making, financial risk is a reflection of the inherent quality of decision-making 
within the endogenous and exogenous context of the entity. As distinguished inside 
followers and outsiders receive new executive appointments, researchers have found 
stockholder reaction to succession events to be statistically inconsistent (Friedman & 
Singh, 1989; Gibson, 2003; Clayton, et al., 2005). Researchers have also differentiated 
actual rather than perceived financial performance dynamics prior and subsequent to 
succession events and revealed similar inconsistencies of statistical significance. Whereas 
Kaplan (1994), Dahya, Lonie, and Power (1998), and Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001), 
disclosed a statistically significant relationship between poor financial performance and 
executive turnover by type of successor, conversely, Friedman and Singh (1989) and 
Puffer and Weintrop (1991) discovered no significant statistical relationship between 
performance and turnover variables. These disparate results may have been attributable to 




purposive sampling entailing a novel approach: the analysis of entities characterized by 
exceptional performance, and the observance of dynamics affecting sustained financial 
and operational results given the occurrence of chief executive departure.  
Since “traditional economic theory holds that the market for management control 
acts as a disciplinary device on nonvalue maximizing management” (Kennedy & 
Limmack, 1996, p. 267), the prevalence of executive removal is conjectured to increase 
as earnings volatility and operational ineffectiveness are addressed by principals who 
exercise their governance control.  Researchers have statistically attested to the increased 
incidence of executive turnover, given the presence of diminishing financial returns 
(Friedman & Singh, 1989; Puffer & Weintrop, 1991; Cannella Jr. & Lubatkin, 1993; 
Allgood & Farrell, 2000). Conversely, an analysis of chief executive turnover in the 
presence of exceptional financial performance warranted review through the 
administration of a substantive framework of evaluation, to determine whether an 
individual’s distinct approach to the implementation of the objectives of the entity affect 
risk dynamics, resulting in statistically significant variation of financial performance 
metrics.  
Statement of the Problem 
Variations in equity market returns are often experienced by investors subsequent 
to a change in an entity’s executive leadership. Researchers (Dahya et al., 1998; Clayton 
et al., 2005) have revealed various degrees of statistical significance of changes in equity 
returns as changes in leadership occur through analyses of samples ranked by financial 




The problem is that executive replacements create a fluctuation in the market 
value of a company and frequently precipitate inappropriate investor reaction. It is 
integral to determine the direction and significance of the relationship between executive 
turnover, market value, financial risk, and investor reaction to replacement events among 
highly performing firms. Potential impacts were revealed through statistical comparison 
of metrics that indicate market value (market value added), investor reaction (Tobin’s q), 
risk (beta), executive performance (accounting metrics economic value added and return 
on assets), and turnover frequency. A chief executive’s distinctive approach or style used 
in the implementation of strategy as compared to a predecessor differentiated levels of 
financial performance and risk for an organization. 
Bower (2007) contemplated the implications of succession planning: “it occurred 
to me toward the end of a decade’s research on the work of corporate leaders that CEO 
succession had everything to do with a company’s ability to sustain high performance 
over decades” (p. x). Identified within a comprehensive analysis conducted by Collins 
(2001) was a sample of high performing entities led by outstanding executives. Analysis 
of executive turnover, replacement, and succession applicable to this sample warrants 
investigation, and thus satisfies the following research question: In the event of executive 
departure, is the individual risk management style of the successor, as differentiated from 
the predecessor, perceptible through a time-series financial analysis of highly performing 
companies? As the introduction of new executive strategic decisions may be the source of 
financial instability, investors often find that a different level of risk does not align with 




the basis of the perceived implications of executive change when financial performance 
may or may not result in statistically significant change. Economic resource allocations 
within society are affected as a result.    
As financial returns are variable for many firms experiencing a change in 
leadership, fiscal performance may deteriorate or improve. Investors rely on continuity of 
returns resulting from experienced leadership. As they seek sustainability of results for 
their own benefit, investors are often sensitized to the fiscal implications of leadership 
changes. Investors, at a minimum, are conjectured to respond appropriately given 
financial results yielded as a result of personnel change, and any strategic endeavors 
detected through the observation of financial metrics. The change in accounting results is 
measurable through observation of return on assets and economic value added, while the 
change in investor response is detectable through observation of Tobin's q, beta, and 
market value added. 
Inadequate financial performance is a relative term. Dahya et al. (1998) observed: 
“the probability of a forced management change is in practice very small even when the 
firm is in the lowest decile of performance or in imminent danger of liquidation” (p. 
1091). These authors documented that, generally, financial performance must be abysmal 
for an entity’s board to replace top management, thus indicating reticence of board 
members and principals to supplant poorly performing executives. A selected set of 
qualifying ratios and indicators which are utilized to detect results of expected versus 
actual performance requisitely satisfies the research question regarding the financial 




outcomes. These benchmarks of executive financial and operational performance, 
optimally designated, are administered in practice and monitored for stakeholder 
tolerance.  All leaders must eventually be replaced, as a natural progression of firm 
continuity; however, upon replacement, risk specific to firm performance as perceived by 
investors and detectable through financial metrics may change in response.  Deterioration 
in financial performance is expected to be followed by an executive replacement event. 
Tangentially, such an investigation is anticipated to reveal reticence to remove executives 
despite the lucid presence of diminished performance sustainability, exposing 
stakeholders to a manifested dearth of corporate governance and social responsibility. 
Whether the problem of inconsistency of financial performance pursuant to a CEO 
change remains pervasive among firms experiencing outstanding and sustained returns 
regardless of the formidability of firm financial structure and operational policy is tested 
within this analysis. 
Background of the Problem 
“Success in today’s competitive environment requires an organizational 
commitment to compete over the long run” (Lee & Milne, 1988, p. 25). Strategic 
continuity is essential for long-term operational and financial success; the implementation 
of transformational initiatives often necessitates regimented adherence to planned 
allocations of human, tangible, and financial resources. Conversely, economic changes 
within the environment in which the firm operates may compel an executive response. 
Contemporary global competition among entities further dimensionalizes risk. Bower 




2004…those hapless companies went bankrupt, were sold, or were broken up principally 
because their management could not redeploy resources in productive ways” (p. 6). 
Executives lagging in their discernment of factors challenging the future success of the 
entity are often not able to formidably and appropriately react to “pervasive, frame-
breaking...and transmuting internal and external environmental conditions” (Gordon, 
Stewart, Sweo, & Luker, 2000, p. 912).  
Further, Bower (2007) observed:  
…what we see, time and time again, are companies that fail to respond to 
changing circumstances and that fail to look forward…the ability of 
companies to adjust their capabilities and direction over the long term—to 
meet the challenges of new markets and new competitors—grows directly 
out of the quality of their leadership. (p. 7)  
It is therefore imperative that a CEO serve as the strategic steward entrusted by 
stakeholders to effectively command enterprise endeavors, to swiftly react to firm-
specific opportunities, and to coordinate appropriate responses among executive team 
members. Rappaport (2005) reflected: “to evaluate the sustainability and potential growth 
of sales and cash flow, [shareholders] must weigh such factors as industry growth 
potential, the company’s competitive position, the likely behavior of competitors, 
technological change, and quality of management” (p. 66). As a majority of the entity’s 
stakeholders typically do not have the skills, access, or time to accomplish these 




the CEO, to engender the best demonstrated practice of augmented value creation, and 
support the concept of capital maintenance. 
 Gray and Cannella, Jr. (1997) contemplated: “What happens, for example, when 
the firm’s environment, and hence its strategy, changes dramatically?” (p. 537). 
Exceptionally sustained operational and financial performance is an imposing objective 
for any leader directing a team of diverse individuals, particularly in an economic 
environment characterized by the presence of macro-level international hyper-
competition in many sectors. Few top executives have the propensity to conjure such an 
enduring legacy. Collins (2001) posited: “leadership…is equally about ferocious resolve, 
an almost stoic determination to do whatever needs to be done to make the company 
great” (p. 30), and further acknowledged: “Greatness is not a function of circumstance. 
Greatness…is largely a matter of conscious choice” (p. 11). From these observations, 
Collins exalted respective executives and their 11 entities (e.g., Abbott Laboratories, 
Circuit City, Fannie Mae, Gillette, Kimberly Clark, Kroger Inc., Nucor Corporation, 
Philip Morris (Altria), Pitney Bowes, Walgreens, and Wells Fargo) upon testing realized 
results versus a designated litmus of 15 years of sustained exceptional financial 
performance, or “cumulative returns at least three times the market over the next fifteen 
years” (p. 6). Current stakeholders and future investors seeking stability of returns to 
satisfy a portfolio objective of growth are acutely interested in the auspice of financial 
outcomes. To the extent that exceptional financial performance may be sustained by 
strategic continuity afforded through the applied talent of a particular executive officer, 




Eventually, a competent chief executive must conclude tenure due to obligatory 
retirement or ailing health; alternatively, resignation may occur as the executive pursues 
employment with another firm. The chief executive successor may offer strategic 
continuity resulting in desirable operational or financial sustainability. The successor may 
conversely introduce a culture of strategic and transformational change, inflicting 
comparatively more business risk upon the entity than a predecessor. As financial risk is 
borne by the entity, its stock price and accounting metric volatility is exhibited through 
financial reporting, and is detectable through ratio analysis and event studies. Since entity 
performance may vary with the acuity of leaders’ decision-making, there exists a 
contingency that a momentous operational or environmental watershed may trigger 
disruptive erosion of financial returns.  
Following a review of executive change occurring from 1980 through 1993, 
Allgood and Farrell (2000) observed, “the mean and standard deviation of the stock 
return diminish with tenure” (p. 389). These results implied that, as an executive garners 
longer tenure, stock prices exhibit less volatility and risk becomes tempered, while 
returns contemporaneously decrease due to more pervasive agency effects, regardless of 
the consistency of profitability ratios and other performance metrics. Allgood and Farrell 
also conceded that “recent research suggests that accounting measures are better 
predictors of management changes than are stock returns” (p. 390). Accordingly, it is 
more empirically comprehensive to query the prevalence of risk in the context of market 
reaction, and complement such an event study with the outcome of decision-making as 




Thus, Collins’s (2001) sample exemplifying exceptional leaders and performing 
entities provided the litmus for examination of the succession event, while Bower (2007) 
contended that deliberate succession planning directed toward a candidate selected from 
an internal coterie provided the greatest assurance of strategic continuity. Combining 
these two analyses, it is informative to reveal the results of financial performance and the 
magnitude of entity risk in the event of CEO replacement, and conduct analysis based on 
the origin of the successor—insider or outsider—to differentiate fiscal outcomes of 
decision-making. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to determine the extent of the relationship between 
executive turnover and company performance.  Substantive tests of financial risk and 
accounting performance conducted upon a specific sample of highly performing entities 
experiencing a change in leadership reveal the significance of these relationships. 
Overarchingly, this research provides an intensive study of the volatility of a firm’s 
equity, specifically changes in market value added, as well as financial risk observable 
through the beta metrics, and investor reaction observable through the Tobin’s q metric.  
It is conjectured that certain operational management behavior and decision-making in 
practice is evocative of the existence of an operational management style, discernable 
through consistency afforded by US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
and pervasive within the presentation of the entity's financial statements. The eliciting of 
such risk factors is of interest to investors, portfolio managers, employees, and executive 




consideration of variability of financial return. Further, this exposition is of significant 
interest to financial analysts seeking to measure and predict the manifestation of risk 
within the stock price or beta metric, and potentially enhances the accuracy of analysts’ 
forecasting. 
 Since samples subjected to previous scrutiny were often drawn from larger 
populations of principally US publicly-owned, exchange-listed companies, prior analysis 
is deficient of samples of US entities dichotomized by performance; thus, there exists a 
gap in the literature. Samples stratified by deciles exist, but entities achieving 
performance levels exclusively deemed exceptional have not previously been reviewed 
for effects of CEO change with respect to risk.   
Adapted from Collins’s (2001) study of exceptionally performing companies, the 
purpose of this analysis thus differs from the research inquiry of other authors with 
respect to sample. Differing samples were analyzed by Conyon and Florou (2002), who 
selected a UK sample which they documented as “[not biased] towards good performers” 
(p. 212). Clayton et al.(2005) sampled the entire range of US firms experiencing turnover 
during the 1979-1995 period, as documented in Forbes Executive Compensation Surveys 
(p. 1788). Stathopoulos, Espenlaub, and Walker (2005) stratified a sample of financial 
results of UK companies into poorly, average, and highly performing subsamples; 
however, this approach is yet to be utilized for a sample of US entities. A research 
approach to sampling applicable CEO turnover occurrences which fails to dichotomize 
entities’ polarized financial results may not prove to be generalizable to entities in highly 




subject of Collins’s sample, is the source of this research inquiry and analysis. A study 
focalized upon the relative unsystematic change in risk to which highly effective firms 
are subject due to a change in leadership may provide insight upon the implications of 
turnover for succession planning, strategic continuity, and equity valuation. Revelations 
derived from this conceptual distinction may also be utilized to develop a strategic 
approach to succession planning, which Bower (2007) termed as a “process [which] 
reflects the discipline with which a company is managed and its culture” (p. xi) 
ultimately intended to sustain an entity’s competitive advantage, and hence, financial 
performance. 
Conceptual Support for the Study 
Puffer and Weintrop (1991) conveyed the paramount importance of gauging 
financial performance under successive executive command:  
…agency theory suggests that an important function of the compensation 
contract is to align the interests of the manager with those of the 
shareholder’s representatives…Since the board of directors cannot observe 
all of the CEO’s actions, the board must rely on various outcomes of 
corporate performance to evaluate the CEO’s effectiveness in what is a 
complex process. Further study of this process could make sense of the 
disparate findings from past studies of the performance-turnover 
relationship and clarify the board of directors’ expectations for the CEO’s 




The performance/turnover relationship is equally worthy of examination from a 
number of other financial perspectives. Shareholder and investor expectations may be 
manifested as a result of anticipated performance or unrealized as a result of sudden 
volatility. Operational and financial risk variation resulting from strategic realignment 
may signal the need for portfolio reconstruction, or inclusion or exclusion of an entity’s 
stock given an investor’s policy statement and designated risk tolerance. Risk variation 
may also diminish the firm’s future ability to augment leverage within the capital 
structure; “increased volatility could alter the firm’s investment policy going forward via 
an increased cost of capital or by a reduction in the attractiveness of the firm’s equity as a 
medium for acquisitions or compensation” (Clayton et al., 2005, p. 1780). Increased cost 
of capital also curtails the firm’s future prospects with respect to expansion projects. 
Continuity of financial performance is also a theoretically pervasive construct underlying 
equity valuation; veracity in forecasting may be compromised in the presence of 
unpredictable returns. 
Forced CEO departures have been precipitated in practice by declining stock 
prices, indicating market participants’ evaluation of the entity’s future prospects.  Since 
“the data indicate…that turnover tends to occur when…stock returns have recently been 
negative” (Huson et al. 2001, p. 2280), incidence of executive removal is inversely 
related to stock price. Agency theory, advocating discipline in the event of 
nonperformance, is evidently applied through the actions of the entity’s principals, 





One underlying assumption of this analysis is that directors, executives, and 
shareholders prefer favorable rather than unfavorable performance. To be sure, Collins’s 
(2001) intent in commending subject firms within his composition was predicated upon 
this assumption. Cannella Jr. and Lubatkin (1993) posited that “a relationship between 
risk and outsider selection can be drawn from some of the arguments concerning return, 
as low levels of return and high levels of risk can each be interpreted as unsatisfactory 
outcomes” (p. 773). They further indicated that a single “benchmark of expected, or 
normal, performance…may lack construct validity in that [it does] not adequately capture 
directors’ perceptions of good and bad performance” (Puffer & Weintrop, as cited in 
Cannella Jr. & Lubatkin, 1993, p. 773). Thus, an established benchmark utilized to 
determine performance within the entity, such as a budget or forecast, may be the 
comparative established to determine performance; such benchmarks are typically not 
publicly available. Analysts’ forecasts or industry benchmarks are often instituted as 
proxies for established performance comparatives. The propriety of utilizing analysts’ 
forecasts as a surrogate for firms experiencing turnover was attested by Sheikholeslami, 
Wilson, and Selin (1998): “financial analysts might do better than statistical forecasting 
techniques because they might be able to integrate outside (i.e., non-time-series) 
information into the forecasting process. Often this information can indicate that the 
time-series pattern is changing” (p. 72). This precept supports the infusion of news 
announcement implications of succession events into security market prices following 




hypothesis. Thus, “CEO changes may cause operational (“real”) change in the earnings 
stream” (p. 72); it is the sensitivity to these dynamics which is sought via the research 
hypotheses presented. “To the extent the announcement of CEO change calls attention to 
the announcing firm (‘Attention Directing Hypothesis‘), it may result in reassessment of 
future performance by market analysts” (p. 72).   
Accordingly, Leibowitz (2005) indicated: “in perfectly efficient markets, all 
information would be immediately embedded in prices” (p. 33). Similarly, CEO 
succession is an important event in firm life, and the market price reflects changes in the 
value proposition of the firm’s strategy as perceived by investors; these changes are 
perceptible through the observation of a time-series of financial metrics about the 
succession event. Offering additional support for the impounding of changes in the stock 
price, Friedman and Singh (1989) concurred: “stock returns associated with successions, 
measured as deviations from the pattern of expected returns of a firm’s stock, reflect 
stockholder evaluations of a new CEO’s differential influence on the future viability of a 
firm” (p. 728).  Hence, effectively applying the concept of the efficient markets 
hypothesis, they clarified: “the movement of returns on a firm’s stock around the time of 
a succession effectively captures the response of stockholders to information about the 
event” (p. 728). However, not all publicly announced events result in appropriate 
responses of investors to equity prices; within a study of firms experiencing earnings 
restatements, Marciukaityte and Varma (2007) elicited: “industry related news does not 
have a significant effect on the market reaction to restatement announcements and on the 




some inefficiency within the market and concomitant lack of perception among market 
participants of the potential impact of news events upon equity pricing, resulting in 
overvaluation or undervaluation. Investor expertise in evaluating the potential financial 
effect of any news event somewhat delimits the market price response within the efficient 
markets context. Resultantly, an assumption applicable to this analysis is that investors 
engage in rational behavior according to their perception of the informational content of 
news events, germane to the semi-strong form of the efficient markets hypothesis and 
demonstrative of the outcome of investor decision-making. Although widely accepted as 
a valuation input variable, one of the related assumptions underlying the application of 
the metric is that returns in the future will mirror those of the past. 
Since this study uses audited financial statements of large public corporations, the 
relevant qualities of transparency and veracity of financial disclosures are assumed to be 
present in the unqualified financial statements issued within the time intervals under 
examination. Indeed, although financial disclosures of certain entities issued during the 
first decade of the 21st century have been characterized by material misstatements, there 
was an incident of restatements of financial data among the companies under study. On a 
theoretical accounting basis, this sample offers relative validity; comparatively, previous 
studies have included more material entities now defunct due to a lack of verifiability of 
obligatory financial disclosures. 
Scope and Delimitations 
The scope of this study is circumscribed by the sample of highly effective entities 




publicly traded US firms exhibiting 15 years of performance meeting or exceeding treble 
returns on the US stock market, he extolled the leadership qualities of these entities’ chief 
executives. Collins qualitatively analyzed firms experiencing a succession event within 
the time interval under study for strategic conformance or incongruity; however, he did 
not document changes in financial outcomes and risk consequent to executive succession. 
The time interval under examination for the subject firms commences in accordance with 
Collins’s initially identified interval of returns, and concludes with each entity’s publicly 
disseminated financial reporting of fiscal 2008. As certain of these entities did not 
experience a change of chief executive within the interval identified by Collins, it is 
necessary to extend the relevant range of the time-series to examine a turnover event. 
Information pertaining to any delisted company for which data could not be obtained 
throughout the continuum delineated above due to access issues subsequent to merger 
and acquisition activity is limited to data publicly available in print within qualified 
investor resources, e.g., Moody’s Industrial Manual. For this reason, an element of 
survivorship bias, or the influence of the inclusion of only firms which are currently 
going concerns, affects outcomes of this analysis to a minor extent since such 
characteristics affect only one entity within the sample.  
Within much of the literature on event studies and the examination of executive 
turnover, designation of the successor source is often delimited by examination of the 
prior enumeration of executives present in publicly disseminated news events and 
obligatory quarterly and annual financial reporting. The classification of a successor as an 




successor has been extensively documented, primarily by Shen and Cannella, Jr. (2002). 
Bower (2007) espoused that an inside outsider, or a capable successor not necessarily 
predisposed to assume the chief executive position, may offer viable candidacy due to 
diffused political loyalty within the executive hierarchy. However, such successors, upon 
examination, or for that matter, polling, are difficult to exact; such designations may be 
based on internally biased observation. Therefore, via exemplification of available data, 
the analytical technique of Shen and Cannella Jr. (2002) is used: Turnover of an 
executive under the age of 64 is considered a forced replacement, and turnover of an 
executive at the age of 64 or over is considered a retirement. The subsequent endeavors 
of the CEO upon conclusion of tenure are researched to verify this assertion. If the 
successor hailed from within the company, the new executive is considered an insider; if 
the successor was sourced externally, the new executive is considered an outsider. 
Succession planning and successor source have been determined to be of paramount 
importance with respect to strategic continuity (Gordon et al., 2000; Bower, 2007). The 
extent to which succession planning exists within each organization under scrutiny is not 
specifically examined through the course of this analysis.  
Limitations 
The primary limitation of this study is generalizability. Since firms within the 
selected sample are characterized by exceptional financial and operational performance 
within their industry or sector, the application of theoretical constructs derived herein 
may be limited by the comparability of performance among the entities within the sample 




results to firms not characterized by highly effective performance is surmised to be 
limited.  
The comparability and interpretation of financial cross-sectional analysis among 
differing entities is limited to an extent by the selection of accounting methodologies and 
the application of generally accepted accounting principles. A time-series analysis of a 
single company’s financial results may also be subject to such limitations of 
comparability due to updates in accounting principles, conscious revisions in 
methodologies, and changes in the exogenous economic environment. The presence of 
nonrecurring, extraordinary, restructuring charges in particular within a company’s 
income statement indicate a strategic revision of planned future operations; a review for 
the presence of these elements often provides qualitative support to quantitative financial 
analysis dynamics.  
Additionally, the predictive value of the beta metric, or the covariance of the 
return on the market and the return on the firm’s equity market price divided by the 
variance of the market, is limited, as it is a historical metric of the variability of returns. 
In practice, endogenous and exogenous factors impact the variability of the stock price; 
the outcome of the event study to be conducted herein may be indicative of the utility of 
beta to predict the entity’s equity risk given a change in chief executive. The utilization of 
accounting metrics which allow further interpretation and analysis of results were chosen 





An ex-post facto research design is employed to document and statistically 
analyze prior-issued financial statements and resultant metrics as a chief executive 
replacement event transpired. As the executive turnover event is typically anticipated in 
the event of a retirement, but not in other instances, dynamics due to forced replacements, 
expiration, or catastrophic illness (i.e., generally nonretirement related) prompt 
organizational consequences typically not observable prior to transpiration. Primarily, 
statistical analysis of financial event studies is conducted ex-post facto. Considering this 
type of design, “the researcher identifies events that have already occurred or conditions 
that are already present, and then collects data to investigate a possible relationship 
between these factors and subsequent characteristics” (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005, p. 232). 
Observations are limited to experiences rather than treatments (p. 232-233). 
Conditionally, the outcome of this analysis is the statistical prevalence of “characteristics 
[that] tend to be associated with certain preexisting conditions” (p. 233); statistical 
observations of existing relationships will not prove the existence of a causal relationship 
between financial performance and chief executive turnover. 
Definition of Terms 
Beta: the covariance of the return on the entity's stock price and the return on the 
market divided by the variance of the market; ultimately, a measure of volatility of the 




Contenders: executives who, “following a CEO’s dismissal…[win] the support 
and approval of the board of directors…likely to be charged with a mandate to initiate 
strategic change” (Shen & Cannella, Jr., 2002, p. 719). 
Economic Value Added: “the excess of the dollar amount of net operating profit 
after tax (NOPAT) over the dollar charge for capital (both debt and equity) obtained by 
multiplying the percentage weighted-average cost of capital (WACC)” (Cordeiro & Kent, 
Jr., 2001, p. 57). This serves as a measure of shareholder value created during the 
measurement period through the employment of financed assets to generate operating 
earnings. 
Efficient Markets Hypothesis: the hypothesis “states that market prices fully 
reflect all available information” (Xiong, 2006, p. 214); the semi-strong form, prevalent 
in US market analyses, confers that “knowledge of information does not allow investors 
to earn excess profits because prices already incorporate the information” (p. 214). 
Followers: “inside executives who are promoted to CEO positions following the 
ordinary retirements of their predecessors” (Shen & Cannella, Jr., 2002, p. 719). 
Market Value Added: “calculated as (Number of shares outstanding x Stock price) 
+ Market value of preferred stock + Market value of debt – Total capital” (Ramezani, 
Soenen, & Jung, 2002, p. 57). While the primary measurement of EVA® is the level of 
stockholder returns generated from internal sources, the primary measurement of MVA is 
the level of stockholder and debtholder returns generated from external sources, 
predicated by changes in market valuation. MVA is resultantly a measure of the market 




Outsiders: executives who “come to new CEO positions from other 
organizations” (Shen & Cannella, Jr., 2002, p. 719). 
Return on Assets: accounting net income divided by total assets; a measure of 
asset utilization undertaken by the firm. 
Tobin’s q: total assets minus the book value of common equity plus the market 
value of common equity divided by total assets (Marciukaityte & Varma, 2007, p. 18). 
Volatility: “characteristic of security…to rise or fall sharply in price within a 
short-term period” (Downes & Goodman, 1995, p. 647). Beta encapsulates the volatility 
of the stock price of the entity relative to the stock market. 
Hypotheses 
Seven hypotheses are tested. Specifically,  
Hypothesis 1 entails the measurement of CEO replacement rate within Collins’s 
sample, an indicator of the stability of firms within the sample: 
There is a significant difference in the rate of CEO change evident in the time-
series analysis of the entities within Collins’s sample for the period t=15, as compared to 
a multiyear sample within the literature spanning a time frame representative of Collins’s 
entities. 
A comparison of the rate of CEO turnover of the firms in Collins’s (2001) study is 
compared to the analysis of Comte and Mihal (1990), which is a comprehensive study of 
turnover frequency which appropriately aligns with the time-series under investigation. 
As Defond and Hung (2004) defined the “[classification] of a firm-year as a turnover year 




definitional basis is applied to events analyzed within the study. Since “large 
organizations tend to choose inside successors” (Friedman & Singh, 1989, p. 728), the 
expected outcome of a statistical significance test of Collins’s (2001) sample is that most 
successors are insiders and thus, there is limited stockholder reaction to CEO change, as a 
result; see also Hypothesis 2. 
Hypothesis 2 entails the measurement of stockholder reaction to CEO change, 
intrafirm: 
There is a significant stockholder reaction to CEO change evident in the time-
series analysis of the Tobin’s q metric for entities within Collins’s sample for the period 
t-2 and the period t+3, where t represents the year of CEO change. 
It is expected that a significant statistical difference in the time-series of the 
Tobin’s q metric is discernable if stockholder perception of a change in chief executive 
officer precipitates a forward-looking negative financial impact.  
Hypothesis 3 entails the measurement of financial market risk relative to CEO 
change, intrafirm, as a proxy for volatility:  
There is a significant change in the magnitude of financial risk relative to CEO 
change evident in the time-series analysis of beta for entities within Collins’s sample for 
the period t-2 and the period t+3, where t represents the year of CEO change. 
Defond and Hung (2004) measured the “extent to which stock prices are likely to 
impound information about firm performance (as opposed to noise)…the propensity for 
stock prices in a country to move in the same direction—termed synchronicity” (p. 280). 




hypothesis informational infusion of equities and is, in effect, a proxy for the reliance of 
risk calculated from historical prices, or beta, within a relevant market. Indeed, it must be 
predicated that the informational power of beta to portend an entity’s equity value is 
reliant upon and limited by the assumption that past experience is an indicator of future 
returns. To the extent that strategic transformation is present, presumably, stock prices 
will respond dynamically to the perception of risk ascertained by market participants.  
Since “the firm’s market price aggregates signals received by the market and the 
firm’s accounting system” (Dutta & Richelstein, 2005, p. 1071), the extent of sensitivity 
to a change in stratagem perceptible through market price kinetics may be proxied 
through an analysis of financial fundamentals. However, “the market sometimes 
misinterprets or overreacts to earnings and disclosure announcements; therefore 
[executives] work hard to meet market expectations so as not to raise investor suspicions 
or doubts about their firms’ underlying strength” (Graham et al., 2005, p. 4). 
“In high beta firms, stock price movements are strongly associated with economy-
wide influences such as economic cycles, interest rates, and government policies. 
Management exerts little or no control on these macroeconomic variables” (Gray & 
Cannella, Jr., 1997, p. 523).  The extent to which the implications of transformational 
strategy materialize into changes in market risk and pricing of equity is tested through 
this hypothesis.  
Friedman and Singh (1989) formulated a hypothesis regarding the change in 




more positive the stock market reaction to a CEO succession” (p. 723). The outcome of 
the hypothesis test relative to Collins’s (2001) sample of entities yields a similar result. 
Hypothesis 4 entails the measurement of differences in accounting ratio analysis 
(return on assets) relative to CEO change, intrafirm, as a proxy for execution of strategic 
change: 
There is a significant change in the magnitude of accounting performance relative 
to CEO change evident in the time-series analysis of return on assets, or ROA, for entities 
within Collins’s sample for the period t-2 and the period t+3, where t represents the year 
of CEO change. 
Hypothesis 5 entails the measurement of differences in accounting performance 
analysis (economic value added) relative to CEO change, intrafirm, as a proxy for 
execution of strategic change: 
There is a significant change in the magnitude of accounting performance relative 
to CEO change evident in the time-series analysis of economic value added, EVA®, for 
entities within Collins’s sample for the period t-2 and the period t+3, where t represents 
the year of CEO change. 
Hypothesis 6, represented through the measurement of differences in accounting 
ratio analysis (market value added) relative to CEO change, intrafirm, as a proxy for 
increases in stockholder value, is entailed thus: 
There is a significant change in the magnitude of accounting performance relative 




entities within Collins’s sample for the period t-2 and the period t+3, where t represents 
the year of CEO change. 
With respect to managerial incentives awarded upon successful execution of 
stratagem under the aegis of the agency relationship and existing informational 
asymmetry, “optimal incentive provisions must combine ‘forward-looking’ market 
information with ‘backward-looking’ accounting information…optimal performance 
measures can be expressed as a weighted average of economic value added (residual 
income) and market value added” (Dutta & Richelstein, 2005, p. 1069). The utilization of 
multiple accounting-based metrics demonstrates a comprehensive approach to evaluation 
of dynamic and strategic outcomes. 
Hypothesis 7 entails measurement of interactions between variables relative to 
CEO change: 
There are significant interactions between the variables listed above relative to 
CEO change evident in a time-series analysis of terms for entities within Collins’s sample 
for the period t-2 and the period t+3, where t represents the year of CEO change. 
Instruments chosen reflect those utilized in prior research, particularly with 
respect to applicable intervals for time-series event studies, as external validity and tests 
of robustness have been performed previously (Freidman & Singh, 1989; Defond & 
Hung, 2004).  
As Doran (2000) acceded, “studies where scrutiny of earnings divergence (e.g., 
forecast error, earnings performance, forecast bias, etc.) is of primary importance should 




representations of relevant data distribution are presented as supporting evidential matter 
for conjectures purported herein. 
Significance of the Study 
This research endeavor promotes positive social change through enhanced 
investor education. As the propriety of reaction to changes in market value added and risk 
are revealed, investors may align their market behavior and equity holdings with 
expectations of continued investment returns as leadership succession transpires.  
Investors may thus protect their assets more effectively and adjust their portfolios 
according to the outcomes of informed risk analysis. As the relationship between 
leadership change and equity return variability among highly performing firms is 
understood, society as a whole may more effectively assess the basis of financial resource 
allocations. 
 As a primary impetus for this study is the observation of stockholder reaction and 
market value fluctuations, it is informative to conduct a comparison of dynamics in 
accounting metrics which are contemporaneous to the actions of investors. The 
interpretation of these statistical outcomes may be indicative of or dispute the application 
of rational investor decision-making. “Collective assessments made by the investment 
community, a salient constituency for corporate managers, can be measured by 
examining how stock prices move in response to announcements of CEO changes” 
(Friedman & Singh, 1989, p. 719). However, the extent to which stockholder reaction is 
appropriate may be demonstrated by the observation of financial outcomes, which 




but by financial reporting summarization through the observation of ratio analysis. “The 
market reacts to how well, compared to their predecessors, new CEOs are suited for the 
demands of their roles, and to the potential for disruption in organizational performance 
attending leadership transitions” (p. 719). The investor reaction to chief executive change 
and other news events, as espoused through the efficient markets hypothesis, generally 
may or may not be appropriate given their investment risk and return objective. An 
indication of potential investor loss sensitizes market participants’ risk perception. 
Investor sensitivity to risk dynamics may or may not be appropriate in the event of CEO 
replacement. Hence, investor response to CEO change through observation of financial 
metrics, and the alignment of investor response to accounting performance of highly 
performing firms, are analyzed.  
Depending on the significance of the volatility, “a forced turnover increases a 
firm’s hurdle rate by [two] percentage points, which could change the optimal/accept 
reject decision for a given project” (Clayton et al., 2005, p. 1779). Given this salient level 
of sensitivity, upcoming or in-progress strategic initiatives may have to be re-evaluated 
for financial feasibility. To this end, statistical tests of the beta metric, ultimately used in 
the derivation of the weighted average cost of capital applied to project evaluation for 
public firms, may provide further validity to the utilization or adjustment of this risk 
factor in the practice of financial analysis. Inquiry into the risk element of CEO turnover 
further clarifies investor perception of forced personnel change in the case of exceptional 




transparency, positive social change is realized as investors are able to fully discern the 
financial implications of chief executive turnover and adjust market reaction accordingly. 
Statistical outcomes of this analysis may potentially guide newly appointed 
executives to initially align strategic objectives with the current direction of the firm, in 
the event of outstanding performance. Shen and Cannella Jr. (2002) offered the following 
caveats: “we advise newly appointed outsider CEOs to be prudent when making 
executive replacement decisions and to strive for some executive leadership stability in 
their firms…boards may also need to consider giving outside successors more time to 
smooth the transition” (p. 730). An analytical outcome which indicates positive 
stockholder reaction throughout the transition period and maintenance of accounting 
metrics subsequent to executive change supports the advisement of Shen and Cannella, 
Jr. 
Acknowledging the social change impact, there is also a demonstration of the 
application of agency theory. “What has become clear is that troubled companies and 
concerned boards are no longer waiting around to replace poor or marginal 
performers...[since] a convergence of economic, historical, and political forces has 
produced a unique, new business climate” (Korn, 1985, p. 30). Thus, principals must not 
be reticent to address the actions of chief executive agents who do not enable and 
materialize the strategic plans of their firms. 
This study lends further validity to financial assessment techniques which serve to 
facilitate the institution of “governance mechanisms that will provide for the most 




appropriately structure the organization” (Coles, McWilliams, & Sen, 2001, p. 24). 
Particularly, utilization of ratio analyses which facilitate the discernment of agency 
effects among entities experiencing CEO turnover will reveal the degree of executive 
alignment with firm performance hence affecting positive social change, both 
endogenously relative to the organization and exogenously relative to financial market 
volatility. 
Summary 
Although analyses of the financial risk and return implications resulting from 
executive change have been previously studied, a gap in the literature exists for 
implications given exceptionally performing firms experiencing executive succession 
events. Additionally, Collins’s (2001) endeavor provided a formidable exploration of 
highly performing entities as well as a robust examination of leadership characteristics of 
prominent and successful executives. However, his analysis is deficient of observation of 
the financial risk and return outcomes given executive turnover, and may be improved 
through additional analysis which features indicators of market declines and corrections 
experienced in fiscal 2008.   
The statistical analysis impacting an array of accounting and financial metrics in 
the event of executive change is tested within this study. Potential limitations include 
generalizability to poorly performing entities, inter-industry comparability of accounting 
metrics among entities, and potential misstatements of financial data by a firm despite 




Ultimately, favorable social impact may be realized as investors refrain from 
irrational selling (or purchasing) reactions to news events of chief executive turnover. 
Preservation or imperilment of invested shareholder capital affected by the turnover event 
will serve as an indicator of the entity’s strategic continuity.  If robust statistical results 
are derived which indicate that internally-sourced followers provide strategic continuity 
in the event of succession, the propriety of chief executive succession planning 
characterized by internal candidate sourcing for highly performing firms may be 
supported by this analysis.  
Correspondingly, chapter 2 includes a review of relevant literature. Chapter 3 
contains an explanation of the research methodology utilized in this analysis. Chapter 4 
contains the results of data analysis. Chapter 5 contains a summarization of the outcomes 
of the research endeavor, including recommendations for future research, as well as 








Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
Financial event studies are “based on a comparison of the variability of equity 
price changes before and after the event to determine the volatility impact of the event” 
(Clayton et al., 2005, p. 1793). In garnering evidence to develop hypotheses for an ex-
post facto research study of highly performing firms, an observation regarding the 
population from which samples of prior studies are derived is required. As field literature 
is bereft of a sample of entities characterized solely by exceptional financial results in the 
presence of CEO turnover, “the consequences of turnover for equity volatility have been 
previously unexplored” (p. 1780) for this characteristic sample in context. Chang and 
Wong (2005) echoed this observation: “existing empirical studies focus primarily on 
corporate control exercised by private shareholders in U.S. and Japanese publicly listed 
companies” (p. 2). In prior research, these experiments were sampled from entities 
representing the entire spectrum of financial performance levels. 
Collins (2001) identified a sample of entities exemplifying exceptional financial 
performance through an extensive time-series review of US market-listed firms. 
However, researchers contributing to his analysis did not test the interaction of beta nor 
other factors as sources of risk under the premise of executive replacements among the 
entities researched; the contributors merely documented the sample entities’ financial 
performance for a 15 year time-series interval. Herein, an investigation of literature is 




affecting firms within Collins’ specific sample, in order to develop a framework of 
evaluation for risk orientation under circumstances of leadership succession.  
Although Cannella, Jr. and Lubatkin (1993) revealed that “succession events are 
generally smooth and predictable transitions that imply few changes in strategy” (p. 768) 
many prior analyses relating leadership change to equity risk do not yield consistent 
results which support their assertion.  However, succession events generally “have 
provided a means for assessing the efficacy of leaders in shaping organizational fortunes 
by demarcating areas of stewardship” (Friedman & Singh, 1993, p. 718). Perpetuating 
strategic intent of the predecessor theoretically should offer continuity of acceptable 
operating results, ceteris paribus. To the extent that market participants are appropriately 
sensitive to potential risk volatility at the nascence of an executive’s term, abnormal 
returns may temporarily accrue to or detract from shareholder value. The identification of 
such opportunities is of interest to institutional and private investors alike. 
An integral approach used in the compilation of research for the review was the 
requirement of primarily quantitative data indicating frequency of turnover among firms 
given diminished performance. Essentially, many different financial and accounting 
metrics are employed in academic research as litmus for determining significant changes 
in financial performance; often executives are compensated and incentivized based on 
changes in the selected metrics. Given the dichotomy of outcomes present within the 
results of prior studies, it is critical to note that similar variability of results may emerge 
from an empirical analysis of Collins’s (2001) sample. This literature review thus serves 




incidences of external validity. As Collins commented extensively on the qualitative 
personal characteristics of the leaders of the firms within his designated sample, research 
addressing qualitative aspects of CEO type and characteristic are also presented.  
The chapter is organized into four segments. Certain aspects of leadership change 
and selection greatly influence financial outcomes and command study relevant to this 
analysis. Within motivations for executive change, aspects of entity ownership and 
capital structure, operational performance, and external influence that affect executive 
turnover are enumerated.  Within differing successions of executive change, the sources 
of replacement personnel as well as the preparation methods for succession which 
influence financial outcomes are outlined. Within consequences of executive change, 
agency effects, political and director influence, and governance dynamics which affect 
financial outcomes are reviewed. Within financial performance and risk indicators of 
executive change, the risk environment including the firm’s exposure to external and 
internal risk, as well as the suitability of finance and accounting performance 
benchmarks, are linked to executive change events, as prior researchers (e.g., Clayton et 
al, 2005; Shen and Cannella, Jr., 2002)  have entailed. Qualitative aspects of the firm and 
its executive influence the incidence of CEO replacement are also appraised; although 
certain of these qualitative aspects are not hypothetically tested within this body of 
research, reviews of the tested outcomes of other authors which may lend qualitative 
explanation to emergent outcomes of data analysis herein are included.  
To obtain relevant literature for inclusion, a keyword search was conducted for 




were discovered, references within those bodies of research were analyzed for content; 
the content of the original articles most relevant to the subject matter was then sourced 
from an online academic journal database. Collins’s (2001) volume served as the sample 
source; Bower’s (2007) more recent exposition was utilized as an updated volume 
providing recent reflections and statistics on sources of successors, which complements 
and updates the prior research of  Cannella, Jr. and Lubatkin (1993), as well as other 
researchers. 
Motivations for Executive Change 
The incidence of CEO turnover has been extensively acknowledged within 
analyses of time-series samples throughout research literature. “CEO succession events 
are of central concern in organization theory. They are universal—if organizations 
survive long enough, they must experience succession” (Freidman & Singh, 1989, p. 
718). Despite the realization that executive change is inevitable, many firms do not give 
adequate priority to succession planning. Bower (2007) summarized the results of an 
internet poll through which 60 % of human resource managers acknowledged that there 
was no “CEO succession plan in place” within their firm (p. 14). Succession events are 
ordinarily precipitated by “resignations for ‘early retirement,’ for policy differences, for 
differences in style and strategy, resignations amid reports of continuing problems, 
losses, and poor or lackluster performance” (Korn, 1985, p. 30). The impetus for turnover 





Ownership and Firm Size Influences upon Executive Change 
Average annual CEO turnover varies by size of firm and more prominently, 
organizational form. The strength of the governance framework unique to the 
geographical location and ownership structure of firms may influence rates of CEO 
turnover among entities. Comte and Mihal (1990) indicated that within the second half of 
a US entity sample dated 1945-1984, a 37 % increase in CEO turnover was present (p. 
48), documenting greater frequency of replacement incidence in more recent decades. 
Increasingly, this evidence specifies that CEO replacement rates, particularly forced 
replacement rates, are comparatively more prevalent among US firms in recent decades. 
In a recent study, Defond and Hung (2004) affirmed: 
 ...recent research asserts that an essential feature of good corporate governance is 
strong investor protection, where investor protection is defined as the extent of the 
laws that protect investors’ rights and the strength of the legal institutions that 
facilitate law enforcement...strong law enforcement institutions significantly 
improve the association between CEO turnover and poor performance, whereas 
extensive investor protection laws do not. (pp. 269-270)   
Accordingly, the scope of relevant mechanisms subjecting executive officers to 
reprisal in the event of deficient performance is augmented to include legal obligations, 
particularly in the context of ethical transgressions. Within environments where 
corruption and expropriation risks influence financial outcomes, an executive has 
“limited ability to affect firm performance” (Defond & Hung, 2004, p. 275). Thus, 




dissuade investor confidence in less stringently controlled capital markets, and reflect the 
risk perception of market participants. Mere CEO change portends limited prospects in 
transformation of deficient governance, given an environment with minimally effective 
law enforcement. “Because good corporate governance reduces the risk of managers 
expropriating shareholder wealth (through theft, shirking, or simple mismanagement), 
shareholders have greater confidence investing in such markets” (p. 276). To safeguard 
stakeholders’ interests, effective executive succession planning must be predicated by 
qualification, and not usurped through ancestral incumbency or “nepotism” (p. 277). 
When tested empirically, Defond and Hung (2004) disclosed that “among countries with 
strong investor protection, CEO turnover decisions are likely to rely more on stock return 
when stock prices are relatively more informative regarding firm performance” (p.278). 
This suggests that the perception of a more robust governance structure among market 
participants elicits investor confidence by exhibiting greater transparency of strategy and 
results. 
Operational Performance-Dependent Executive Change 
Replacement of a CEO is frequently precipitated by an entity’s deficient 
operational performance. “Boards of directors are more assertive of their prerogative of 
removing CEOs when there is evidence of ineffective management” (Friedman & Singh, 
1989, p. 738).  Control mechanisms supported through the organizational structure of an 
entity exist to ensure the removal of executives that do not perform well. Directors and 
executives remaining in the organization subsequent to CEO turnover and subsequently 




challenges from other stakeholders. Huson et al.(2001) asserted: “stockholders rely on 
internal and external monitoring mechanisms to help resolve agency problems that arise 
from the separation of ownership and control in modern corporations” (p. 2265).  
As Chang and Wong (2005) acknowledged, “for CEO turnover to be an effective 
corporate control event, CEOs need to be removed in poorly perform[ing] enterprises, 
and performance has to improve following their turnover” (p. 8). Paradoxically, these 
authors also evidenced that “forced turnovers are not followed by a significant reduction 
in the percentage of enterprises experiencing negative earnings” (p. 9). Without a 
differentiable change in the diminished performance of an entity, CEO replacement may 
not be worthwhile or result in intended organizational and financial changes, while 
exposing investors to increased financial risk, observed through changes in financial 
metrics pre and post turnover. 
Further, Cannella Jr. and Lubatkin (1993) hypothesized that “when an outgoing 
CEO has influence with directors, or when directors have committed to an heir apparent 
[in a relay succession], performance will be decoupled from the selection decision” (p. 
764). Influence and prior performance are integral factors in the consideration of a 
replacement; given the prevalence of exceptional performance, an influential candidate 
within the sphere of the outgoing CEO has a greater probability of being selected for 
succession. In support of this observation, Comte and Mihal (1993) offered the following 
optimal cyclic succession: “the founding or central leader is eventually replaced by 
prepared executives who are chosen at an age that allows them ten years at the helm and 




performance and acceptable positioning will edify board choice and establish an intended 
relay succession which perpetuates current strategic policy. To this Nagar (2004) added:  
…the firm decides what responsibilities to delegate to the employee, keeping in 
mind the feasible set of performance measures on which incentive contracts can 
be written to ensure that the firm can hire the right person for the job (adverse 
selection), and this person works hard after being hired (moral hazard). (p. 317) 
Waldman, Ramirez, House, and Puranam (2001) confirmed the existence of a 
relationship between executive charisma and performance under conditions of 
uncertainty. Utilizing strategic management theory as a basis, Waldman et al. queried the 
“leadership characteristics” of “transactional leadership” and “charismatic leadership” (p. 
134). While transactional leadership is instituted via the assimilation of the current 
structure and personnel, establishment of corrective action, and consequent dissemination 
of rewards, charismatic leadership is instituted on a behavioral basis, engaging the regard 
and loyalty of subordinates to incite motivation and thus strategic action among them, 
deemed “collective cohesion” (p. 135), through the development of interpersonal 
relationships. In times of environmental turbulence, Waldman et al. hypothesized that 
“CEO charismatic leadership will be highly related to an organization’s performance 
when the organization’s environment is perceived as uncertain and volatile” (p. 136). 
However, Waldman et al. alternatively documented a highly positive relationship 
between better performance results in the presence of uncertainty and charismatic 




effect upon organizational cohesiveness, a salient component in achieving strategic 
outcomes and profitability given the prevalence of environmental turbulence (p. 140). 
Externally Precipitated Executive Change 
Insightfully, Lee and Milne (1988) conveyed the erosion of competitive 
manufacturing among US firms: “the efforts of major corporations were devoted to 
generating earnings through mergers and acquisitions, or through lucrative financing 
arrangements in debt markets. This trend prevented firms from recognizing the 
importance of developing new products and processes” (p. 26). By stifling the potential 
enhancement of core competencies through innovation, the leadership incentive to realize 
earnings solely through merger and acquisition activity is derived from the myopic 
pursuit of unsustainable extraordinary events. “When there is no long-term consistency in 
developing and maintaining a company’s philosophy, it is impossible to justify making 
decisions on any basis other than financial considerations” (p. 26). Accordingly, leaders 
employing an extensive growth by acquisition strategy must eventually tend to further 
development of the conglomerated entity, as the sustainability of their own strategic 
success is challenged as the pool of potential takeover candidates narrows. In the event of 
CEO replacement following a sustained period of acquisition activity, often the 
successor’s greatest challenge is the identification of synergies pertinent to varied 
divisions, particularly if such development was not addressed by the predecessor. If 
investors perceive such CEO replacement as an impediment to realizing expected returns, 





Faleye (2004) explored the “control mechanism for addressing the agency 
problems of excessive corporate liquidity” (p. 2041). If the entity experiences a dearth of 
positive net present value investment opportunities, this deficiency may resultantly serve 
as an indicative antecedent of obligatory strategic change for the benefit of shareholders. 
As excess cash is often an attractive characteristic of takeover targets, elevated corporate 
liquidity augmented by lack of strategic intent further enhances potential opportunity for 
an external strategic change agent to transform the targeted entity.   
The issuance of new equity or recapitalization efforts suffuses a signaling effect 
upon the market; investors construe the entity’s investment prospects as limited once new 
capital is sought to complement the existing capital structure. “As a result,” Hillier, Linn, 
and McColgan (2005) espoused: “boards of firms that require additional outside capital 
are likely to be more responsive to outside calls for the removal of top management in 
return for implicit promises of new funding” (p. 516). Thus, the absence of profitable 
investment opportunities from the recapitalization perspective may also precipitate a 
stakeholder-desired change in leadership as a consequence of this perception. In context, 
this may be demonstrated through a lack or reinvestment, decreasing economic value 
added, and decreasing return on assets over time. Myopic behavior may result from the 
curtailment of necessary investment required to maximize longer term growth and 
profitability, at the sacrifice of contemporaneous profitability.  
Finkelstein and Hambrick (as cited in Gray & Cannella Jr., 1997, p. 518), 
purported that “the most consistent conclusion in the literature is that firm size accounts 




performance accounts for very little.” Given this observation, it may be conjectured that a 
higher level of compensation is implicitly relative to agency risk due to the size of the 
firm. Higher levels of compensation have also been associated with greater levels of 
entrenchment. In response, Gray and Cannella, Jr. (1997) also observed:  
Shareholders manage risk through portfolio diversification. 
Executives, however, do not have this option…[they] cannot diversify 
their risk because of their close association with the firm. An executive 
can only hold a single job, and is unlikely to be risk-neutral with respect to 
that job…fixed components [of income] help protect executives from 
factors beyond their control, such as poor ex poste outcomes from 
strategies that, a priori, appeared promising…firm risk affects personal 
risk of the executive when compensation is contingent upon firm-level 
outcomes such as profitability or stock price movements. (p. 518-520)  
 
As previously noted, a strategy of growth through continuous acquisition, even in 
the context of diversification, is not indefinitely sustainable. Since the acquisition of 
capital required to pursue such a strategy may eventually be required to be sourced 
externally, a CEO endeavoring to mitigate personal income risk through entity 
diversification may elicit negative shareholder response, ironically affecting the 
realization of executive remuneration through options and decreasing potential wealth. 




A fundamental principle of agency theory is an acknowledgement 
of the propensity of executives to engage in behavior inconsistent with 
shareholders’ interests, particularly when the interests of these two parties 
diverge. The board of directors serves as a protective mechanism to ensure 
that managers are attentive of shareholders’ interest in maximizing the 
value of the firm. (p. 8)  
 
Offering clarification of the effects of managerial ownership upon the agency 
relationship, Dahya et al. (1998) summarized the observations of Denis, Denis, and Sarin 
(as cited in Dahya et al., 1998) by ascertaining: “share ownership levels in excess of 1 
percent led to managerial entrenchment in US firms” (p. 1105). These researchers also 
documented the presence of abnormal returns and post-earnings-announcement drift 
associated with forced turnover; “results suggest that there is a statistically significant 
difference in the pre-announcement period abnormal returns for non-routine departures of 
executives who own less than 1% (abnormal return = -2.19%)” (p. 1107). Such results are 
indicative of the significance of the turnover event, and potential risk resultantly borne by 
the firm’s shareholders. Notably, subsequent anticipated improvement may not 
materialize despite a requisite change of command. “Non-routine top executive 
departures are associated with a further deterioration in firm performance which is more 
pronounced in firms where the departing top executive owned a substantial equity stake 
in the firm” (p. 1110). Successor performance levels are commonly dependent upon the 




Cannella Jr. and Lubatkin (1993) reflected: “two performance-related factors to 
influence the succession decision: risk, or the uncertainty associated with a firm’s income 
stream, and return” (p. 764). Acknowledgement that these factors were likely to affect 
turnover correlated with findings of previous studies; however, an emergent underlying 
assertion predicated by Cannella Jr. and Lubatkin is the view that the CEO is not 
responsible for all decision-making. “Powerful interests in a firm are able to divert blame 
for poor performance onto the less powerful” (p. 766); as the senior executive team 
composition within a firm is considerably influenced through reassignment of culpability 
for suboptimal performance from the CEO to direct reports, the political environment 
may noticeably deteriorate, giving rise to dissention and breaches of loyalty. 
 “External factors such as environmental volatility, resource scarcity, and 
financial risk, and internal factors such as characteristics of the board of directors…may 
have important effects on the decision to remove the CEO and who will replace him or 
her” (Comte & Mihal, 1990, p. 47).  A leader significantly challenged by the strategic 
management of all contemporaneous aspects affecting the entity will often be 
overwhelmed if supported by inadequate managers and directors. Friedman and Singh 
(1989) claimed: “the rational adaptation view of organizational change implies that CEO 
succession is one way organizations can intentionally align resources to better suit 
changing environmental demands” (p. 719). Accordingly, contextual assumptions are that 
the succeeding CEO affords a degree of omnipotence, or “abundant discretion” (p. 720), 
and that the “most appropriate person for the role so defined [is] then chosen as the new 




positive organizational change is heightened. However, “CEO succession is a change 
that, in itself or as an indication of a more fundamental underlying structural shift, is 
substantial enough to result in a deleterious misalignment with a firm’s environment” (p. 
721). Thus, it is integral that the firm’s economic and environmental moats are 
formidably established to ensure sustainability of strategic intent and to mitigate the risk 
of exogenous threats, despite the replacement of the top executive position. 
Gordon et al. (2000) surmised a relationship between “industry turbulence and 
CEO turnover, as precursors to strategic reorientation” (p. 911). As Gordon et al. also 
indicated that “industry turbulence conditions managers’ external attributions for 
negative financial performance in influencing strategic reorientation” (p. 911), executives 
often attempt to fundamentally shift culpability for lackluster performance to exogenous 
origins. Hence, poor operational performance is often deemed a culmination of strategic 
turbulence, a “phenomenon…[which is] pervasive, frame-breaking, or difficult to 
predict” and concomitantly influences the prevalence of CEO replacement. As such, 
deficient performance may reveal the presence of strategic turbulence, given the presence 
of a weak governance structure and action inspired by moral turpitude. The nascence of 
corporate change may be elicited by “strategic commitment and power 
distributions…external stakeholder expectations…industry discontinuities…legal, 
political, or technical conditions that affect the basis of competition” (p. 914). The 
pervasiveness of these circumstances will affect financial performance to varying 
degrees. “Organizational change becomes predicated on the dialectic tension between the 




any industry or economic dynamic which precipitates organizational response, a 
“strategic reorientation” (p. 915) typically occurs; the organization and its leadership 
seeks to establish “rules and routines [to] dominate logic and reduce uncertainty” (p. 
915). In response, operational stability endures for a period of time, correspondingly 
portending future financial stability. 
Shen and Cho (2005) assimilated a “theoretical framework of involuntary 
executive turnover…paying close attention to the environmental and organizational 
context executives face” (p. 843). Concordant to prior research, particularly that of 
Gordon, et al., (2000), Shen and Cho (2005) conciliated the emergence of turbulent entity 
circumstances which accompany forced ousting of top executives, by indicating the level 
of “high-discretion contexts” present within the company (p. 844). An organization 
affording the top executive high latitude of objectives allows for “freedom managers have 
to pursue personal objectives” whereas, an organization affording the top executive 
latitude of actions allows for a “range of strategic options available to managers as they 
strive to bring about organizational outcomes demanded by stakeholders” (p. 844).  
Constraints and parameters tangential to organizational objectives must be recognized 
while developing tactics to address strategic goals, otherwise adverse operational effects 
may ensue; for instance, achievement of strategic objectives may be thwarted by a 
company’s inability to raise adequate capital to support a novel venture.  
Correspondingly, the latitude of action may be low, while the latitude of objectives may 
be high. “Latitude of objectives addresses the performance pressure faced by managers, 




as they strive to bring about the performance demanded by stakeholders” (p. 846). These 
authors also conjectured that in an environment characterized by low latitude of 
objectives and actions, the probability of executive change is higher than differing 
counterparts, as “managers in this scenario face strong performance pressures” (pp. 847-
848). Further, in organizations in which there is high latitude of action, and the CEO has 
been particularly responsive, replacement of a CEO by an outsider may prove to be more 
volatile or detrimental from an operational performance perspective. Since there is little 
strategic change to be garnered by an executive within a low latitude of actions 
environment, as processes drive action, outsider replacement is theorized to not affect the 
entity’s performance and risk as adversely as a comparable replacement within an 
environment exhibiting high latitude of actions. “Because of their high latitude of actions, 
managers in this context understand that their decisions have significant impacts on 
organizational performance, which, in turn, affects their reputations and values in the 
external managerial labor market” (p. 850). 
 
Differing Successions of Executive Change 
Successors, Followers, Contenders—and Outsiders 
Executive turnover is manifested through three distinct scenarios, as posited by 
Shen and Cannella Jr. (2002). Successors may be followers, whose “firm-specific 
knowledge and the relatively low risk of adverse selection they pose can help reduce the 
disruption of CEO succession” (p. 720); contenders, whose “firm-specific knowledge, 
different strategic perspectives, and supportive directors and executives…can not only 




to formulate and implement appropriate strategic changes in a timely manner” (p. 720); 
or outsiders, whose “fresh perspectives and...ability to initiate strategic change” (p. 720) 
have the potential to result in auspicious and prompt transformation of the entity. Based 
on successor familiarity with the entity, turnover may result in enhanced, sustained, or 
erosive operational performance. If the candidate is deficient in “firm-specific 
knowledge” (p. 720) in initiating corporate transformation, presumably, the lack of 
intimacy and continuity typically augments financial risk to the firm. “In the eyes of 
many, good performance implies executive competence” (Cannella Jr., & Hambrick, 
1993, p. 738); the competence of an outsider selected to assume the position of CEO is 
difficult to ascertain if no prior experience exists on record, particularly if the successor 
hails from a different commercial sector. Despite the fact that the successor may engage 
in decision making which ameliorates financial results, risk and volatility may be more 
pronounced; Cannella Jr. and Lubatkin (1993) revealed that “as the firm’s level of 
unsystematic risk increases, so does the likelihood of outsider selection [of a new CEO]” 
(p. 784). Stability and sustenance of strategy is increased when turnover is avoided; 
however, whether the turnover outcome is necessarily low risk and high return is 
contingent upon the CEO’s experience level and whether the replacement is a follower, 
contender, or outsider. This observation can be tested for differing performance levels 
within selected samples. 
Upon contemplating executive departures Young (1998) revealed the following: 
“while senior executives may be pushed when firm performance declines, they may also 




However, Young acknowledged the incidence of such an event to be less likely given the 
prevalence of significant managerial ownership, mirroring the assertions of Friedman and 
Singh (1989) and Dahya et al. (1998). Young (1998) also contended that performance 
declines subsequent to CEO resignation may be the result of “big-bath accounting 
choices by the incoming CEO” (p.1122).  
However, postsuccession senior executive turnover, or the replacement of senior 
executives with the intent of contributing to strategic change, often occurs following an 
interval of diminished performance. Comte and Mihal (2001) documented: “firms 
experiencing performance problems may tend to choose outside successors, whereas 
firms with good performance would tend to choose insiders” (p. 50). These authors 
indicated in a study of Fortune 500 firms from 1945-1984 that 23% of turnover was 
attributable to substandard performance; these results were not statistically significant, 
however. “Further, the succession context may even significantly moderate the impact of 
senior executive turnover attributable to dismissal on firm operational performance” 
(Shen & Cannella Jr., 2002, p. 721). Hillier et al.(2005) discovered additional evidence of 
turnover and outsider replacement under the pretext of diminished financial performance 
among UK firms sampled; “outside CEO succession is more likely following poor stock 
price performance and forced CEO turnover” (p. 530). Notably, stock price performance, 
or the perception of value placed upon the entity by external market participants is a 
driver of turnover frequency; however, the conjecture that poor financial (accounting) 
performance precipitates a stock market response resulting in turnover has also been 




Radical personnel and political dynamics are less likely to affect firm 
performance outcomes in the event of a follower succession, as the “follower successors 
are usually committed to the retired CEOs' strategies” (Shen & Cannella Jr., 2002, p. 
721); thus, a contender’s information asymmetry and informed appraisal of the entity’s 
status quo often results in optimal “restructuring…to suit their new strategies” (p. 722) 
when required. As Korn (1985) provided statistics on insider promotions through 
recounting of survey results, “80 percent of executives are, and will continue to be, 
promoted from within” (p. 32), it is interesting to note that Bower’s (2007) more recent 
survey revealed that a mere 40 % of entities practice formal succession planning. 
Reticence to practice formalized succession planning theoretically bodes additional risk 
for the firm. Volatility may be diminished by an heir apparent organizational succession, 
as shareholders perceive continuous outcomes with alacrity; in contrast, in the event an 
inside successor’s intimacy with firm operations is unknown, shareholders may perceive 
the decreased level of a successor’s familiarity as contributing to organizational and 
operational upheaval, which in turn may precipitate equity volatility. Dahya et al. (1998) 
delineated that “governance variables” critical to seamless succession included 
“potentially important determinants in the strategic management literature: whether 
replacement executives can be appointed easily (whether the firm has a formal succession 
plan in place)…characteristics of the industry… remuneration and value of non-
pecuniary benefits to senior management” (p. 1096).  
Shareholder perception is influenced by CEO turnover precipitated by ad hoc 




negative reactions, regardless of the performance context” (Freidman & Singh, 1993, p. 
739).  As Bower (2007) noted the surprising dearth of succession planning among 
prominent public entities, investors thus appear to respond appropriately to potential 
volatility within the risk context. Often “an executive search firm will be retained to find 
a replacement;” as the timeline of replacement extends approximately “10 months to a 
year…before any real action is taken by the CEO” (Auchterlonie, 2003, p. 53). Due to the 
successor’s required assimilation with the entity’s status quo, uncertainty augured by an 
adverse turnover event bodes additional risk for investors, particularly in the absence of 
an enhanced governance framework. Within an enhanced governance framework, 
adequate process and strategy documentation facilitates personnel transitions, and 
mitigates potential risk of ineffective change conjured by succeeding executives. 
 
Relay and Planned Successions 
 
Relay and planned successions are special cases employing follower successions. 
Zhang and Rajagopalan (2004) examined incidences of “relay” CEO successions, in 
which successors are specifically groomed by their incumbents prior to assuming their 
new office; these authors also contemplated the effects upon stock market perception (p. 
483). Non-relay CEO succession defines an event in which the successor emerges from 
within the organization, but was not the chosen “heir apparent” (p. 484); hence, a non-
relay succession is a distinctly classified contender succession. “The chance of a 
mismatch between a new CEO and a firm should be lower in relay succession than in 




impact on post-succession firm performance” (p. 484). A deliberate replacement 
sequence enhances firm strategic continuity, “enabl[ing] the firm to better manage 
ongoing strategic and industry instability and turn around poor performance…high 
strategic instability diminishes the likelihood of relay succession” (p. 485-487). Zhang 
and Rajagopalan divulged results which indicated relay succession was positively 
correlated to postsuccession firm performance (p<.01), and outside succession was 
negatively correlated to postsuccession firm performance (p<.01), (p. 492). 
Correspondingly, the interactive effects of postsuccession firm performance and high 
postsuccession strategic instability produced a significant slope component (p<.05) under 
the prevalence of relay succession, indicating that the strategic effect of relay CEO 
successions mitigate firm performance in the presence of high postsuccession strategic 
and industry instability for their sample under study (p. 495-496). These results evidence 
further the findings of Shen and Cannella Jr. (2002) with respect to the moderation of risk 
affecting firm performance under the auspices of strategic continuity. 
 If a particular CEO’s management style is not miscible with the organization and 
its political hierarchy, it may require alteration to conform; in this case the entity may 
also experience augmented risk. “Job match theory stresses the importance of the entire 
CEO succession process, as opposed to focusing solely on how to motivate or monitor 
CEOs once chosen…good matches are characterized by better firm performance than are 
bad matches” (Allgood & Farrell, 2003, p. 318). Thus, it is expected that risk outcomes 
should markedly differ as a result of personnel change conducted under job match theory, 




studying CEOs is the ability to compare two individuals in the same position with the 
same firm” (p. 319).   
A “peak in the hazard” of a CEO leaving a position “occurs at approximately five 
years of CEO tenure” (Allgood & Farrell, 2003, p. 319), or at the midpoint of average 
total CEO tenure of ten years, as documented by Comte and Mihal (2001, p.47). The 
hazard is defined as: “an instantaneous probability of transition from one state to another, 
when the transition has not already occurred…an executive had not already departed” 
(Cannella Jr. & Hambrick, 1993, p. 747). If the hazard of turnover indicates that an 
inappropriate job match has occurred, then prior to five years of tenure or immediately 
after, risk should be at a nadir, in accordance with the propriety of the match. Upon 
analysis of 309 job matches among firms, Allgood and Farrell (2003) ascertained that, 
“the likelihood of an inside CEO being a good match after the previous CEO quit is 
significantly greater (83%) than the likelihood of an outside CEO being a good match 
(67%)” (p. 331). Presumably, the follower/contender successor has strategic intimacy and 
information asymmetry with the intended change concurrently transpiring in the 
organization, and may adjust the firm’s dynamic course as required to align with 
stakeholder expectations. In the event that an initially good match is followed by another 
good match, the previous CEO institutes a leadership legacy, in which the strategy of the 
firm is perpetuated through constructive staffing and succession planning. This in turn is 
surmised to minimize the financial exposure; however, such conjectures remain to be 




In their study of CEO succession, Shen and Cannella Jr. (2002) classified the 
executive turnover of 228 CEO successions as follower, contender, and outsider contexts 
and compared the dynamics in three-year average industry return on assets (ROA) to that 
of the entity experiencing personnel change, while controlling for “the entropy measure 
of diversification as a control variable. The entropy measure has two components: related 
diversification (DR) and unrelated diversification (DU)” (Palepu, 1985, as cited in Shen 
& Cannella Jr. 2002, p. 725). Related diversification occurs when diversification 
transpires as a consequence of succession, whereas unrelated diversification occurs when 
diversification initiatives were formulated prior to a personnel change. The contingency 
of financial risk correlating to a change in CEO may be increasingly pervasive if 
unrelated diversification is experienced; CEO executive ability thus saliently affects any 
outcome under unrelated diversification.  
 
Internal Outsiders versus External Outsiders 
Whereas Shen and Cannella Jr. (2002) primarily researched the source of 
successors, and Allgood and Farrell (2003) essentially investigated the organizational and 
behavioral suitability of successors, Clayton et al. (2005) synthesized situational 
reasoning for CEO turnover with the “choice of replacement [type]” (p. 1782); their 
approach extended prior research. Given the directors’ or stakeholders’ desired outcomes, 
the CEO selection process is more effectively consummated if a chief executive’s 
required characteristics are evaluated at or prior to the inception of the selection process; 
the desired outcomes edify the commencement of an executive search. Clayton et 




“increases after a turnover…[and is the] result of increased uncertainty about the nature 
of the strategy that will be implemented by the new CEO” (p. 1783). This scenario is 
surmised to occur subsequent to a forced turnover and outsider replacement. Following 
an interpretation of CEO compensation, these authors also indicated: “although some 
outside CEOs have an established track record from leading another company, most do 
not” (p. 1785). Further, executive skill may lack portability between individuals, despite 
transition planning in context. It is hence prohibitively challenging for shareholders to 
assess financial effects based upon disclosure of such evidence regarding a CEO’s prior 
experience.  
Contrastingly, the “ability hypothesis” was ascribed as reasoning for financial 
volatility transpiring as “investors gather evidence to evaluate the skill of the new 
CEO…investors update their ability estimates and revalue the firm” (Clayton et al., 2005, 
p. 1784). Under the ability hypothesis, “firm strategy is not expected to change 
significantly” as it is applicable given the succession of an insider (p. 1784). Finally, a 
“scapegoat hypothesis” was ascribed as the convergence of turnover and agency theory, 
which induces “a credible dismissal threat…in order to ensure optimal exertion of effort 
by the CEO…and dismissal occurs when there is poor performance due to chance” (p. 
1786).  Although it is less likely that performance may be ameliorated by an insider or 
outsider successor as exogenous variables influence firm results, dismissal is often 
imminent and implemented to appease shareholders and investors. 
Cannella Jr. and Lubatkin (1993) perceived that if performance was exceptionally 




successor selection (p. 782); “the dismissal group shows higher levels of unsystematic 
risk than the normal retirement group (p<.05)…systematic risk does not differ 
significantly among the five disposition categories” as expected. Thus, “low profitability 
was a good predictor of outside selection, particularly when sociopolitical forces were 
weak” (p. 789). If sociopolitical forces were weak within the organization, potential 
vulnerability stemming from lack of managerial “cohesion” (Waldman et al., 2001, p. 
135) may result in misalignment toward firm objectives. Khurana (as cited in Bower, 
2007) offered additional perspective: “some boards, facing difficult strategic 
circumstances in the markets for their company’s products and services, lose faith in the 
capabilities of the insiders who produced those lousy results” (p. 13). Despite the 
expectation that shareholders seek agency effects to be enhanced following executive 
replacement by an outsider, Bower noted from his own study of a decade of executive 
replacement results of firms within the S&P 500 that “insiders outperformed 
outsiders…especially when the company had had poor prior performance” (p. 12). 
Should results of this research effort differ, one may question why a particular entity was 
not subject to this type of unsystematic risk, as it is typical that firms sampled from 
Collins’s (2001) selection all operate within the same market structure and economic 







Consequences of Executive Change 
Changes in Goal Congruence, Agency Effects, and Organizational Inertia 
 
One integral aspect of a follower’s or contender’s triumph in transformational 
change may arguably be rooted in “organizational inertia,” which theoretically 
contributes to hindrances in the execution of strategy; “for successors who want to 
initiate strategic changes, the strong organizational inertia developed during their 
predecessors' time in office will increase the difficulty of, or may even prevent, 
accomplishing their goals” (Shen & Cannella, Jr., 2002, p. 723). This contention was 
amplified by the findings of Gordon et al. (2000), who conveyed that the CEO is 
instrumental in overcoming inertia associated with strategic commitment (p. 918). In 
addition, Gordon et al. substantiated that lack of “environmental awareness,” and 
“external attribution for negative financial performance” (p. 920) also affects executive 
and management team recognition of exogenous variables affecting the firm. “A lack of 
environmental awareness may result in persistence with the current strategy” (p. 920), 
indicating a recalcitrance to acquiesce to the necessity of strategic transformation. 
Friedman and Singh (1989, p. 722) specified: “two sets of contingencies [determine] the 
efficacy of new CEOs: organizational context (presuccession organizational performance 
and organizational size) and event content (initiating force impelling a succession, 
disposition of the predecessor, and origin of the new CEO).” The aftermath of a CEO 





The longer CEO tenure is accompanied by organizational inertia, the more 
intransigent the entity and its management team will be in accepting and executing novel 
strategic tactics. Shen and Cho (2005) indicated: “governance and control mechanisms at 
corporate organizations (e.g., ownership structure, board composition, and investor 
activism) can have an important effect on the occurrence of involuntary executive 
turnover during periods of poor performance” (p. 844).  The concomitant existence of an 
indulgent governance structure may further prohibit acceptance of organizational change 
with the intent of mitigating agency risk. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998, as cited in 
Allgood & Farrell, 2000, p. 374) indicated that “the balance of power between the CEO 
and other directors that predicts board independence declines over the course of a CEO’s 
tenure.” Whereas board independence enhances the custodianship and fiduciary control 
of the firm while deterring agency conflicts emanating from a single source, a highly 
influential magnate often attracts directors who succumb to the leader’s capricious 
pursuit of “costly pet projects and…compensation packages that benefit [them] at the 
expense of stockholders” (Allgood & Farrell, 2000, p. 374). The degree to which agency 
effects are omnipresent among the CEO and executives within the entity may contribute 
to the decreased incidence of stewardship (Coles et al., 2001); “managerial hegemony 
theory, which views boards as passive instruments who hold allegiance to the managers 
who selected them” (p. 27) may also be prevalent within the firm, giving rise to the 
deterioration of directors’ fiduciary control.  




…the benefits of improved goal congruence should include the reduction 
of asymmetries of information, the diminution of moral hazard and a 
lessening of the likelihood of adverse selection in policy choice by 
managers who also have a vested interest in maximising the share values 
of their companies. (p. 1091)  
 
In effect, agency risk should be mitigated in the presence of CEO turnover by the 
institution of equitable and incentivizing compensation packages. Supporting this 
assertion, Conyon (1998) posited: “the estimated pay-for-performance elasticity 
potentially reveals information about the incentives faced by managers to pursue 
shareholder interests…the greater the estimated effect, the more congruent are 
shareholder and managerial interests” (p. 485). This assertion aligns with agency theory, 
as well as the propriety of CEO dismissal pending abysmal financial performance. 
Dedman (2003), however, conveyed that due to an acknowledgement of agency effects, 
“managers have incentives to ‘entrench’ themselves, making themselves more costly to 
dislodge” (p. 33). Lee, Lev, and Yeo (2007) echoed similar assessments given the 
presence of organizational complexity: “the scope for moral hazard increases with 
organizational complexity, especially in firms with high organizational relatedness, 
because direct monitoring by principals is difficult” (p. 297). Organizational cohesiveness 
may contribute to malfeasant aspects of collusion prompted through the establishment of 
intrafirm operational relationships. “Collusion by agents is typically opportunistic 




which eventually harms the overall firm performance” (p. 297). Since unique, “firm-
specific factors…can consume a large portion of managerial time, thereby changing the 
nature of managerial work from proactive to reactive” (Mintzberg, 1973, as cited in 
Cannella Jr. & Lubatkin, 1993, p. 775), it is of paramount importance that personnel as 
well as initiatives are strategically aligned to create value within the organization, and not 
garnered to merely enhance political cohesiveness.  
Once a “situational analysis” is performed following a dismissal, and it is 
determined that the business has continued viability, corrective strategic planning is 
undertaken and an action plan to implement typically developed. “The key to a successful 
turnaround is early intervention…action and the organization’s willingness to adapt can 
avert a significant restructuring or worse” (Auchterlonie, 2003, pp. 56-57). Subsequently, 
the decision to “‘fix, sell, or close’” (Korn, 1985, p. 33) will be addressed in context. In 
the instance of a business merger or takeover, contrasting personal dynamics are 
applicable. Cannella Jr. and Hambrick (1993) delineated: “acquisitions…disrupt 
organizational social standings…the [voluntary] departure of acquired executives is best 
understood as an outgrowth of social processes” (p. 733). In cases where “autonomy is 
removed, status is removed, and a climate of acrimony prevails” (p. 733), competent 
executives are often marginalized and usurped by the institution of a new regime, instead 
of being proselytized into an elite group with the intent of advancing knowledge through 
strategic advantage. Often, perception by the acquired party and resultant lack of 
communication may contribute to the demise of an otherwise potentially advantageous 




Through an analysis of the computer software and furniture industries, Gordon et 
al. (2000) substantiated an empirically significant relationship between “CEO turnover… 
[and the] increased likelihood of strategic reorientation. CEO turnover (t=1.65, p < .05) 
was statistically significant, suggesting that a change in CEO does increase the proclivity 
to reorient” (p. 930). Surprisingly, the relationship between “environmental awareness,” 
or essentially, recognition of exogenous economic and strategic influences upon the firm, 
and poor financial performance was not significant (p=.42), (p. 930). Gordon et al. (2000) 
interpreted their results: 
…in this final iteration of the hierarchical analysis, the 
main effect for both industries is reversed when top management 
blames the external environment for poor past performance. This 
means that an external attribution for poor performance in the 
stable industry increases the probability of strategic reorientation 
whereas it decreases the likelihood of reorientation in the turbulent 
industry…Total main effects show that firms with CEO turnover 
are 12% more likely to have a strategic reorientation, whereas 
firms with top management team turnover are 18% less likely to 
have a strategic reorientation. (p. 931-32) 
 
Competent, incumbent CEOs often lend precedent support to succeeding 
executives promoted from within, especially if the former leader successfully executed 




satisfactorily achieved. Gordon et al. (2000) ascribed this “psychological investment” of 
tenured executives as “cognitive commitment” (p. 917). Conversely, within a 
performance-deficient firm, succession planning is less likely to occur, particularly in the 
event of a pending merger; in that case, succession efforts may not transpire as intended, 
due to the nature and typical alacrity of the replacement. Cannella, Jr. and Hambrick 
(1993) hypothesized: “the lower the pre-acquisition performance of an acquired firm, the 
greater an acquired executive’s propensity to depart” (p. 739); the authors’ expectations 
were that performance improves over time as CEO tenure within the merger context is 
extended. As new owners perceive that strategic reorientation is required to transform the 
firm’s future destiny, the probability of executive removal increases. Additionally, 
Cannella Jr. and Hambrick conjectured that “the greater the degree to which autonomy is 
removed from the acquired firm, the greater an acquired executive’s propensity to 
depart…we expected the effects of the removal of autonomy…to be relatively slow in 
appearing…manifesting…in the second and third years” (p. 742). Drawing from a sample 
size of 430 merger events dated years 1980-1984, Cannella Jr. and Hambrick reported 
that 67% of executives of acquired firms had departed within 48 months of firm 
acquisition, with the highest incidence of departure occurring in the second (87 
executives) and third (76 executives) years; the model was “highly significant,” with 
p=.001 (p. 749). Notably, the authors observed that “ROE (return on equity) was 
negatively associated with executive departure through the second year” (p. 749). The 
results were statistically significant (with p=.01), and suggested that market reaction to 




differentiation of risk as purported by executive change is perceived as similarly 
significant by investors. It should also be noted that the effects of decreased ROE 
dissipated overall in later periods within the Cannella Jr. and Hambrick sample, 
indicating a tempering of future results as tenure increased (p.755). Further, the “in the 
first two time periods [essentially the first twelve months], removal of autonomy was 
positively associated with departure, as hypothesized” (p. 752).  
Whereas Sheikholesami, Wilson, and Selin (1998) advised: “abrupt changes 
(forced resignations or dismissals) are a surprise and often involve significant shocks to 
earnings” (p. 74), Allgood and Farrell (2000) asserted in clarification: “when there is 
greater uncertainty about a new CEO’s ability, the board will be more lenient regarding 
poor performance that deviates from the expected level” (p. 374). In context, if the board 
is more permissive in their tolerance of deficient CEO performance, this approach 
introduces further volatility and risk into financial results. Consider that the efficient 
markets hypothesis, through which it is posited that stock prices imbue all relevant 
information, is upheld as a theoretical framework supporting equity markets; hence, it is 
conjectured that the risk element of earnings variability due to a change in personnel will 
be distinctly measurable within the market context as investors sense imminent risk 
changes. “The wealth effect associated with an announced change in CEO can be 
decomposed into an information effect (the firm’s prospects are worse than previously 
believed) and a real effect (the new CEO is expected to improve firm performance)” 
(Clayton et al., 2005, p. 1780). Correspondingly, reaction to the information effect has 




salient than the real effect in the short term. It is of worthy note that Clayton et al. (2005) 
also discerned: “poor stock performance and higher volatility typically precede a forced 
turnover” (p. 1787). These researchers confined sampling to that of poorly performing 
entities. However, the extent to which the response of market participants affects equity 
pricing when cash flows have been necessarily altered due to risk and return volatility 
remains to be tested within Collins’s (2001) sample.  
 
Dynamics in Organizational Interactions 
 
Modifications in board composition and hence political influence may also 
accompany the decision to replace an underperforming CEO. “Boards of directors, then, 
may be seen as acting as the shareholders’ first line of defence against a potentially self-
serving management” (Conyon, 1998, p. 486).  They exposited the tenets of Fama (1980, 
as cited in Conyon & Florou, 2002, p. 210): “the board is viewed as a market-induced 
institution, the ultimate internal monitor of the set of contracts called a firm, whose most 
important rule is to scrutinize the highest decision makers within the firm.” In context, 
the board is responsible for independent governance aspects of monitoring executive 
performance, regardless of political or organizational alignment of individual directors 
with the executive team. Prime (2007) fundamentally concurred: “a strong turnover-
performance connection provides evidence of good corporate governance within a firm” 
(p. 79). 
CEO replacement may also precipitate turnover among board members, 




(2000) observed “an increased likelihood of outside director turnover following forced 
CEO succession, especially among those directors that are closely aligned with the 
outgoing CEO” (p. 597) According to their findings, in the presence of deficient financial 
performance, a higher incidence of equity ownership among directors of firms served 
often motivated an executive dismissal decision. Reticence to oust a poorly performing 
CEO is less probable with effective incentive alignment among board members. Farrell 
and Whidbee (2000) asserted that “removing a poorly performing CEO…is one of the 
most observable signals that outside directors can send to shareholders and labor markets 
about their effectiveness as directors” (p. 598). Inquiry as to the fulfillment of fiduciary 
duty and application of objectivity surfaces: “directors with characteristics associated 
with effective monitoring (e.g., independence from the CEO, substantial equity 
ownership, and sufficient decision-making expertise to make good replacement 
decisions) tend to be rewarded for removing a poorly performing CEO” (p. 599). In 
addition to pecuniary benefits, the likelihood of securing future board seats serving other 
entities increases for the director based on prior demonstration of successful governance. 
Consequently, Farrell and Whidbee (2002) also acknowledged, “CEOs have significant 
control over the director selection process, especially if CEOs serve on the board’s 
nominating committee…a new CEO is a catalyst for change in board committee 
structure” (pp. 49-50).  
 
Organizational Effects distinguished by Replacement Type 
As an outsider supplants the former CEO, any current affiliated board members 




audit, pension, and nominating). In response to queries regarding the propriety of service, 
practitioners have decried that myriad and potentially interlocking governance 
obligations instituted by directors be constrained by limiting of the number of board 
positions a director may serve. Directors often seek additional board positions to gain 
exposure to multiple industries and solidify their reputation. To offer apposite evidence, 
these researchers further elaborated: “when directors become busy as a result of obtaining 
a new board seat, stock prices tend to drop for the firms in which they are incumbent 
directors…boards are inclined to become distracted and monitoring intensity is likely to 
suffer” (Fich & Shivdasani, 2006, p. 692). The probability of busy boards to displace a 
deficiently performing CEO diminishes as the number of board directorships become 
more prevalent among members; busy directors will tend to be indifferent to the necessity 
of ousting a CEO, whereas, contrastingly, non-busy boards are more sensitive to this 
imperative (p. 716). 
If the CEO replaces a company founder, then “the founder may not fully 
relinquish control of the firm when the new CEO takes over…[and thus is] unable to run 
the firm as he or she wishes” (Allgood & Farrell, 2003, p. 333).  CEO tenure may be 
prolonged if boards are permissive “in the face of poor performance because [CEOs] 
have coped successfully with contingencies posed by their environments or strategies in 
the past” (Comte & Mihal, 2001, p. 50). In this case, previous performance rather than 
current achievement is utilized as litmus for continuing tenure. Coles et al. (2001) 
documented the findings of Miller: “the relationship between CEO tenure and firm 




becoming negative as the CEO becomes rigid and less likely to engage in environmental 
monitoring and adaptation” (Miller, as cited in Coles et al., 2001, p. 29). An expectation 
may exist among board members that an incumbent CEO has the ability to ameliorate 
future operational outcomes despite more current unsustained performance; directors may 
conclude that maintenance of the status quo is the best option. From an accounting metric 
perspective, this conjecture is further substantiated by the findings of Coles et al. (2001) 
who observed: “significant and negative interaction of CEO tenure and board 
composition and MVA…indicate that when insiders dominate the board and the CEO has 
been in the office a long time, market performance declines” (p. 41). Hence, Andrews 
(2001), subsequent to an observation of Gillette and Xerox, alternatively advocated, 
“if…companies…are seeking improved performance, the course is clear: Hire an outsider 
and clear away any obstacles to change” (p. 14). 
Friedman and Singh (1989) suggested that the degree of obligatory strategic 
change may determine the effect of executive successor, based on stockholder 
expectations:  
…results suggest that customary successions are neither adaptive 
nor disruptive but are best explained by a random transformation 
view of organizational change: leaders assuming power in the 
modal succession event do not seem to matter in determining the 
fortunes of large corporations…stockholders see new CEOs as able 




need of redirection and when the accession to power represents 
alterations in management practice and corporate policy. (p. 739) 
 
Contrastingly, outsiders do not garner the perspective nor the political influence 
required to entrench themselves with alacrity, which often hinders the execution of novel 
strategic initiatives. Auchterlonie (2003) noted that there exists a “’knee-jerk’ tendency to 
replace CEOs of distressed or underperforming companies that, in many cases, are no 
more capable of fixing the underlying problems causing the distress than their 
predecessors” (p. 52). Allgood and Farrell (2000) also posited, “outside hires are unlikely 
to have influenced the composition of the board before their hire, suggesting it may take 
several years for them to become entrenched”; the operative duration of tenure required 
to achieve entrenchment, per their results, was three years (p. 374-376). Hillier et al. 
(2005) explicated further by indicating that political influence is not promptly garnered 
by newly appointed outsiders: “External succession is damaging to the incentives of 
lower management, and therefore, external candidates must display superior potential to 
that of the available internal talent pool” (p. 530). This indicates that if a post-succession 
turnover occurs within a fleeting interval following the prior replacement, the outsider 
successor may have not been able to influence outcomes and build organizational 
cohesiveness quickly enough to placate the performance expectations of stakeholders, 
particularly investors and directors. 




CEO succession, therefore, may result in two kinds of disruption. 
It can destroy the fit between an organization and its environment 
because, as a structural change, a succession event results in an 
organization’s selection out of its population (a radical ecological 
view). Or it can disrupt internal authority relations, breaking up the 
unity or command and disrobing work patterns (a bureaucratic 
theory view). Both kinds of disruption may lead to performance 
decrements and increase the likelihood of organizational death. (p. 
721) 
 
Financial Performance and Risk Indications of Executive Change 
Effects of the Risk Environment upon Entity Context 
 
Academicians have conducted myriad analyses in order to investigate the 
relationship between past financial performance and CEO turnover; however, 
convergence and resultant consistency fail to dominate conveyed outcomes. Huson et al. 
(2001) insightfully premised: “[CEO turnover] has long-term implications for a firm’s 
investment, operating, and financing decisions” (p. 2266). As previously stated, strategic 
change is often requisite as a new executive attains position, and has the potential to 
inflict a more pronounced level of risk upon the entity. Although Conyon (1998) 
acknowledged, “low company profits may be attributable to adverse demand shocks or 
increases in industry or market costs rather than malfeasance by the agent” (p. 487), it is 




financial results according to forecasted projections despite current instability. Financial 
performance is the ultimate litmus capable of gauging the executives’ and directors’ 
ability to mitigate risk and augment value within the context of the entity. Mere dismissal 
of endogenous and exogenous sources of risk currently suffusing financial detriment 
upon the entity as insurmountable is evocative of executive complacency, entrenchment, 
and reticence to innovatively realign the entity’s strategic position. Conyon espoused: “a 
boardroom culture which eschews frankness in favour of politeness and courtesy may be 
a proximate cause in the failure of the corporate control mechanism” (p. 490).  
Subsequent to completion of an analysis of equity volatility following 872 CEO 
changes occurring from 1979 through 1995, Clayton et al. (2005) evidenced that “the 
most significant increase [in volatility] is associated with forced turnover” (p. 1781). The 
forced post-turnover mean standard deviation of returns was 43.2%, as compared to the 
full sample mean standard deviation of 30.7%, and the voluntary turnover mean standard 
deviation of 28.7% (p. 1792). Auchterlonie (2003) offered: “involuntary successions in 
2002 increased by more than 70% in 2001…with 39% of 2002’s global CEO departures 
being forced, performance-based change,” (p. 53). 
Kaplan commenced studies of the financial performance given the incidence of 
CEO turnover in Japan (1994) and Germany (1995). Notably, within these cultures, 
corporate governance structures differ from that of the United States and are more 
“relationship-oriented” (Kaplan, 1995, p. 23), contingent upon associations with financial 
institutions and groups of “large shareholders.” Board-level decision-making is viewed as 




governing boards for each public entity—a supervisory board and a management board—
deemed “the codetermination system” (p. 26). Financial performance is attributable to the 
actions of the entire management board. Hence, “turnover of the management board in 
German companies increases significantly with poor stock performance and with 
earnings losses” (Kaplan, 1995, p. 24). This possible replacement of the entire team 
contrasts significantly with actions often initiated in US firms, in which CEO turnover is 
typically not accompanied by complete managerial team replacement, excluding the 
consequences of takeover activity. Managerial ownership among German firms also 
contrasts with that of US entities; as such, “German banks typically act as custodians for 
the shares of stock corporations held by small shareholders” (p. 28).  
 
Increased Governance Risk through Earnings Manipulation 
 
Detzler and Machuga (2002) amplified Kaplan’s (1994) findings on the incidence 
of turnover among firms subject to the prevalence of earnings management. Asserting the 
potential manifestation of four separate hypotheses regarding earnings management 
during the interval circumscribing the turnover event, these authors revealed that “mutual 
interests between incoming and outgoing presidents...to portray a triumphant transition” 
(p. 343) are often addressed to ensure continuity of strategic intent between the newly 
appointed and outgoing leaders. By expanding tests of the horizon, cover-up, and big bath 
theories suggested by Murphy and Zimmerman (1993, as cited in Detzler & Machuga, 
2002) with the addition of the coaching hypothesis, Detzler and Machuga elucidated that 




incentives to manage earnings in these situations” (p. 344). Horizon theory “suggests that 
departing CEOs approaching a known retirement date will attempt to increase earnings 
during their last years at the expense of future earnings...motivations for increasing 
earnings may be pecuniary” (p. 344); this situation is more prevalent in the case of 
routine turnovers. Conversely, cover-up theory suggests the concealment of “poor 
performance in order to avoid disciplinary action” (p. 345); thus earnings manipulation is 
theorized to be more prevalent given the incidence of forced turnover. Big bath theory 
“applies to incoming CEOs who attempt to decrease earnings in the transition year in 
order to report improved earnings in the following year” (p. 345); hence, the incidence of 
the big bath accounting approach is also surmised to be more prevalent given forced 
turnover.  
The coaching hypothesis, “suggest[ing] that both departing and incoming 
presidents have incentives to smooth earnings during a routine transition” (Detzler & 
Machuga, 2002, p. 346) was also derived. The incidence of earnings management in this 
case may subdue and impede the pronounced and detectable sensitivity of otherwise 
differentiated results due to manipulated financial metrics. Further, risk perception of 
shareholders participating in the market may be affected by the application of such 
practices, to the extent that distorted financial disclosures lead investors to anticipate 
spurious results. In turn, the authors offered the following conjecture: “since non-routine 
turnovers are typically unanticipated, it is possible that departing presidents have been 
managing earnings to cover up poor performance for several years before they are 




was predicated by fifteen years of extraordinary financial results, it is unlikely that 
material earnings management could be sustained for a lengthened period of time without 
being detected through manifestation of cash flows.  
Whereas Detzler and Machuga detected the incidence of earnings management 
through the examination of trends in depreciation, research and development, 
extraordinary gains and losses, and accounting accrual dynamics, Lee et al. (2007) 
confined their examination exclusively to accrual dynamics, citing discretionary accrual 
changes as a proxy for earnings management. “The likelihood of organizational fraud is 
likely to be positively associated with organizational complexity because of monitoring 
difficulties and greater information asymmetry” (p. 296).  
Upon investigation of the effect of changing discretionary accruals from financial 
results within CEOs retirement years, Reitanga and Tearney (2003) provided additional 
edification of the prevalence of the horizon theory, termed ‘short horizon theory’ (p. 
255). The resultant augmentation of income is spurred by appealing and reciprocative 
increases in bonus remuneration to the executive in the final years of service. 
Additionally, “institutional investors are interested in short-run performance…[which] 
can exacerbate earnings management behavior” (p. 257); this observation of myopic 
behavior was also noted by Rappaport (2005). Reitanga and Tearney (2003) found 
significant “evidence of earnings management” (p. 255) through the analysis of multi-
year ascending accrual growth prior to retirements, and descending accrual release upon 
the executive separation from the entity; they specifically touted the decoupling of the 




retirements. Although the results of Reitenga and Tearney overall did not reveal 
significant relationships between earnings management through discretionary accruals in 
the last and fourth years leading to CEO retirement, there was a positive association 
noted between the variables. In contrast, analysis of the second and third year results 
prior to departure did reveal a significant relationship between discretionary accruals and 
retirement (p. 270). To the extent that discretionary accrual adjustments are not material, 
the subsequent effect upon risk is liminal, if at all detectable. 
Lee et al. (2007) also provided evidence of a positive association between 
earnings management and “organizational relatedness...a high proportion of outside 
directors and high institutional equity ownership have less pronounced earnings 
management...[this] suggests an interaction between corporate governance and 
organizational relatedness” (p. 293). By recounting the incidence of ethical transgressions 
among financial executives, Lee et al. conjectured that the pervasiveness of collusion 
within a “multi-person and cross-division [situation]...raises the fundamental question...of 
how is it possible to get a large and diverse group of top-level employees to participate in 
sustained fraud,” requiring, “‘commonality of purpose’” (p. 294).  
With respect to earnings restatements and risk prevalence, ineffective governance 
has to date had a relatively minimal effect on investor reaction within a portfolio context, 
and a marginal effect upon turnover frequency of other board members overall. 
Marciukaityte and Varma (2007) educed: “firms experiencing large-loss restatements...do 
not have significantly different composition of boards and audit committees than other 




enforceable; if the fiduciary relationship is violated, it becomes the obligation of the 
board members to act on behalf of the shareholders and rectify any turbid actions on the 
part of a CEO or ineffective fellow committee members. 
Solely, Marciukaityte (2005) documented a positive association between 
managerial optimism and the magnitude of discretionary accruals, suggesting that “high-
growth firms derive a substantial part of their value from highly uncertain growth 
opportunities, making it harder for investors to appraise the high-growth firms and easier 
for managers of these firms to mislead investors” (p. 6). Results garnered from a sample 
of firm financials dated 1988 to 2001 revealed the presence of significantly differing 
levels of discretionary accruals (p<.01) based on the method of financing major projects, 
i.e., debt, equity, and retained earnings, with “reliance on external equity 
financing...negative and significant at the 1 percent level”  (pp. 14-15). Generalizing 
these results, high-growth firms, such as the firms in Collins’s sample, may be less 
subject to earnings manipulation and more subject to managerial optimism with respect to 
forecasting future earnings. Equity issuance, despite its signaling effect, may be the 
financing methodology of choice if management’s projected results are more aleatory 
than anticipated. More pronounced levels of risk would then result in more highly priced 
financing for the firm. Considerable financial impact may be experienced if the firm’s 
hurdle rate must be adjusted by one to two percent in response to personnel change 
(Clayton et al., 2005, p. 1782). 
Defond and Hung (2004) commented upon the “convergence of international 




who wish to improve corporate governance may find it more beneficial to expend 
resources on strengthening law enforcement institutions rather than on adopting 
additional laws” (p. 274). Without adequate governance addressing the presence of 
financial management impropriety, transparency and market efficiency are thwarted. A 
reallocation of resources may be necessary to properly align recognition of malfeasant 
management activity, and enhance transparency. A significant amount of institutional 
ownership of a firm’s equity may delimit oversight and external influence from passive 
investors. Nagar (2004) provided both a rationalization and a caveat, indicating: “if 
turnover is indeed performance related...[it is] suggested that a change in management 
should be accompanied by an increase in performance” (p. 315).  
 
Suitability of Finance and Accounting Performance Benchmarks 
Results of Shen and Cannella, Jr.’s (2002) sociopolitical organizational 
experiment indicated that the “interactive effects of successor type and postsuccession 
senior executive turnover on firm ROA” (p. 727) were positively related in the case of 
contender successors and negatively related in the case of outsider successors, with the 
slope of the outsider contenders being far more pronounced. These results implicate that 
erosive financial effects result from outsider CEO succession paralleled with senior 
executive turnover, and negatively and significantly impact return on assets (ROA) for 
the sample. Also, these results are consistent with the findings of Allgood and Farrell 
(2000), who revealed that “performance measures are negatively related to the likelihood 
of forced turnover…when measuring performance using ROA, 53 percent of the forced 




is…negative and significant” (p. 386). Conyon (1998) similarly echoed reciprocity 
between dismissal and performance in documenting outcomes: “the marginal effect of a 
performance change on the turnover likelihood is about 8 [percent]” (p. 503). In a 
subsequent study, Conyon joined Florou (2002) and opined: “there is an inverse and 
robust relation between the probability of a top management dismissal and firm 
performance: senior managers are fired for poor performance” (p. 210). Whether 
diminished results were sustained subsequent to a forced leadership change, or 
ameliorated temporarily resulting in eventual recidivism of financial failure, remains to 
be compared within this analysis of Collins’s (2001) sample. Rappaport (2005) presaged: 
“failure to meet earnings targets is seen as a sign of managerial weakness and, if 
repeated, can lead to a career-threatening dismissal... managers must develop and 
effectively execute strategies that maximize the company’s long-term cash flow 
potential” (p. 69). 
Since myriad financial ratios and inputs to equity valuation are saliently 
influenced by measures of income, it is conjectured that risk indicators such as beta, or 
the covariance of the equity return versus the market return divided by the variance of the 
market return, will also be negatively impacted by CEO succession and senior executive 
team reciprocative dynamics. Presumably, the lack of continuity at numerous supporting 
levels, excluding the top of the organizational hierarchy, portends operational instability 
which renders financial risk, until synergy transpires among the senior management team 
members and the new CEO. The introduction of “incentive contracting…contingent pay 




shareholders’ interests” (Coles et al., 2001, p. 28). Specific linkage to define the metric 
utilized to designate performance may drive the CEO to attain the incentive 
complementarily or detrimentally; it is critical to ensure that metrics are selected with 
consideration to potential agency conflicts.  
Shen and Cannella Jr. (2002) conferred that one of the limitations of their study 
was the inability to apply outcomes to financial market performance (p. 729); literature is 
somewhat void of analytics which may be subtended through the examination of the 
significance of risk factors, and the metrics which specifically augur variation. Although 
the literature includes limited comparisons of financial metrics given changes in 
leadership, research to date has specifically addressed sample sizes across the entire 
range of equities within the US market. A dearth of literature exists addressing the 
analysis of risk-relative financial effects of leadership turnover within companies deemed 
exceptional prior to the leader’s departure.  
“Turnover is negatively related to prior year stock returns” (Anderson, Bates, 
Bizjak & Lemmon, 2000, p. 13), which suggests that risk is determinable through 
observation of beta. If turnover is negatively related to prior year stock returns, then the 
last year of tenure may prove to inculcate the poorest financial performance of a CEO’s 
tenure among sampled firms. This is consistent with match theory phenomenon, as 
presented by Allgood and Farrell (2003). In an earlier study, Allgood and Farrell (2000) 
also provided evidence that “the mean stock return of firms with new outside CEOs is 
more than 20 percent…the variation around this mean is enormous with a standard 




excluded financial institutions and public utilities. In acquiescence they offered: “the 
hiring of an outside CEO is a risky decision with the potential for high returns…the mean 
and the standard deviation of the stock diminish with tenure” (p. 389). Since stock returns 
are the primary input for the beta, this documented magnitude of change should result in 
a pronounced variation in beta for equities affected by outsider CEO turnover; this 
provides edification for an approach to risk measurement through an analysis of 
investment returns, with the assumption that the semi-strong form of the efficient market 
hypothesis holds in sample context.    
Researchers also conferred the limited miscibility of accounting and finance 
performance scalars. Allgood and Farrell (2000) observed a dichotomy between 
accounting and finance metrics; they asserted: “accounting measures are better predictors 
of management changes than are stock returns” (p. 390). Hambrick and Cannella Jr. 
(1993) further clarified and advocated the use of time-series accounting metrics: 
“accounting-based performance measures have well-known limitations, but three-year 
averages are thought to yield generally robust indications of corporate economic 
performance” (p. 745). In testing the replicability and extant generalizability of this 
assertion, one may consider the varying degrees of informational transparency of 
accounting data across capital markets.  
In contrast to accounting data, which exhibits the historical result of previous 
decisions, stock return data is thought to instantaneously exhibit high variation in the 
event that the expected effect of CEO change among market participants is an increase in 




this view by conferring: “earnings are relevant to valuation to the extent that they help 
investors and analysts estimate the magnitude, timing, and uncertainty of future cash 
flows”; he also remarked that “earnings are an amalgam of facts (realized cash flows) and 
assumptions about future outcomes (accruals)” (p. 66). Commenting on suitability, 
Appleyard (1996) also noted, “central to the success of a piece of work involving the 
interpretation of evidence from the capital market is that market efficiency holds and that 
we have a robust model of asset pricing” (p. 287); the underlying assumption remains 
that fundamental analysis is a robust input of asset pricing models.  
Conyon and Florou (2002) advocated the utilization of both market returns and 
accounting metrics to comprehensively assess the performance of CEOs within their 
selected sample. As strong proponents of the efficient markets hypothesis, they asserted: 
“in an efficient market…stock prices anticipate the future benefits of the possibility of 
CEO dismissal and therefore tend to increase as the capital market becomes aware of new 
avenues for management improvement” (p. 214). Notably, they also offered, 
“accounting-based measures, on the other hand, are more stable and not vulnerable to 
speculative or exogenous shocks (although a counter argument could be made that 
accounting-based measures are endogenous and susceptible to managerial manipulation)” 
(p. 215). They revealed a significant relationship (p≤ .001) between forced turnovers and 
performance of both stock returns and return on assets for their UK sample from 1990-
1998; “the data reveale[d] no association between non-forced departures and firm 
performance” (p. 218). Dahya et al. (2002) also “employ[ed] both accounting earnings 




return on assets (ROA) and industry adjusted stock returns, as differentiated from the 
methodology of Conyon and Florou, who documented abnormal returns circumscribing 
the announcement date of CEO departure. The test employed by Dahya et. al. (2002) 
does not distinguish realized returns from the variation stemming from the reaction and 
perception of risk by market participants at the turnover announcement date. 
Accounting information is, in practice, subject to manipulation. In particular, 
“executives of poorly performing firms have a greater incentive to make discretionary 
accounting choices to increase earnings than executives of good performing firms” 
(Detzler & Machuga, 2002, p. 368). However, since the efficient markets hypothesis was 
established under the premise that equity values are impounded with current relevant 
information, market prices should thus adjust to perceived risk more promptly than 
historical accounting information exhibits. Dutta and Richelstein (2005) observed: “one 
might expect that as market information becomes less precise, an optimal performance 
measure puts less weight on current stock price and instead relies more heavily on 
accounting measurements and future cash flows” (p. 1071).  Market movements are 
based on anticipated risk of CEO actions as perceived by stockholders, while accounting 
information conveys the results of CEO actions executed, as interpreted through the 
framework of generally accepted accounting principles. However, it is necessary to relate 
potential limitations of disseminated information, as Allgood and Farrell (2000) 
purported. Graham et al. (2005) acclaimed a related sentiment by asserting:  
…companies voluntarily disclose information to facilitate ‘clarity’ and 




reputation for not consistently providing precise and accurate information, 
can lead to under-pricing of a firm’s stock…accounting earnings matter 
more to managers than cash flows for financial reporting purposes, which 
contrasts with the emphasis on cash flows found in the finance literature. 
(p. 2)  
These researchers substantiated the perspective of surveyed CFOs, and the 
ascription of Lev (2001, as cited in Graham et al., 2005, p. 31): “GAAP-based financial 
reporting ignores intangible assets such as ‘people, processes, and brand position.’” To 
the extent that a chief executive is considered an intangible asset, expertise is not valued 
per se within a financial statement, but the strategic financial ramifications of executive 
decision-making have contemporaneous cash flow and earnings implications. 
Overarchingly, “results indicate[d] that CFOs believe that earnings, not cash flows, are 
the key metric considered by outsiders” (p. 4), and although fundamentally, earnings are 
related to cash flows, a distinct difference in shareholder perception exists among finance 
executives.  
As equity valuation models are chiefly derived from expected cash flows, 
convergence between stock price and accounting data theoretically transpires when the 
firm’s accrual income closely equates to its cash flow from operations. A time series 
analysis of accounting metrics identifies trends which provide information useful in the 
determination of financial outcomes of operations by identifying sustainable cash flows; 
this is the nature of the predictive value of accounting information. Coles et al. (2001) 




EVA® and MVA, since CEO-implemented performance change is ostensible through an 
extended time series interval in comparing a minimum of two data points, three years 
apart. Defond and Hung (2004) generalized findings of their studies of both financial and 
accounting related metrics by indicating: “CEO turnover is negatively related to stock 
price performance when prices are more informative and negatively related to earnings 
when stock prices are less informative and earnings are more informative” (p. 272). To 
the extent that an accurate infusion of the expected results given CEO turnover occurs in 
the context of an efficient market, CEO turnover is negatively related to stock prices. As 
a heuristic anticipation of market reaction, Nagar (2004) asserted: “other firms can 
capitalize on a distressed firm by hiring its talented managers, and investors can turn 
bearish in anticipation of these managers’ resignations. These effects will also manifest 
as a negative association between stock price and turnover” (p. 316). 
Dutta and Reichelstein (2005, pp. 1069-70) conceded: “to provide incentives for 
senior managers, firms rely on a range of performance indicators based on accounting 
data and external market information….inclusion of the ‘forward-looking’ stock price in 
the manager’s performance measure is one way to generate investment incentives.” This 
conjecture implicitly assumes that the efficient market hypothesis holds, and the market 
is at least semi-strong form efficient. By observing that “the role of stock prices can be 
thought of as a form of intertemporal relative performance evaluation in which current 
price serves as a benchmark for evaluating the manager’s future performance” (p. 1070), 




Additionally, a chosen robust metric must be sensitive enough to differentiate pricing 
dynamics relative to such changes. Detzler and Machuga (2002) deferred:  
…since firms that undergo non-routine turnovers typically have 
poor performance, it is especially important to control for firm 
performance to isolate changes in discretionary financial variables 
that are caused by changes in firm performance from those caused 
by management manipulation. (p. 365)  
 
Key financial metrics which detail the financial outcomes of operational 
investment and marketing endeavors are critical to monitor through CEO transitions. 
While market value added (MVA) is designated as “‘the definitive measure of corporate 
success’” (Stern Stewart, 1996, as cited in Coles et al., 2001, p. 33), there is also evidence 
that economic value added (EVA®) is a salient indicator of a firm’s utilization of assets, 
and ability of the CEO and executive team to generate shareholder returns from asset 
expenditures, adjusted by the cost of investment. Coles et al. (2001) disclosed results 
which “indicate[d] a strong relationship between industry EVA® (or MVA) and 
performance” (p. 39). Not only did these authors report a significant positive relationship 
between EVA® and combined leadership structure, they also ascertained a “negative 
relationship between the proportion of outside directors on the board, and CEO salary 
sensitivity with MVA” (p. 39). Firm and industry EVA® were both correlated with 




Şabac (2007) provided further evidence of managerial tenure and performance 
assessment; “the CEO’s power is based on perceived ability, which in turn is based on 
observed past performance” (p. 849). The concept of CEO retention until retirement is 
conducive to the strategic performance continuum; the moral hazard of turnover is thus 
reduced and risk mitigated. Increased risk is also dependent upon the switching costs of 
the agent’s subsequent renegotiation at the transpiration of turnover. Şabac construed: 
“the general solution to the agency problem allows for considering a variety of 
performance measurement systems, in particular, negatively auto-correlated accounting-
based performance measures, and highlights the different implications of using different 
performance measurement systems” (p. 850).  
It is integral, from an operational as well as an agency incentive perspective, for 
boards of directors to align performance metrics of organizations with those designating 
the overall acceptability of CEO success. Puffer and Weintrop (1991) ascribed: “to the 
extent that a performance measure reflects the board’s heuristic of differences from 
expectations it should be an effective predictor of CEO turnover” (p. 1). Accordingly, 
they employed a number of financial and accounting metrics to establish linkage from 
performance to turnover, and established an underlying assumption that analysts’ 
forecasts could be utilized as a proxy for board expectations of performance, “because 
much of the information analysts work with comes from executive officers of the firm 
who are members of the board of directors or advisors to the board” (p. 2). Stock price is 
often utilized as an exemplary metric, ubiquitously forming the basis of additional 




with substantial accuracy by financial analysts. Arguably, systematic “exogenous factors” 
may also unpredictably affect stock prices (p. 3). Therefore, a set of metrics which 
provide a more comprehensive CEO performance litmus may be more effective in 
assessing results over the long term, and should be instituted to develop “compensation 
contracts...used to align the interests of the two parties” (p. 5). Despite their extensive 
inclusion of independent variables (i.e., unexpected earnings per share, cumulative 
abnormal returns, return on assets, return on equity, etc.), Puffer and Weintrop failed 
initially to discover a significant relationship between any of the chosen performance 
variables and CEO turnover (p. 10). However, in further development of a more 
parsimonious model based upon the changes in expected EPS and market share, Puffer 
and Weintrop recounted the significance of a negative relationship (p<.10) between CEO 
turnover and the EPS comparison versus analyst forecasts and decline in market share (p. 
13). The authors contended: “measures of differences between actual EPS and financial 
analysts’ expectations, which served as a proxy for the board’s expectations, was 
significant, whereas measures based on mechanical algorithms—changes in accounting 
ratios...were not significant” (p. 15). 
Within two studies, Farrell and Whidbee (2000, 2002) prescribed a significant 
relationship between accounting performance and CEO turnover, in contrast to a 
significant relationship between stock returns and CEO turnover. Fich and Shivdasani 
(2006) denoted through an observation of US firms: “underperforming the industry by 
50% in the prior year increases the probability of forced CEO turnover by 4.36 




reflected: “managers believe that meeting benchmarks conveys future growth prospects 
to investors…in sum, the dominant reasons to meet or beat earnings benchmarks relate to 
stock prices” otherwise, an “information risk premium” (p. 25) may be expected by 
investors. Achieving benchmarks invariably signals future predictability to investors, 
which is critical from a valuation perspective; for this reason, “CFOs equate the idea of 
smooth earnings with the desire to avoid negative earnings surprises (relative to earnings 
targets)” (p. 25). As previously asserted, the burden of achieving forecasted results along 
with pervasive informational asymmetry and a weak governance structure may present 
the opportunity for an executive to engage in earnings manipulation.  
 Friedman and Singh (1989) conjectured:  
…if a rational selection process has occurred, an appropriate 
change in strategic direction is signaled. In such cases…the 
greatest potential for adaptiveness and hence, a positive 
stockholder reaction is likely…stockholder reaction to inside 
successors is likely to be positive under conditions of good 
performance. (p. 725) 
  
The outcome of their empirical tests revealed significant (p<.01) results for the 
interaction between variables representing performance and cumulative abnormal returns, 
as well as an inverse relationship to turnover (Friedman & Singh,1989, p. 734). However, 
outcomes were contrary to their original hypothesis “origin [of the successor] is not a 




738). “Results of this study support the notion that stockholder reactions to successions 
are heterogenous,” (p. 738); these findings indicate ambivalent or latent reactions among 
shareholders to corporate control events, which is typical of results of event studies. 
Utilizing “a matched sample of ‘non change’ firms (control group)” as compared 
to firms experiencing CEO change, Sheikholesami, Wilson, and Selin (1998, pp. 73-74) 
disclosed the existence of a “marginally” significant relationship (p<.08 for all variables) 
between time horizon and change versus non change firms and analyst forecast accuracy. 
Disclosure of the event led to appropriate analytical “attention directing” which provided 
greater scrutiny of fundamentals fueling equity pricing given news dissemination; results 
“indicate[d] that the forecast precision has improved more for CEO change firms than for 
control firms” (p. 74). 
 Stathopoulos, Espenlaub, and Walker (2005) stratified samples given financial 
results of UK firms into highly performing, mid-performing, and poorly performing, and 
attested to a truncated tenure for CEOs within the poorly performing sub-sample; “CEOs 
of poorly performing firms are significantly more likely to be dismissed...[these are] 
companies that have experienced a performance ‘shock’” (pp. 89-92). Results of their 
study were conjectured to have been impacted by the adoption of the Cadbury 
Committee’s advisement on governance (i.e., dichotomizing the role of CEO and Board 
Chair among UK entities). “The turnover more than triples after bad abnormal 
performance…this corresponds to an increase of 8 percent in the occurrence of CEO 
turnover in poor performers in year t + 1” (p. 102) or nearly eight times the rate of good 




represented in their three stratified samples, with respect to compensation, “the CEOs of 
poorly performing companies are better-off than their counterparts in the well performing 
firms” (p. 103). These authors also suggested that the primary governance mechanism 
within the UK sample was CEO removal rather than overall compensation decline, and 
CEOs are “well protected under their current contract (even in extreme cases of poor 
corporate performance)” (p. 104). Young (1998) echoed similar theoretical tenets: 
“turnover frequency may reflect the fact that measures short of outright dismissal (e.g., 
pay adjustments, early retirement, etc.) are the preferred method for correcting 
performance problems in the corporate sector” (p. 1125).  
 
Summary 
Chapter 2 contained the breadth of research on CEO turnover.  Such executive 
replacements occur through the normal course of retirements and resignations, however, 
these events may also be precipitated by a continuous exhibition of poor operational and 
financial performance. As Clayton et al. (2005) ascertained: “a change in executive 
leadership is a significant event in the life of a firm” (p. 1779). Assuredly, through 
differing applications of leadership styles and strategies, a change in executive personnel 
has the potential to exert pronounced operational impact upon a firm. In recounting the 
results of prior studies of CEO succession, the circumstances precipitating replacement as 
well as the source (internal or external) of successor may augur an equally significant 
impact upon financial outcomes. Within Collins’s (2001) sample, significant results of 
volatility tests within the time-series selected for observation will represent a departure 




the litmus an entity’s board applies to justify the replacement decision and the source of 
the successor may vary according to political and organizational structure, governance 
structure, and ownership structure. Further, agency effects due to entrenchment may 
become prevalent as an entity’s board seeks to unseat a deficiently performing executive. 
The degree of organizational inertia often predicates the board’s proclivity to act in the 
event of a requisite executive replacement.  
Financial metrics provide appropriate data regarding performance; the board 
utilizes metrics derived from accounting and financial markets regarding executive 
achievement. To perform an analysis of the differentiated results given a change in 
executive within an extraordinarily performing entity, both accounting and finance 
metrics are useful to gauge the propriety of reaction among investors given the 







Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
Through the application of a quantitative ex-post facto research design, statistics 
indicative of the incidence of CEO turnover, as well as accounting performance and risk 
analysis, were analyzed in order to complete tests of significance for five separately 
identified metrics. As the sample was indicative of that contained within a foundational 
piece of management literature, a prior analysis of the data existed (Collins, 2001). 
Financial data for relevant years under study were collected and analyzed to reveal 
whether significant statistical differences exists distinguishing financial performance 
outcomes prior to and post the qualifying CEO replacement event, which served as a 
nonmanipulated variable. Data was obtained from publicly available sources, including 
Moody’s Industrial Manual and its modern electronic successor, 
www.mergentonline.com, as well as the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) online database. Spreadsheet software programs as well as statistical 
software programs were utilized to complete the required data analysis. Findings are 
presented in both numeric and graphical formats, as appropriate. These unique tests 
conducted and documented herein provide an extended framework for evaluating the 
significance of the main effects of executive turnover upon high performing firms in the 
financial context.  
Description of the Research Design 
To assess whether optimal financial performance was affected given chief 




analysis of relevant intervals prior and subsequent to the replacement event. As derived 
from the literature, risk-related fundamental financial metrics which capture volatility 
impounded within current stock prices and historic accounting returns which capture the 
internal performance of firms are often employed as a statistically testable source of 
variability in accordance with a change in CEO. These metrics were designated to serve 
as proxies for operational implementation of transformational strategic change by the 
CEO, stockholder reaction to the CEO turnover event announcement, and overall risk to 
the firm through observed reaction to and measured perception of market participants 
prior to and post a qualifying event. 
The quantitative ex-post facto experimental design elements were modeled after 
the volatility event tests of Clayton et al. (2005): “a majority of [authors] perform a 
volatility event study based on a comparison of the variability of equity price changes 
before and after the event to determine the volatility impact of the event” (p. 1793). To 
address fiscal linkage to the manifestation of transformational leadership, accounting-
based metrics were comparatively employed at the time-series interval advocated by 
Clayton et al. (2005, p. 1802): “from the fiscal year prior to the turnover (t-1) to the 
second fiscal year after the turnover year (t+2).” Return on equity, as utilized by Cannella 
Jr. and Lubatkin (1993, p. 773), was employed as a proxy for transformational leadership, 
by calculating “income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations as 
reported during the fiscal year prior to the year of succession,” as noted within the 
analysis of Clayton et al. (2005). The time-series of the initial metric was identical within 




employ a comparison of entity results versus industry average designated by Standard 
Industry Code (SIC), Clayton et al. utilized entity metrics for successive time-series as 
indicated.  
Controlling for performance limited the influence of other factors during the 
initial period of selection; however, through continued longitudinal analysis, 
differentiable performance occurring as a result of CEO replacement has the potential to 
transpire in a continuum, edifying the effects of governance and strategic continuity. 
These tests were thus based on temporal precedence of turnover prior to the observable 
erosion of financial performance. Since the outcomes sought within this analytical 
context were driven by past events, an ex-post facto design was suitably employed. “Ex-
post facto designs provide an alternative means by which a researcher can investigate the 
extent to which specific independent variables…may possibly affect the dependent 
variable(s) of interest” (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005, p. 232). This is a basic approach applied 
in financial research, particularly in event studies, as variables cannot be manipulated for 
the sole purpose of experimentation in research.  
A weakness of the ex-post facto design is inherent as “the experimenter cannot 
control for confounding variables that may provide alternative explanations for any group 
differences that are observed” (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005, p. 232). However, financial 
statements are more revealing by design and generally authentic and transparent in 
recounting the monetary outcomes of operational decision making within the firm 




an absence of material restatements among the sampled entities for the periods under 
investigation.  
This was a pretest / posttest multiple baseline design; the differing time-series 
under investigation constituted experiences as indicated through transpiration of the 
turnover event. In the case of experimentation in other social research areas, conclusions 
of cause and effect are limited in application. Conversely, related conclusions regarding 
factors leading to the turnover event and significance of the data were drawn through an 
observation of the underlying financial data, due to its revealing nature.  
Hence, the choice of inclusion for multiple financial metrics was initiated to elicit 
research responses which aid in the assertion of relationships between accounting based 
performance metrics, market based risk measures, and strategic change. The observed 
magnitude of return on assets and Tobin’s q indicated whether asset utilization and 
external stockholder response were aligned as the replacement event occurred.  
To determine the turnover year(s) applicable to CEO and firm, the Forbes Survey 
of CEO Compensation (http://www.forbes.com/2004/04/21/04ceoland .html) was used  
and compared across annual time-series intervals. The Mergent Online Database, http://0-
www.mergentonline.com.helin.uri.edu/compsearch.asp, was also utilized as a source for 
financial and CEO information, as applicable. 
Population and Sample 
The population under study was that of entities experiencing a chief executive 
officer replacement which Collins (2001) identified within his analysis; presence or 




independent variable which delimited the sample under study to the annual financial 
results of those entities experiencing such a change in personnel prior to and post the 
replacement event. Conjecture that the fiscal effectiveness of strategic changes 
implemented by a replaced CEO were presaged to be detectable through a time-series 
financial analysis of accounting metrics and market measures of risk delimits this study 
to publicly held enterprises for which market information may be acquired through 
conventional access.  Equity prices of companies are affected by the general reaction of 
market participants, as defined by investors who are shareholders or market makers 
within the securities market context.  
The grid below summarizes the population from which the sample was drawn. 
Collins (2001, p.7) identified a “transition point” in firm performance for the eleven 
entities outlined in his analysis which indicated the inception of exceptional results. The 
original years of Collins’s analysis are distinguished by an asterisk; the financial 
performance and CEO replacement events of these entities were scrutinized commencing 
at the inception of the transition point and concluding with the fiscal performance of 
2008, published through SEC reporting in 2009 and indicated in the grid by an arrow. For 
firms which were subsequently acquired since Collins’s text was published, in particular, 
Gillette, data analysis was limited to that obtainable through public records disseminated 





 Table 1 
Population and Sample 
Financial Reporting Year
Firm Name 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 Total
Abbott Laboratories * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 35
Circuit City * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * > > > > > > > > > > > 27
Fannie Mae * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * > > > > > > > > > 25
Gillette * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * > > > > > > > > > 25
Kimberly Clark * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 37
Kroger * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 36
Nucor Steel * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 34
Philip Morris (Altria) * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 45
Pitney Bowes * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 36
Walgreen's * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 34
Wells Fargo * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * > > > > > > > > > > 26
Total Firm Years 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 5 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 9 10 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 10 10 10 10 360





The firms included in the sampling frame were: Abbott Laboratories; Circuit City; 
Federal National Mortgage Association, or Fannie Mae; Gillette, now merged with 
Proctor and Gamble; Kimberly-Clark; Kroger Foods; Nucor Steel; Philip Morris 
Company, now Altria; Pitney Bowes Company; Walgreen Company; and Wells Fargo 
(Collins, 2001). The financial results of high performance years as purported by Collins 
for each firm were examined beginning with each applicable interval, differing by firm.  
Since much of the research addressing CEO replacements to date was conducted 
within the syntax of stratified financial performance sampling, such results would be 
generalizable to the relevant population of firms within the market from which the data 
was derived. Distinguishing the chosen sample as those entities profiled in Collins’s 
(2001) text limits the population to those eleven entities which were highly performing 
both operationally and financially, as underscored within the ascribed limitations, 
generalizability of results of this study may be limited. Collins’s assertions of prevailing 
excellence in leadership among the companies within the sample allowed for tests of 
sustainability of strategic outcomes achieved under an individual’s tenure.  
Selection of this particular sample delimited the influence of some exogenous or 
systematic market variables, as it was by definition a nonprobability purposive sample. 
The sample was a census in which every member of the population is analyzed for 
inclusion given the presence of a qualifying event. Since the firms in Collins’s (2001) 
sample were all high performing, most strategies were sustainable and most leaders were 




affecting the firm; this was pervasive during the tenure of the CEOs profiled within the 
text. Hence, the chosen census was characteristically differentiated from prior research 
samples which considered the entire population of the market in that high performance, 
strategic continuity, and presence of a CEO leadership legacy were all relevant among 
the entire tested population. Whereas prior studies, most notably, Clayton et al. (2005) 
utilized a sample of entities subject to CEO turnover, but did not feature stratification of 
the heterogeneous sample according to realized financial performance, the intent in 
utilizing Collins’s (2001) sample for the study was to determine the degree of change in 
accounting and financial performance which resulted from a change in leadership among 
exceptionally performing firms. Further rationale was that results of this study are 
potentially generalizable specifically to exceptionally performing firms; contrastingly, 
samples derived from a larger population include the performance of poorly performing 
firms, which may not be generalizable to highly performing firms. The probability of 
CEO turnover and the choice of successor type, whether insider, follower, or outsider, 
have both been correlated to firm financial performance by a myriad of researchers 
(Farrell & Whidbee, 2005; Fich & Shivdasani, 2006; et al.).  An intimate understanding 
of the propriety of strategic personnel fit in the turnover circumstance assists in the 
development of appropriate succession planning strategies for a continuum of firm 
financial performance.  
Instrumentation 
Initially, the published balance sheets, statements of income, and selected stock 




recorded manually within an Excel spreadsheet format for years prior to 1994, and 
obtained from an online data base for years subsequent to 1994. The data collection 
exercise was performed to facilitate calculation of Tobin’s q and beta financial metrics as 
well as the return on assets, economic value added, and market value added accounting 
metrics applicable to the historical population. As a condition of testing, metrics of the 
aforementioned companies comprising the sampling frame were compared pre-and-post 
to the conditional change of CEO replacement; these metrics served as the independent 
variables under investigation; the CEO replacement event serves as the nonmanipulated 
dependent variable. The test of Hypothesis 1 specifically entailed the experimentation of 
the annual probability rate of CEO replacement for Collins’s (2001) sample of firms 
versus that was also entailed in the research of Comte and Mihal (1990), which addressed 
the historical rate of CEO turnover for US public firms during the years 1945 through 
1984. The tests of Hypotheses 2 and 3 entailed a pre-and-post CEO replacement time-
series analysis of the exogenous financial metrics Tobin’s q and beta. The tests of 
Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6 entailed a pre-and-post CEO replacement time-series analysis of 
the endogenous accounting metrics return on assets or ROA, economic value added or 
EVA®, and the hybrid market value added or MVA, respectively. As EVA® and MVA 
are absolute measures of firm performance, the annual financial statement outcomes must 
be inflation adjusted for these items. The source for US inflation adjustment employed is 
available at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl. The test of Hypothesis 7 entailed an 
analysis of variance, testing interactions between the variables of the financial and 




form of an F-test to determine the existing level of interrelatedness among these 
dependent variables. Comparison of financial and accounting metrics as ascribed served 
as the instrumentation of the experiments. Parametric tests of statistical significance, as 
entailed in the hypotheses, were conducted subsequent to the sampling and calculation of 
the relevant interval of CEO tenure as documented in Collins’s (2001) volume.  
Data Collection Procedures 
All financial data utilized within this study was derived from publicly available 
resources. Interpretive background and analysis of the personal qualities of the CEO 
under study for any particular firm was garnered from Collins’s (2001) summary of 
highly performing entities, or factual data from the firm’s annual financial reporting filed 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the United States, or the SEC. As 
previously designated, the time-series of financial results within Collins’s sample differ 
by firm, according to the inception of the period of high performance in which the firm 
earned returns which significantly exceeded the general market return for the same 
interval. With the earliest year of Collins’s analysis being 1964 and the latest being 1999, 
the earliest time frame of results was not readily available electronically through the SEC 
electronic resource database known as EDGAR. Principal sources of financial data prior 
to 1994 were annual entries within Moody’s Industrial Manual, an investor resource of 
compiled annual financial data. Data for financial statements published within the last 15 
years was also harvested from the Mergent Online database, http://0-
www.mergentonline.com.helin.uri.edu/compsearch.asp, a successor of Moody’s through 




academic analysis are available. Certain of these financial statement elements, as 
mentioned, were adjusted for inflation. Relative measures of financial statement data 
utilizing dollarized measures in all ratio inputs did not require conversion; however, as 
certain ratios and metrics included a dollarized financial statement element in a single 
input, this element required conversion to a reference point in time to ensure relative 
comparison. To facilitate this exercise, the Bureau of Labor Statistics website was 
utilized to convert relevant measures:  http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl. The relevant 
elements were converted into 2008 US dollars. Following the calculation of all relevant 
test metrics, the data was identified for inclusion within the sample. The data was 
compiled and analysis completed within a spreadsheet format (Microsoft Excel) or 
statistical package as appropriate. 
Data Analysis 
The time-series under investigation varied according to the applicable interval as 
indicated in Collins’s (2001) study. To adequately assess differing financial performance 
levels for the firms’ time-series under comparison, the approach of Clayton et al. (2005, 
p. 1794), utilizing standard deviations calculated in accordance with a five-year period: at 
(t-2), (t-1), (t), (t+1), (t+2), and (t+3) was employed.  This represented a longitudinal 
analysis of annualized financial results, the most comprehensive of which spans a period 
exceeding four decades. As Clayton et al. also tested the volatility of financial results of 
other intervals circumscribing the event date based on a stratified sample of CEO 
replacement type, it will be informative to develop the same interval for investigation, 




were sourced from within the firm. Tests of significance were conducted for each 
individual firm. The regression derived from the set of five control variables, accounting 
and finance metrics Tobin’s q, beta, ROA, EVA®, and MVA, were observed for 
robustness, as entailed by the correlation coefficient, given a test for multicollinearity. 
Within this analysis of variance application, the difference in the five metrics pre-and-
post turnover served as independent variables. The observed p-values for each of the 
variables were utilized to assert inferences regarding the robustness of the resultant 
statistical model. In the event of an indication of multicollinearity, systematic 
improvements to the model were suggested in order to robustly enhance its predictive 
value.  
Significance of volatility was tested through the employment of a standard 
parametric F-test for the ratio of variances, derived from sample standard deviations of 
each applicable finance or accounting metric of the sample squared. The time-series 
interval advocated by Clayton et al. (2005, p. 1794) required standard deviations to be 
calculated in accordance with a five-year period: at (t-2), (t-1), (t), (t+1), (t+2),and (t+3); 
“volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of returns over the event year” (p. 
1795).  Volatility in the applicable capital asset pricing model (or CAPM) over the same 
time period capturing was indirectly tested through the employment of the F-test for beta. 
Note that the CAPM is employed as the covariance of the equity return against the 
market return divided by the variance of the market return (Sharpe, 1972, p. 93). Tobin’s 
q, a measure of the total market value of the firm divided by total asset value of the firm, 




content of a CEO replacement event; however, it is a formidable litmus utilized to 
characterize stockholder value perception in many other financial contexts. Directional 
consistency was expected to occur across a time-series analysis between the beta metric 
and the Tobin’s q metric, representing convergence of the stockholder perception of 
enterprise asset value. This assertion was commented upon pending the completion of 
Hypotheses tests 2 and 3, and indicated in Chapter 5. The efficient markets hypothesis, or 
the extant impounding of monetary implications of extant events affecting the entity, 
whether internal or exogenous, was also indirectly tested. Further, the robustness of beta, 
or the covariance of the entity's stock price versus the variance of the market, was 
addressed and tested to determine if this metric was sensitive to stock price movements 
which result due to a change in executive leadership.  
The EVA® metric is more conducive to differentiating risk to the firm, as it 
captures the cost-of-capital and the change in the cost of capital relative to a change in 
leadership. As EVA® is a managerially oriented metric, its complement, MVA, is 
market-oriented metric. Hence, it is useful to calculate and compare both measures of 
value added, addressing the intrinsic addition of value and the extrinsic perception of 
added value. Coles et al. (2001) purported:  
The EVA® measure, which contains a weighted average cost of capital, explicitly 
controls for the riskiness of the firm. The MVA measure only accounts for the 
actual accumulated value of the firm, but the risk factor borne by investors to 




A qualitative commentary of the factors influencing the performance of each firm 
given a CEO turnover event was undertaken following the data analysis. Given 
contemporaneous and precipitous market declines experienced in the 2008 reporting year 
for many public firms, it was integral to interpret statistical findings if CEO change 
occurred during the reporting year. Although Collins’s (2001) analytical classification 
technique warranted investigation as certain firms within his prior sample were no longer 
going concerns, it was revealing to perform financial analysis and differentiate factors 
which precipitated significant value erosion among these firms, and introduce techniques 
which enhance or refute prior approaches. Qualitative aspects and quantitative financial 
trends were reviewed and compared intra and inter firm for factors influencing risk 
differentiation as identified in the literature review. These descriptive and revealing 
qualitative aspects ascribed financial results by providing ancillary explanations which 
asserted reasons for the direction of data influence. This paralleled the technique of 
Clayton et al. (2005) in which “alternative explanations for volatility changes” (p. 1787) 
were sought through research technique. Potential aspects of governance which 
precipitate executive turnover, including agency effects and hierarchical firm structure, 
were identified in the literature review and may be qualitatively related as explanations 
for trends and significance discovered through data analysis. 
Summary 
A test of financial performance outcomes of strategic continuity, given the 
presence of CEO replacement, was conducted in order to provide evidence for and 




executive within a highly performing firm, can strategic continuity of financial results be 
sustained subsequent to departure? The relative frequency of CEO changes among highly 
performing firms within Collins’s (2001) sample are compared to the results of Comte 
and Mihal’s (1990) 80 randomly selected sample of Fortune 500 firms spanning the years 
1945-1984. 
The financial performance of all eleven firms in Collins’s (2001) seminal work 
were reviewed for the years of coverage of Collins’s research, and extended to the 
reporting year of dissemination, 2007. Level of significance of change in financial and 
accounting metrics Tobin’s q, beta, ROA, EVA®, and MVA, was determined and 
presented, as well as a test of interaction of all metrics, serving as independent variables 
within a binary logistic regression. Qualitative commentary as well as interpretations, 
convergences to, and divergences from Collins’s assertions and observations is presented 
in both statistical and graphical format where appropriate. 
The data collection process for this research effort has been approved by the 








Chapter 4: Results  
Introduction 
This chapter contains the statistical results of hypothesis testing conducted on the 
financial ratios for the sample of firms as detailed in Collins’s (2001) analysis and 
extended time-series, given the presence of chief executive replacement events. The 
incidence rate of chief executive turnover as compared to prior studies and tested in 
Hypothesis 1 is statistically analyzed for significance through the application of a 
studentized t test. The establishment of a leadership legacy by the incumbent chief 
executive hinges upon the presence of volatility in financial metrics as compared to a 
successor. Thus, F tests that provide indication of the statistical significance of the 
variance of the metrics asserted within the hypothesis tests are conducted in conjunction 
with hypotheses 2 through 6. The significance of each of five ratios as independent 
variables in a predictor equation of chief executive turnover (prior versus post event 
comparison) is presented in support of Hypothesis 7.  
To provide an additional point of comparison to that of the sampled time-series (t-
2), (t-1), (t), (t+1), (t+2), and (t+3), which aligned with the prior research approach taken 
by Clayton et al. (2005), an F-test of the volatility of financial ratios is also conducted for 
the time-series representing the entire tenure of the chief executive officer, in comparison 
to the performance of that of the successor executive. This additional comparison departs 
from the Clayton et al. study and provides edification as to whether a traditional event 
study approach yield results similar to that of a longitudinal study of expanded length, 




expanded interval exhibiting less volatility results in differentiation from typical event 
studies in which investor trading precipitates increased volatility as the event date 
transpires, during an interval immediately circumscribing the event date.  
Contents of this chapter are presented thus: a data description within which the 
resources utilized in the procurement of data are enumerated; tests of hypothesis: Ratio 
Analysis, within which the results of a Studentized t test and F tests performed to 
examine volatility among financial metrics by firm for hypotheses 1 through 6 are 
enumerated; and Test of Hypothesis: Regression, within which the results of a regression 
analysis performed to examine the significance of independent variables (i.e., ratios 
tested in hypotheses 2 through 6) to the dependent variable, pre-and-post CEO turnover. 
The chapter concludes with a brief Summary 
Data Description 
The primary source of financial data for the analyses conducted herein was the 
electronic successor of Moody’s Industrial Manual, Mergent Online. It is noted that 
Collins’s (2009) team also utilized Moody’s reporting to develop a quantitative analysis 
of firms under review; hence, sources of data essentially align. Further reliable support 
for notable events or recognized trends providing support to observations was garnered 
from the sample firms’ US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) annual 10K 
filings; generally, electronic filings were procured through the Mergent Online portal 
which provides electronic access to EDGAR, the SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering, 
Analysis, and Retrieval System. A firm’s management’s discussion and analysis included 




to past or contemporaneous material or strategic events. Each firm’s balance sheet, 
income statement, and daily equity prices were extracted from the aforementioned 
website in a spreadsheet format for the maximum retrievable annual reporting time frame 
of 15 years. For most firms, this retrieval began with the reporting year 2008 and 
concluded with the reporting year 1994. The exception to this was the analysis of Gillette, 
as it had been procured by another entity after 2004. To the extent that Collins’s (2001) 
analytical interval extended further into the chronological past, the data were obtained 
from the firm’s earliest obtainable SEC 10K reporting first, then complemented with 
earlier required data from Moody’s Industrial or Financial Services Manual, as 
applicable. All calculations of relevant data comprising empirical and fundamental 
analyses were originated from the data retrieved; if the ratio under examination was 
available for retrieval directly from the Mergent Online website, it was recalculated in 
order that, should it be subject to further analysis on separate componentized 
fundamentals, analyses would reveal trends integral to further conclusions.  
In order to support the calculation of dollars of relevant weighted average cost of 
capital required to complete the computation of EVA®, an Excel spreadsheet was 
retrieved from www.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/pc/ wacccalc.xls (Damodaran, n.d.). The 
reconciliation of the weighted average of debt issues outstanding by dollar amount, 
maturity, and applicable interest rate were conducted through the review of each firm’s 
10K debt disclosures or Moody’s Industrial or Bank & Finance Manual, as applicable. In 
addition, the beta of each firm’s equity was calculated from the derived covariance of two 




movements were not retrievable from Mergent Online, the subsequent period’s beta 
calculation was utilized for the calculation of the weighted average cost of capital and the 
statistical calculation required to test Hypothesis 3. In certain cases in which stock price 
movements could not be determined, the test of beta for that event was excluded. 
As modeled after the research of Clayton et al. (2005), the delimited sample was 
utilized for the hypothesis testing. It was drawn from the population of 360 firm years 
which includes ratios calculated for the entire sample and extracted from the time-series 
interval in accordance with a five-year period: at (t-2), (t-1), (t), (t+1), (t+2),and (t+3). In 
addition, due to the heightened sensitivity of the F-test employed for statistical analysis 
when samples are limited in size, F-tests of ratios were also conducted for an expanded 
interval which began with the year following the turnover as tenure began; this was 
compared to the performance interval for the entire tenure of the CEO successor for 
hypothesis tests two through seven.   
Test of Hypotheses: Ratio Analysis 
1. Hypothesis 1: Measurement of CEO change rate within Collins’ sample, 
an indicator of the stability of firms within the sample. 
Hø: There will be no significant difference in the rate of CEO 
change evident in the time-series analysis of the entities within 
Collins’ sample for the period t=15, as compared to a multiyear 
sample within the literature spanning a time frame representative 




Ha: There will be a significant difference in the rate of CEO 
change evident in the time-series analysis of the entities within 
Collins’s sample for the period t=15, as compared to a multiyear 
sample within the literature spanning a time frame representative 
of Collins’s entities. 
Comte and Mihal (1990) documented executive turnover events for four decades, 
a time-series which extended from 1945 through 1984. The randomly selected sample 
originated from Fortune 500 firms, and was further dichotomized into two twenty year 
subsamples, the second of which spanned the years 1965 through 1984. This body of 
research based on the named decades most closely aligned with the fifteen year spans of 
observation performed by Collins (2001) for the relevant census, the earliest and latest of 
which began in 1964 and 1984, respectively. Comte and Mihal (1990) denoted firms 
comprising the sample displayed higher, similar, and lower turnover rates for the second 
two decades under observation; data provided within a frequency histogram of their 
findings was expressed as a percentage frequency. The average CEO turnover across all 

























Abbott Laboratories 74 1 6.67 08 3 8.57 35
Circuit City 82 1 6.67 08 3 11.11 27
Fannie Mae 84 2 13.33 08 4 16.00 25
Gillette 80 1 6.67 04 3 12.00 25
Kimberly Clark 72 0 0.00 08 2 5.41 37
Kroger 73 1 6.67 08 3 8.33 36
Nucor Steel 75 0 0.00 08 3 8.82 34
Philip Morris (Altria) 64 1 6.67 08 6 13.33 45
Pitney Bowes 73 1 6.67 08 3 8.33 36
Walgreen's 75 0 0.00 08 4 11.76 34
Wells Fargo 83 1 6.67 08 3 11.54 26
Total CEO Turnover Events 9 5.45 37 10.28 360
Standard Deviations 4.02 2.92
 
The table above displays the descriptive statistical calculation of the mean CEO 
turnover for Collins’s (2001) sample, and the extended sample as ascribed within Table 
1, denoting 360 firm reporting years. During that time, the mean frequency turnover 
percentage was 5.45 %. To statistically compare this to Comte and Mihal’s (1990) 
sample, as the variance of that sample is not known, a t-test was conducted to determine 
whether the mean as calculated above is significantly different than the mean value of 9 





Figure 1. CEO Turnover Frequency. 
 
 
The Hypothesis 1 test is thus indicated as:  
Hø: µ = 9%. 
Ha: µ ≠ 9%. 
The sample t-statistic is defined as follows:  = . Hypothesis testing 
will primarily be completed at the 95% confidence level. The critical value of the t-
statistic at 10 degrees of freedom and an assumed 95% confidence level for a two-tailed 
test is ±2.228.  
Calculation of the t-statistic for the initial 15 year sample indicated by Collins 
(2001) yields a value of -2.929. Hence, the null hypothesis may be rejected in favor of the 




within Collins’s 15 year sample statistically is significantly different from that of Comte 
and Mihal’s (1990) sample.  
Calculation of the t-statistic at the 95% confidence level for the extended sample 
continued through 2008 (or until acquisition or liquidation as applicable by firm) yields a 
value of 1.454. Hence, the null hypothesis may not be rejected in favor of the alternative 
at the 95% level of confidence. The mean CEO turnover rate occurring among Collins’s 
(2001) highly performing firms extended sample is not statistically different from that of 
Comte and Mihal’s (1990) sample. An extension of the sample to include more recent 
experience does not statistically differentiate the mean CEO turnover of highly 
performing firms from the results reported by Comte and Mihal at the 95% confidence 
level. In addition, the results of the test of Hypothesis 1 for the extended sample further 
support the finding present in the research of Comte and Mihal, that the mean CEO 
turnover rate continued to increase as time progressed and the interval was expanded.  
Hypothesis 2: Measurement of stockholder reaction to CEO change, intrafirm. 
Hø: There will be no significant stockholder reaction to CEO 
change evident in the time-series analysis of the Tobin’s q metric 
for entities within Collins’s sample for the period t-2 and the 
period t+3, where t represents the year of CEO change. 
Ha: There will be a significant stockholder reaction to CEO 
change evident in the time-series analysis of the Tobin’s q metric 
for entities within Collins’s sample for the period t-2 and the 




 Tobin’s q may be employed as a determinant of investor perception of market 
value of assets. To the extent that a point value for market price at the balance sheet date 
is correlated with the general trend in the direction of market price, then price will have 
revealing valuation qualities, although price may be significantly differentiated from 
book. Clayton et al. (2005) empirically tested the statistical significance of volatility of 
the Tobin’s q metric for firms experiencing CEO turnover as compared to their sector (p. 
1797). 
Results of the test of Hypothesis 2 were mixed; a statistical test of volatility as 
measured through an F-test of variance revealed that stockholder reaction is fairly 
sensitive, in some instances, to the event as measured within the interval confined 
immediately prior and subsequent to the CEO change. Thus, metrics were computed at 
the interval when the departing executive’s impact on financial performance is 
conjectured to be influential, i.e., t-2 representing the year of the turnover event less two 
years, and conversely, inconsequential, i.e., t+3. If turnover occurred subsequent to 2006, 
a completed pair of observations could not be drawn; hence, for events so affected, the 
observation was excluded from the analysis. The number of turnover events affected by 
this exclusion is eight. Additionally, if the sampled intervals representing the entire CEO 
tenure resulted in a single year between events subsequent to the turnover, the F-test for 
the event was undefined, for the degrees of freedom in the denominator amounted to 
zero. As certain events also resulted in degrees of freedom of zero in the numerator, these 
were also excluded. The number of events affected by either of these potential anomalies 




Table 3 below details the results of hypothesis testing for the Tobin’s q metric for 
Collins’s (2001) interval extended for each firm through fiscal 2008 for the time frame 
indicated by Clayton et al. (2005).  In addition the extended interval over the entire tenure 
for which the metric prior and subsequent to each turnover was measured from the 
inception of Collins’s (2001) analysis through fiscal 2008. For turnover events within 
Collins’s (2001) extended time-series of eleven firms through 2008 utilizing the Clayton 
et al. (2005) t-2 vs t+3 sampling, the test of variance of the Tobin’s q metric yielded a 
statistically significant F-test at the 95% confidence level for three of the pre-versus-post 
CEO turnover events of the total sample of 29 turnovers emerging from the financial 
history of Collins’s (2001) eleven selected firms. These were: Kimberly Clark, 2003; 
Kroger, 1989; and Walgreen Company, 2005. This statistical result implies that for 
approximately 10.34 % of the CEO turnover events sampled, shareholders were sensitive 
to the potential change in market value of the firm which coincided with a succinct 
interval circumscribing the event; shareholders promptly reacted to the perceived change 
in market value, despite a brief comparison interval.  
In contrast to the results provided through the modeled application of the Clayton 
et al. (2005) interval, the expanded interval documenting results of the entire tenure of the 
chief executive supported the conjecture that shareholder sensitivity, as measured through 
the Tobin’s q metric, more prevalently yielded a statistically significant F-test at the 95% 
confidence level. Over a prolonged time-series which encompassed the CEO’s entire 
tenure, shareholders were thus more highly sensitive to a total of nine, or 31.04 %, of 




Kimberly Clark, 2003; Kroger, 1977 and 2003; Philip Morris, 2002; and Wells Fargo 
2001. Statistically significant results at the 95% confidence level are designated by the 
double asterisk included to the left of the F-test result. 
Table 3 






F-critical     





F-critical     
α = .05
Abbott Laboratories 1978 61.18             199.50           Abbott Laboratories 1978 7.43                   8.81              
Abbott Laboratories 1989 13.34             199.50           Abbott Laboratories 1989 1.18                   3.29              
Abbott Laboratories 1998 1.62               199.50           Abbott Laboratories 1998 3.10                   3.68              
Circuit City 1987 1.80               199.50           Circuit City 1987 1.36                   3.59              
Circuit City 2000 8.05               18.51             Circuit City 2000 1.09                   3.36              
Fannie Mae 1989 2.22               199.50           Circuit City 2005 2.73                   224.60          
Fannie Mae 1998 5.55               18.51             Fannie Mae 1989 9.02                   ** 6.26              
Fannie Mae 2005 1.65               18.51             Fannie Mae 1998 17.25                 ** 4.88              
Gillette 1990 14.83             18.51             Fannie Mae 2005 1.86                   19.30            
Gillette 1999 8.02               18.51             Gillette 1990 3.61                   ** 3.29              
Gillette 2001 7.36               199.50           Gillette 1999 40.50                 ** 6.04              
Kimberly Clark 1991 2.20               199.50           Kimberly Clark 1991 1.59                   2.41              
Kimberly Clark 2003 21.04             ** 18.51             Kimberly Clark 2003 10.22                 ** 5.96              
Kroger 1977 12.73             199.50           Kroger 1977 205.67               ** 8.79              
Kroger 1989 24.99             ** 18.51             Kroger 1989 1.50                   2.91              
Kroger 2003 6.60               18.51             Kroger 2003 9.35                   ** 5.91              
Nucor Steel 1995 5.51               18.51             Nucor Steel 1995 1.97                   19.45            
Nucor Steel 1999 1.63               18.51             Nucor Steel 1999 1.76                   19.35            
Nucor Steel 2000 2.2584           199.50           Nucor Steel 2000 2.41                   8.89              
Philip Morris (Altria) 1978 26.92             199.50           Philip Morris (Altria) 1978 1.68                   8.71              
Philip Morris (Altria) 1983 12.91             199.50           Philip Morris (Altria) 1983 1.32                   4.35              
Philip Morris (Altria) 1992 2.75               18.51             Philip Morris (Altria) 1992 1.76                   3.73              
Philip Morris (Altria) 2002 2.49               199.50           Philip Morris (Altria) 2002 4.99                   ** 4.39              
Pitney Bowes 1983 37.94             199.50           Pitney Bowes 1983 2.87                   3.10              
Pitney Bowes 1996 2.21               199.50           Pitney Bowes 1996 1.05                   2.90              
Walgreen's 1998 2.38               18.51             Walgreen's 1998 4.29                   19.45            
Walgreen's 2005 3,179.72        ** 199.50           Walgreen's 2002 9.71                   19.00            
Wells Fargo 1995 9.75               199.50           Wells Fargo 1995 1.34                   5.93              
Wells Fargo 2001 5.91               18.51             Wells Fargo 2001 14.04                 ** 6.39              
**significant at 5% level




Hypothesis 3: Measurement of financial market risk relative to CEO change, 




Hø: There will be no significant change in the magnitude of 
financial risk relative to CEO change evident in the time-series 
analysis of beta for entities within Collins’s sample for the period 
t-2 and the period t+3, where t represents the year of CEO change. 
Ha: There will be a significant change in the magnitude of 
financial risk relative to CEO change evident in the time-series 
analysis of beta for entities within Collins’s sample for the period 
t-2 and the period t+3, where t represents the year of CEO change. 
 
 Table 4 below reveals the significance of the F-test of variance for the beta metric 
for the intervals specifically surrounding three CEO turnover events for Kroger, Pitney 
Bowes, and Wells Fargo. These results implicate that for financial risk as indexed 
through the beta metric defined as  , for approximately 88% of 
turnover events, stock price volatility was not measurably statistically distinguished by 
significance as compared through observation of the variance, pre-versus-post turnover. 
Overall, this result is not consistent with the expectations of and outcomes present within  
many event studies. Typically, the results of event studies align with outcomes consistent 
through applications of the theory behind the semi-strong form of the efficient markets 
hypothesis, that news concerning the firm that reaches the market precipitates valuation 
reassessments of their own holdings by investors as well as managers of larger holdings 











F-critical     





F-critical     
α = .05
Abbott Laboratories 1989 10.73        199.50      Abbott Laboratories 1989 2.52          3.29          
Abbott Laboratories 1998 130.13      199.50      Abbott Laboratories 1998 2.26          3.68          
Circuit City 2000 1.40          18.51        Circuit City 1999 1.11          5.93          
Fannie Mae 1989 1.19          18.51        Circuit City 2005 5.65          224.60      
Fannie Mae 1998 1.93          199.50      Fannie Mae 1989 7.43          ** 4.12          **
Fannie Mae 2005 11.22        199.50      Fannie Mae 1998 2.76          3.97          
Gillette 1990 7.75          199.50      Fannie Mae 2005 21.18        ** 5.79          **
Gillette 1999 10.39        18.51        Gillette 1990 1.09          3.29          
Gillette 2001 2.56          199.50      Gillette 1999 5.38          6.04          
Kimberly Clark 1991 4.40          199.50      Kimberly Clark 1991 30.72        ** 2.41          **
Kimberly Clark 2003 1.27          18.51        Kimberly Clark 2003 51.61        ** 5.96          
Kroger 1989 19.86        ** 18.51        Kroger 1989 20.55        ** 2.91          **
Kroger 2003 1.60          199.50      Kroger 2003 3.58          5.91          
Nucor Steel 1995 41.47        199.50      Nucor Steel 1995 1.78          19.45        
Nucor Steel 1999 3.42          18.51        Nucor Steel 1999 6.72          19.35        
Nucor Steel 2000 7.01          199.50      Nucor Steel 2000 5.78          8.89          
Philip Morris (Altria) 1978 5.65          199.50      Philip Morris (Altria) 1978 2.92          3.41          
Philip Morris (Altria) 1983 10.90        199.50      Philip Morris (Altria) 1983 1.98          4.35          
Philip Morris (Altria) 1992 1.57          18.51        Philip Morris (Altria) 1992 4.64          ** 3.73          **
Philip Morris (Altria) 2002 53.60        199.50      Philip Morris (Altria) 2002 1.75          4.95          
Pitney Bowes 1996 71.72        ** 18.51        Pitney Bowes 1996 5.52          ** 3.10          
Walgreen's 1998 35.41        199.50      Walgreen's 1998 3.52          ** 3.44          **
Walgreen's 2005 87.14        199.50      Walgreen's 2002 2.37          19.00        
Wells Fargo 1995 40.94        ** 18.51        Wells Fargo 1995 1.05          5.93          
Wells Fargo 2001 11.24        18.51        Wells Fargo 2001 4.55          6.39          
**significant at 5% level
β t-2 vs. t+3 β full tenure
 
Contrastingly, in observation of the time-series which extended through the entire 
tenure of the executive, nearly treble the amount of turnover events or 32% of events 
under scrutiny resulted in significant volatility in stock price through observation of the 
variance of the beta metric, pre-versus-post turnover. Fannie Mae (1989 and 2005), 
Kimberly Clark (1991 and 2003, or all events within this firm’s time-series), Kroger 




(1998) all experienced significant changes in stock price volatility as measured through 
beta for the interval extending throughout tenure.     
Hypothesis 4: Measurement of differences in accounting ratio analysis 
(return on assets) relative to CEO change, intrafirm, as a proxy for execution 
of strategic change. 
Hø: There will be no significant change in the magnitude of 
accounting performance relative to CEO change evident in the 
time-series analysis of return on assets (ROA) for entities within 
Collins’s sample for the period t-2 and the period t+3, where t 
represents the year of CEO change. 
Ha: There will be a significant change in the magnitude of 
accounting performance relative to CEO change evident in the 
time-series analysis of return on assets (ROA) for entities within 
Collins’s sample for the period t-2 and the period t+3, where t 
represents the year of CEO change. 
Return on assets, or ROA, is typically employed as a litmus for the efficacy of 
managerial operations and strategy measured through accrual net income in relation to 
the general utilization of all firm resources. It should be noted that in comparison to 
financial market-based metrics, ROA is a historical assessment of performance. Changes 
in performance are materialized through the dynamic realization of accrual based income 




The occurrence of statistically significant variation in pre-versus-post turnover 
ROA for firms in Collins’s (2001) sample for the interval t - 2 vs t + 3 is eight of 29 
events, or 27.6% of all events expressed as an incidence rate. In terms of directional 
change for those events which are statistically significant, Abbott Laboratories (1978), 
Gillette (1990), Pitney Bowes (1996), and Wells Fargo (1995) all experienced increases 
in performance when viewed chronologically with respect to the time-series return on 
assets for the shortened interval. 
Table 5 






F-critical     





F-critical     
α = .05
Abbott Laboratories 1978 72.59          ** 18.51          Abbott Laboratories 1978 2.38                8.81              
Abbott Laboratories 1989 9.20            18.51          Abbott Laboratories 1989 19.69              ** 3.68              
Abbott Laboratories 1998 397.56        ** 199.50        Abbott Laboratories 1998 97.83              ** 3.68              
Circuit City 1987 150.97        199.50        Circuit City 1986 3.72                ** 3.59              
Circuit City 2000 39.31          199.50        Circuit City 1999 1.55                5.93              
Fannie Mae 1989 7.26            18.51          Circuit City 2005 4.20                7.71              
Fannie Mae 1998 7,608.76     ** 199.50        Fannie Mae 1989 6.63                ** 4.12              
Fannie Mae 2005 331.95        ** 199.50        Fannie Mae 1998 1.89                3.97              
Gillette 1990 163.02        ** 199.50        Fannie Mae 2005 1,072.14         ** 5.79              
Gillette 1999 2.28            199.50        Gillette 1990 1.62                3.68              
Gillette 2001 8.13            18.51          Gillette 1999 6.29                ** 3.63              
Kimberly Clark 1991 118.64        199.50        Kimberly Clark 1991 5.11                ** 2.41              
Kimberly Clark 2003 5,460.52     ** 199.50        Kimberly Clark 2003 75.24              ** 5.96              
Kroger 1977 2.44            18.51          Kroger 1977 9.11                ** 8.79              
Kroger 1989 7.71            18.51          Kroger 1989 2.11                2.91              
Kroger 2003 71.21          199.50        Kroger 2003 1.09                3.11              
Nucor Steel 1995 13.27          199.50        Nucor Steel 1995 14.21              19.45            
Nucor Steel 1999 5.89            199.50        Nucor Steel 1999 83.26              ** 19.35            
Nucor Steel 2000 1.07            199.50        Nucor Steel 2000 29.33              ** 8.89              
Philip Morris (Altria) 1978 0.40            199.50        Philip Morris (Altria) 1978 4.34                8.71              
Philip Morris (Altria) 1983 3.42            199.50        Philip Morris (Altria) 1983 6.84                8.89              
Philip Morris (Altria) 1992 5.63            18.51          Philip Morris (Altria) 1992 2.92                3.73              
Philip Morris (Altria) 2002 5.35            18.51          Philip Morris (Altria) 2002 12.23              ** 4.39              
Pitney Bowes 1983 5.05            18.51          Pitney Bowes 1983 3.37                ** 2.90              
Pitney Bowes 1996 21.56          ** 18.51          Pitney Bowes 1996 1.32                3.10              
Walgreen's 1998 23.78          199.50        Walgreen's 1998 17.43              19.45            
Walgreen's 2005 35.66          199.50        Walgreen's 2002 3.33                19.00            
Wells Fargo 1995 316.68        ** 199.5000 Wells Fargo 1995 2.81                5.93              
Wells Fargo 2001 16.54          18.51          Wells Fargo 2001 12.61              ** 6.39              
**significant at 5% level





Abbott Laboratories (1998), as well as Fannie Mae (1998 and 2005) also realized 
significant directional declines in ROA performance for the periods under scrutiny. 
Fannie Mae performance in particular supported the true degradation in performance 
which occurred after aberrant financial reporting was discovered through a study 
completed by the OFHEO (2004). Kimberly Clark (2003) experienced significant 
volatility in general which did not, upon observation, delineate directional change in a 
particular trend as compared to predecessor term results. 
 With respect to the comparison of the full tenure intervals pre-and-post turnover, 
the incidence rate of significance of variance nearly doubles in comparison to the events 
measured through the interval surrounding the event date, as 14 of the 29 of the turnover 
events, or 48.3%, are characterized by salient differences in ROA performance. An 
ascending direction of change in ROA is noted through observation of chronological 
succession for Abbott Laboratories (1989), Kroger (1977), Nucor Steel (1999-2000), 
Philip Morris/Altria (2002), Pitney Bowes (1983) and Wells Fargo (2001). Contrastingly, 
five of these same firms also experienced overall comparative declines in ROA 
performance; affected thus were Abbott Laboratories (1998), Circuit City (1986), Fannie 
Mae (1989 and 2005), Gillette (1999), and Kimberly Clark (1991). The lengthened time-
series interval pertaining to entire tenure also results in a significance of variance for 
Kimberly Clark (2003); however, as noted with respect to the shortened interval 
surrounding the event date, there is no particular trend in an overall direction of change, 





Hypothesis 5: Measuring differences in accounting ratio analysis (economic 
value added) relative to CEO change, intrafirm, as a proxy for execution of 
strategic change. 
Hø: There will be no significant change in the magnitude of 
accounting performance relative to CEO change evident in the 
time-series analysis of economic value added (EVA®) for entities 
within Collins’s sample for the period t-2 and the period t+3, 
where t represents the year of CEO change. 
Ha: There will be a significant change in the magnitude of 
accounting performance relative to CEO change evident in the 
time-series analysis of economic value added (EVA®) for entities 
within Collins’s sample for the period t-2 and the period t+3, 
where t represents the year of CEO change. 
EVA® has been more prevalently utilized in the last decade as a performance, 
compensation, and investment appropriation litmus since the total cost of capital 
structure is considered. The metric itself has been devised based on the sustainability of 
operating profit in excess of financing costs and tax expenses for a given firm. As 
defined in Chapter 1, the calculation of total net operating profit after tax less the total 
dollar amount of cost of capital simulates the deduction of all financing costs, including 
not only interest but equity costs from earnings, even if no dividends were disbursed. 
Coles, McWilliams, and Sen (2001) opined that “EVA® also can be adapted to measure 















F-critical     





F-critical     
α = .05
Abbott Laboratories 1978 36.71          199.50        Abbott Laboratories 1978 11.62            ** 8.81              
Abbott Laboratories 1989 23.03          199.50        Abbott Laboratories 1989 5.86              ** 3.29              
Abbott Laboratories 1998 1.07            18.51          Abbott Laboratories 1998 4.40              ** 3.68              
Circuit City 1987 222.10        ** 199.50        Circuit City 1986 0.41              3.59              
Circuit City 2000 159.60        199.50        Circuit City 1999 1.45              3.36              
Fannie Mae 1989 23.89          ** 18.51          Circuit City 2005 144.35          224.60          
Fannie Mae 1998 35.05          199.50        Fannie Mae 1989 4.57              ** 4.12              
Fannie Mae 2005 3.66            199.50        Fannie Mae 1998 6.38              ** 3.97              
Gillette 1990 21.00          199.50        Fannie Mae 2005 8.64              ** 5.79              
Gillette 1999 9.26            18.51          Gillette 1990 366.67          ** 3.29              
Gillette 2001 1.13            18.51          Gillette 1999 3.39              6.04              
Kimberly Clark 1991 1.13            199.50        Kimberly Clark 1991 4.47              ** 2.41              
Kimberly Clark 2003 1.52            199.50        Kimberly Clark 2003 3.46              5.96              
Kroger 1977 18.29          18.51          Kroger 1977 13.83            ** 8.79              
Kroger 1989 10.47          18.51          Kroger 1989 5.76              ** 2.91              
Kroger 2003 8.24            199.50        Kroger 2003 3.57              ** 3.11              
Nucor Steel 1995 12.73          18.51          Nucor Steel 1995 9.42              19.45            
Nucor Steel 1999 6.90            199.50        Nucor Steel 1999 94.62            ** 19.35            
Nucor Steel 2000 2.58            199.50        Nucor Steel 2000 28.05            ** 8.89              
Philip Morris (Altria) 1978 16.43          199.50        Philip Morris (Altria) 1978 2.32              3.41              
Philip Morris (Altria) 1983 991.78        ** 199.50        Philip Morris (Altria) 1983 3.04              8.89              
Philip Morris (Altria) 1992 1.78            18.51          Philip Morris (Altria) 1992 6.99              ** 3.73              
Philip Morris (Altria) 2002 5.23            199.50        Philip Morris (Altria) 2002 1.88              4.95              
Pitney Bowes 1983 1.30            199.50        Pitney Bowes 1983 2.30              3.10              
Pitney Bowes 1996 2.16            199.50        Pitney Bowes 1996 1.20              3.10              
Walgreen's 1998 1.98            199.50        Walgreen's 1998 5.62              ** 3.44              
Walgreen's 2005 39.56          199.50        Walgreen's 2002 4.01              19.00            
Wells Fargo 1995 256.24        ** 199.50        Wells Fargo 1995 20.59            ** 3.20              
Wells Fargo 2001 1.97            18.51          Wells Fargo 2001 14.49            ** 6.39              
**significant at 5% level  
performance, project performance, and managerial performance…[and] use yearly 




as a superior “short-term [performance] measure” (p. 47). Coles, Williams, and Sen also 
corroborated with the Stern Stewart regression analysis conducted which revealed that 
“EVA® is the single best predictor of standardized MVA (with an R-squared of 0.50)” 
(p. 33). Subsequent to acknowledging limitations of the impact between CEO tenure and 
EVA®, Coles, McWilliams, and Sen extended further documentation of their own 
empirical evidence which indicated that there was a “positive relationship of EVA®, an 
accounting measure of performance to combined leadership structure” (p. 43).  
 Economic value added® experience for the firms under study is calculated based 
on a conversion of the reporting year accounting based disclosures of net operating profit 
after tax less the weighted average cost of capital to 2008 inflation adjusted US dollars. 
Results are characterized by a statistically significant F-test of variance for four of 29 of 
the t - 2 versus t + 3 intervals surrounding the events, which constituted 13.8% of the 
CEO turnover events under study.  The results evidenced in Table 6 above indicate that 
statistically significant, increasing variability in EVA® was more prevalent as the time-
series of CEO tenure under observation was lengthened. In consideration of the CEO’s 
full tenure, the likelihood of significant variance with respect to this accounting metric 
was over four times versus the interval immediately surrounding the turnover event. 
Hence, for 17 of 29 occurrences, or 58.6% of extended tenure events, statistically 
significant variability of EVA® was noted. 
 In terms of individual firm impact, it is notable that Abbott Laboratories, Fannie 
Mae, Kroger, and Wells Fargo all experienced significant volatility in EVA® for every 




firms, which were between 25 and 36 years; Abbott Laboratories, Fannie Mae, and 
Kroger experienced three successions each, and Wells Fargo experienced two. 
Hypothesis 6: Measuring differences in accounting ratio analysis (market 
value added) relative to CEO change, intrafirm, as a proxy for increases in 
stockholder value. 
Hø: There will be no significant change in the magnitude of 
accounting performance relative to CEO change evident in the 
time-series analysis of market value added (MVA) for entities 
within Collins’s sample for the period t-2 and the period t+3, 
where t represents the year of CEO change. 
Ha: There will be a significant change in the magnitude of 
accounting performance relative to CEO change evident in the 
time-series analysis of market value added (MVA) for entities 
within Collins’s sample for the period t-2 and the period t+3, 
where t represents the year of CEO change. 
 Coles, McWilliams, and Sen (2001) posited: “MVA focuses on a long-range 
perspective of performance…the measure of performance focused on investors. It 
captures the extent of wealth created for the shareholders over a given period of time” (p. 
47). It must be acknowledged that disparate time-series performance may be reflected 
through the observation of EVA® as a contemporaneous interpretation of the culmination 
of efforts of a CEO to sustain and increase firm market value, while MVA may be 




capital. Although these two metrics differ from the perspective of accounting versus 
market based measures, these both warrant concurrent observation in the contrast of short 
term versus long term performance, although not convergent. Employing an effective 
performance litmus may elucidate the effect of agency theory, stewardship, and 
governance in the retention and sustenance of market value by the agent(s) on behalf of 
shareholders (p. 25). It should be noted that, similar to the approach of Clayton et al. 
(2005), Coles et al. (2001) utilized a five year interval to observe the occurrence of 
statistically significant changes in EVA® and MVA, and defended by acknowledging, 
“we examine a five-year time period to allow for compensation, ownership, and 
governance structure to have a material effect on both of our performance measures” (p. 
36). Empirical evidence from event studies (e.g., Coles et al., 2001) indicated that 
changes in EVA® and MVA are sensitized to such changes in operational approaches 
and the organizational structure of the entity.  
 As evidenced in the left panel of Table 7 below, the incidence rate of statistical 
significance of the variance of MVA is minimal among the sampled firms for the time-
series interval t-2 vs. t +3 surrounding the CEO turnover event date. Four of twenty-nine 
events affecting four different firms are associated with significant volatility in market 
value added pre-versus-post CEO change; the firms affected were Abbott Laboratories, 
Gillette, Kroger, and Wells Fargo. Although the incidence rate is lower for significant 
volatility of Tobin’s q and beta for the same interval, one event, the Kroger CEO turnover 
of 1989, resulted in significant volatility in relation to both of these market metrics as 




variances pre-and-post turnover in beta and MVA, as well as EVA® and ROA. Hence, 
metrics which are sensitive market indicators of investor behavior had some likelihood of 
concurrent statistical significance among some of the firms sampled.  
This observation may be extended to the results of the entire tenure of the CEO as 
related to turnover, presented in the right panel of Table 7. A concerted inspection of the 
incidence rate of significance of variance pre-and-post comparison revealed sixteen of 
twenty-nine events were statistically significant at the 5% level. Of the sixteen events 
which exhibited statistical significance, two events for Fannie Mae (1989 and 1998), two 
events for Gillette (1990 and 1999) and one event each for Kimberly Clark (2003), 
Kroger (1977), and Wells Fargo (2001) exhibited statistical significance of variance 
concomitantly for both Tobin’s q and MVA. All three equity market-related metrics—
Tobin’s q, beta, and MVA— of both Fannie Mae (1989) and Kimberly Clark (2003) 
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F-critical     
α = .05
Abbott Laboratories 1978 516.76            ** 199.50        Abbott Laboratories 1978 23.07            ** 8.81              
Abbott Laboratories 1989 47.26              199.50        Abbott Laboratories 1989 7.49              ** 3.29              
Abbott Laboratories 1998 2.96                199.50        Abbott Laboratories 1998 1.03              3.68              
Circuit City 1987 3.94                18.51          Circuit City 1986 44.70            ** 3.59              
Circuit City 2000 4.78                18.51          Circuit City 1999 1.73              5.93              
Fannie Mae 1989 67.44              199.50        Circuit City 2005 3.69              224.60          
Fannie Mae 1998 0.03                18.51          Fannie Mae 1989 13.12            ** 6.09              
Fannie Mae 2005 2.55                199.50        Fannie Mae 1998 6.43              ** 3.97              
Gillette 1990 0.97                18.51          Fannie Mae 2005 4.26              5.79              
Gillette 1999 14.97              18.51          Gillette 1990 41.66            ** 3.29              
Gillette 2001 51.00              ** 18.51          Gillette 1999 50.27            ** 6.04              
Kimberly Clark 1991 1.47                18.51          Kimberly Clark 1991 9.51              ** 2.41              
Kimberly Clark 2003 7.35                18.51          Kimberly Clark 2003 9.76              ** 5.96              
Kroger 1977 1.19                199.50        Kroger 1977 222.34          ** 8.79              
Kroger 1989 24.98              ** 18.51          Kroger 1989 2.43              2.91              
Kroger 2003 1.60                18.51          Kroger 2003 1.22              5.91              
Nucor Steel 1995 6.12                18.51          Nucor Steel 1995 1.80              19.45            
Nucor Steel 1999 1.12                199.50        Nucor Steel 1999 19.66            ** 19.35            
Nucor Steel 2000 1.33                199.50        Nucor Steel 2000 29.39            ** 8.89              
Philip Morris (Altria) 1978 2.13                18.51          Philip Morris (Altria) 1978 15.07            ** 8.71              
Philip Morris (Altria) 1983 3.11                199.50        Philip Morris (Altria) 1983 792.08          ** 8.89              
Philip Morris (Altria) 1992 2.59                18.51          Philip Morris (Altria) 1992 2.41              3.44              
Philip Morris (Altria) 2002 109.17            199.50        Philip Morris (Altria) 2002 2.18              4.39              
Pitney Bowes 1983 167.83            199.50        Pitney Bowes 1983 81.67            ** 3.10              
Pitney Bowes 1996 1.05                199.50        Pitney Bowes 1996 1.11              2.90              
Walgreen's 1998 1.68                199.50        Walgreen's 1998 3.16              3.44              
Walgreen's 2005 12.46              199.50        Walgreen's 2002 1.35              19.00            
Wells Fargo 1995 320,510.84     ** 199.50        Wells Fargo 1995 7.13              ** 3.20              
Wells Fargo 2001 10.72              18.51          Wells Fargo 2001 9.23              ** 6.39              
**significant at 5% level  
Test of Hypothesis: Regression 





Hø: There will be no significant interactions between the variables 
listed above relative to CEO change evident in a time-series 
analysis of terms for entities within Collins’s sample for the period 
t-2 and the period t+3, where t represents the year of CEO change. 
Ha: There will be significant interactions between the variables 
listed above relative to CEO change evident in a time-series 
analysis of terms for entities within Collins’s sample for the period 
t-2 and the period t+3, where t represents the year of CEO change. 
Table 8 
Regressions: for Collins’s (2001) and extended samples by firm, interval t-2 vs. t+3 
Firm Name Constant p-value Tobin's Q p-value Beta p-value ROA p-value EVA® p-value MVA p-value
Abbott Laboratories (41.7933)          0.17        + 4.4680          0.14        + 27.9333       0.18        + (21.1217)          0.74        4.60E-06 0.20        + 4.00E-07 0.26        
Circuit City (1,163.9100)     0.98        954.4110      0.98        (458.7870)    0.98        (1,396.4000)     0.98        -2.41E-03 0.98        5.16E-04 0.98        
Fannie Mae 46.6861            0.17        + (44.6730)       0.16        + (5.6010)        0.18        + 244.6660          0.82        -1.00E-05 0.15        + 1.00E-07 0.29        
Gillette 5.6806              0.65        (1.7976)         0.78        (3.6641)        0.58        12.5652            0.56        -2.00E-07 0.87        0.00E+00 0.72        
Kimberly Clark 474.8210          1.00        (262.2190)     1.00        (121.4870)    1.00        378.4050          1.00        -1.40E-04 1.00        5.00E-06 1.00        
Kroger (336.8870)        0.99        (346.3570)     0.99        428.6520     0.98        6,272.9000       0.98        -7.21E-04 0.98        1.26E-05 0.99        
Nucor Steel 58.2939            0.99        104.6590      0.99        (85.0816)      0.98        (764.3730)        0.99        0.00E+00 1.00        0.00E+00 1.00        
Philip Morris (Altria) (4.5563)            0.43        (1.0291)         0.69        1.2784         0.59        60.6728            0.11        + -2.00E-07 0.46        0.00E+00 0.91        
Pitney Bowes (247.2210)        0.99        136.2970      0.99        63.9221       1.00        (54.4928)          0.99        5.11E-05 0.99        -5.00E-06 1.00        
Walgreen's 697.1660          0.99        79.3287        0.99        (196.5200)    0.99        (6,490.3000)     0.99        3.70E-05 1.00        -3.70E-05 1.00        
Wells Fargo (111.5270)        0.33        102.4540      0.33        21.8014       0.35        (220.7600)        0.86        1.80E-06 0.54        5.00E-07 0.39        
significant at: ** 5% level, * 10% level, + 20% level
 
Results of a binary logistic regression conducted across all independent variables 




(expressed as a qualitative dependent variable) are displayed in Table 8 for the interval t-
2 versus t+3 surrounding the turnover event. A binary logistic regression as a statistical 
method is characterized by two modalities, or potential outcomes, representing the 
qualitative dependent variable, which in this case were pre-and-post succession events. A 
separate regression analysis was conducted for each firm; firm coefficients and the p-
values relative to significance for the analysis for each firm are provided in Table 8 
above. In addition, the significance of each coefficient is designated at the 5, 10, and 20% 
levels, as additional pertinent information. Observation was made for the potential 
presence of multicollinearity or exhibition of high correlation among the independent 
variables of the regression for the intervals immediately surrounding the succession 
events, and no events fulfilling the criteria were noted. The results of the extended tenure 
sample firms were also screened for multicollinearity, with no observed emergent issues. 
As a result, the potential for multicollinearity among the independent variables was fairly 
low.  
Results were generally of minimal significance, however, of the sampled firms, 
the experience of Abbott Laboratories and Fannie Mae displayed lower levels of 
significance for most individual independent variables considered; significance was noted 
at the twenty percent level for Tobin’s q, beta, and EVA®. Of the independent variables 
noted within the Philip Morris analysis, ROA was significant at the twenty percent level 
as well. These outcomes indicate that pre-and-post performance event metrics for these 
firms displayed statistically significant changes in market and accounting based metrics 





Regressions: for Collins’s (2001) and extended samples by firm, full tenure   
Firm Name Constant p-value Tobin's Q p-value Beta p-value ROA p-value EVA® p-value MVA p-value
Abbott Laboratories (2.2300)         0.71       (0.1388)         0.86         1.5813         0.73        (2.9678)       0.86        9.00E-07 0.49              1.00E-07 0.31              
Circuit City (0.4407)         0.73       (0.0887)         0.92         0.9881         0.37        (12.0473)     0.32        1.20E-06 0.46              2.00E-07 0.52              
Fannie Mae 2.6818          0.67       (2.9448)         0.58         (0.8732)       0.42        76.1926       0.53        -2.00E-07 0.09              * 0.00E+00 0.15              +
Gillette (4.4318)         0.05       ** 0.4814          0.70         1.4379         0.36        10.9458       0.55        4.00E-07 0.21              1.00E-07 0.09              *
Kimberly Clark (1.4125)         0.75       (2.6962)         0.30         3.8646         0.39        (17.5220)     0.28        1.00E-06 0.25              3.00E-07 0.07              *
Kroger 0.1011          0.96       (0.7941)         0.54         0.1186         0.90        5.3463         0.78        -4.00E-07 0.62              1.00E-07 0.54              
Nucor Steel 12.7039        0.09       * (11.4737)       0.04         ** 4.2949         0.31        (90.1250)     0.04        ** 0.00E+00 0.28              0.00E+00 0.03              **
Philip Morris (Altria) (1.1498)         0.62       (1.2106)         0.20         (0.4592)       0.72        (0.0000)       0.11        + (0.0000)         0.48              0.00E+00 0.18              +
Pitney Bowes (6.9758)         0.14       + 1.1383          0.67         2.1559         0.43        10.3808       0.62        2.20E-06 0.47              5.00E-07 0.05              **
Walgreen's (260.4370)     0.99       (18.4324)       0.99         169.0270     0.99        63.3103       1.00        2.78E-05 1.00              8.00E-06 0.99              
Wells Fargo (9.3073)         0.63       1.1848          0.94         0.8286         0.83        254.3540     0.35        3.00E-07 0.48              1.00E-07 0.29              
significant at: ** 5% level, * 10% level, + 20% level  
The p-values for two of eleven firms were statistically significant at the five 
percent level for a limited amount of the independent variables under observation. Of 
these two firms, from an individual firm perspective, Nucor Steel experienced statistical 
significance among three independent variables (Tobin’s q, ROA, and MVA) at the five 
percent level. Pitney Bowes’s results exhibited statistical significance for the independent 
variable MVA at the five percent level. Philip Morris (Altria) experienced statistical 
significance at the twenty percent level for ROA and MVA. Gillette and Kimberly Clark 
also experienced statistical significance at the ten percent level for MVA, while Fannie 
Mae experienced statistical significance at the ten percent level for EVA® and at the 





Collins (2009) explained the emergence of unsustainable financial performance 
levels among firms selected for his prior (2001) research: 
…the principles in Good to Great were derived primarily from 
studying specific periods in history when the good-to-great 
companies showed a substantial transformation into an era of 
superior performance that lasted fifteen years. The research did not 
attempt to predict which companies would remain great after their 
fifteen-year run. Indeed, as this work shows, even the mightiest of 
companies can self-destruct. (2009, p. 4) 
As Collins (2009) further acknowledged: “the critical question is: ‘what do we 
learn by studying the contrast between success and failure?’” (p. 15). The conjecture that 
a CEO has the ability to direct an organization through “frame-breaking,” transformation 
(Gordon, et al., 2000) requires significant financial flexibility.  
It may be stated that a leadership legacy is defined as sustained financial 
performance or non-significance of statistical assessment of risk as measured through the 
observation of variances of financial metrics related to past performance and market 
perception. From the results of analytical testing presented, as summarized through 
Hypothesis 6, a leadership legacy so defined was attained by approximately half of the 
executives of highly performing firms.  Hence, Collins’s (2001) original litmus of Level 




long-term firm performance, despite disclaimers Collins (2009) offered in a subsequent 
analysis. 
Table 10 
Compiled Results of significance of Hypothesis Tests 2-6, for Collins’s (2001) and 




Tobin's q   
t-2 vs. 
t+3





























Abbott Laboratories 1978 ** ** Abbott Laboratories 1978 ** **
Abbott Laboratories 1989 Abbott Laboratories 1989 ** ** **
Abbott Laboratories 1998 ** Abbott Laboratories 1998 ** **
Circuit City 1987 ** Circuit City 1986 ** **
Circuit City 2000 Circuit City 1999
Fannie Mae 1989 ** Circuit City 2005
Fannie Mae 1998 ** Fannie Mae 1989 ** ** ** ** **
Fannie Mae 2005 ** Fannie Mae 1998 ** ** **
Gillette 1990 ** Fannie Mae 2005 ** ** **
Gillette 1999 Gillette 1990 ** ** **
Gillette 2001 ** Gillette 1999 ** ** **
Kimberly Clark 1991 Kimberly Clark 1991 ** ** ** **
Kimberly Clark 2003 ** ** Kimberly Clark 2003 ** ** ** **
Kroger 1977 Kroger 1977 ** ** ** **
Kroger 1989 ** ** ** Kroger 1989 ** **
Kroger 2003 Kroger 2003 ** **
Nucor Steel 1995 Nucor Steel 1995
Nucor Steel 1999 Nucor Steel 1999 ** ** **
Nucor Steel 2000 Nucor Steel 2000 ** ** **
Philip Morris (Altria) 1978 Philip Morris (Altria) 1978 **
Philip Morris (Altria) 1983 ** Philip Morris (Altria) 1983 **
Philip Morris (Altria) 1992 Philip Morris (Altria) 1992 ** **
Philip Morris (Altria) 2002 Philip Morris (Altria) 2002 ** **
Pitney Bowes 1983 Pitney Bowes 1983 ** **
Pitney Bowes 1996 ** ** Pitney Bowes 1996 **
Walgreen's 1998 Walgreen's 1998 ** **
Walgreen's 2005 ** Walgreen's 2002
Wells Fargo 1995 ** ** ** ** Wells Fargo 1995 ** **
Wells Fargo 2001 Wells Fargo 2001 ** ** ** **




The results of testing for Hypotheses 2 through 6 are shown in Table 10 above in 
the left hand side of the panel. Considering the contemporaneous incidence rate of 
significance for the variance of financial metrics of three or more of the five financial 
metrics tested, evidence suggests the lack of a leadership legacy among the sampled 
firms surrounding the succession. Kroger (1989) and Wells Fargo (1995) exhibited 
variances in three and four metrics, respectively, which were statistically significant. 
These firms were not able to mitigate financial performance risk in the short term given 
the succession event. However, for the majority of firms, a leadership legacy in terms of 
financial performance was sustainable over the interval, and the interval surrounding the 
event date was not characterized by pervasive volatility and risk as observable through 
financial metrics.  
In contrast, an observation of right panel details the incidence rate of significance 
of variance for five financial metrics, given the full tenure of the CEO. Twelve of twenty 
nine events resulted in a majority of statistically significant results. From these outcomes 
it was observed that approximately 41% of the firms experienced results which were not 
indicative of the establishment of a leadership legacy. Measurable financial risk was 
observable through the variance in metrics. Further, in consideration of the affected 
entities, certain firms experienced significant variances in terms of volatility of financial 
metrics for the entire tenure and each succession event in the history of the sampled 
interval. These firms were Fannie Mae, Gillette, and Kimberly Clark. Despite the 
replacement of the top executive position, it is integral that the firm’s economic and 




effectively accomplished, significant volatility emergent due to financial risk may 
potentially be mitigated.  
There is evidence that, for firms demonstrating volatile financial performance, 
sustainability of the firm through the development of a robust and fortuitous operational 
and financial structure to mitigate risk may be particularly challenging. Volatility of 
earnings is a deterrent to capital accumulation which potentially nullifies the future 
ability of the entity to seize opportunity for growth. Certainly, with two of the said firms 
experiencing acquisition (Gillette) and near failure (Circuit City), research outcomes 





Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Summary 
The objective of determining an indication of sustainability of financial 
performance was addressed through an empirical study reported in chapter 4. Conjectured 
to potentially emerge through the observation of a time-series of financial metrics was an 
absence of significant financial volatility as executive succession occurred among a 
census of highly performing firms first identified by Collins (2001). Performance bereft 
of significant financial volatility was hypothesized to be an indicator of the establishment 
of a leadership legacy. An executive succession characterized by a leadership legacy was 
hypothesized  to not give rise to significant financial risk from strategic instability, as 
evidenced through statistically significant changes in financial metrics. Risk mitigation 
gives rise to effectively planned growth, realization of opportunity, return on capital, 
stability of value proposition for shareholders, and concomitant sustainability of the 
entity. 
Collins’s (2001) original assertion held that the sampled companies of his study 
initially demonstrated sustained high performance from both a financial and operational 
perspective. The query herein sought to demonstrate whether the integral factors 
underlying the assertion of sustainability of performance, primarily during and after 
leadership succession, were associated with augmented risk for the firm. The hypotheses 
were tested through a statistical investigation of concurrent financial performance related 
to asset management and efficiency, market risk, market perception of firm value, and 




This study yielded mixed results, that financial performance over the time-series 
beyond the years originally sampled by Collins (2001) was sustainable for certain of the 
firms within the census, and unsustainable for others. Of the eleven firms originally 
identified as highly performing firms by Collins, three (i.e., Circuit City, Fannie Mae, and 
Gillette) were liquidated, acquired, or affected by substantial financial restatements. 
However, a closer investigation of financial metrics herein either provided evidence 
which indicated certain challenges due to heightened volatility, or supported earnings 
persistence through observation of minimal volatility. As an example, though Philip 
Morris/Altria experienced prominent operational and legal challenges to its fundamental 
product offerings, but sustained performance throughout the period under scrutiny, with 
barely observable change in overall risk. This firm was able to mitigate environmental 
risk despite the influence of ‘frame-breaking’ change to its constituency and operations.  
Conclusions 
There is notable evidence that sustainability of firm financial performance among 
highly performing firms may be threatened by the emergence of financial risk, despite a 
concerted effort toward a controlled relay succession approach to CEO turnover. This 
level of financial risk is more pervasively evident in consideration of the time-series of 
the entire tenure of the CEOs under study than in consideration of an interval surrounding 
the event date. Of 29 succession events sampled among the firms in Collins’s (2001) 
original analysis, approximately 41.4% resulted in a statistically significant variance for 




EVA®, and MVA. The prevalence of this statistical significance is an indication of 
financial risk, and not indicative of the establishment of a leadership legacy.  
Discussion of Hypothesis 1  
Hypothesis 1 featured a conjecture addressing the incidence rate of chief 
executive turnover for the sample under investigation. Contemplating the statistical 
outcomes of Hypothesis 1, the incidence rate of succession events within the fifteen year 
period sample initiated by Collins (2001) of 4.02 % was significantly different from the 
incidence rate of approximately nine percent noted by Comte and Mihal (1990) in their 
time-series analysis extending from 1945 through 1984. These results implied that there 
was greater leadership stability in terms of CEO tenure during the periods that Collins 
(2001) observed for the analysis completed within Good to Great as compared to the 
generalized population of publicly held firms empirically tested within Comte and 
Mihal’s (1990) research. In contrast, no statistical significance was noted for the 
alternative hypothesis of differentiating the incidence rate of chief executive turnover for 
the extended full tenure sample of 10.28 % from that derived from Comte and Mihal’s 
incidence rate of nine percent. 
These results may also be uniquely interpreted in the context of the source of 
successors, and whether these executives hailed from inside or outside the company (see 
also Comte & Mihal,1990; Cannella Jr. & Lubatkin, 1993; Collins, 2001; Clayton et al., 
2005; Bower, 2007). Comte and Mihal (1990) presented empirical research detailing that, 
of the number of successions occurring across 41 selected firms, the selection rate of 




research, over 90 percent of the CEOs that led companies from good to great came from 
inside” (p. 95), and further indicated that for an extended review of highly-performing 
sample firms through 1998, the selection rate of outsiders as successors was 4.76 %, 
which implies that the complement of 95.24 % of successors were insiders. Hence, the 
sampled entities more prevalently selected insiders as successors to the CEO position. 
Further, Collins suggested that a “search for a disciplined executive with a bias for 
selecting a proven performer from the inside” (p. 90) is a formidable practice which may 
allow the company to “reverse a downward spiral” (p. 90). Notably, the result also 
contrasts with the observations of Allgood and Farrell (2000), who predicated the mean 
percentage of outsider sourced successors within “a sample of 760 firms with 7,402 CEO 
years between 1980 and 1993” (p. 378) was 26.7 % of all turnovers. This result generally 
supported the incidence of “relay successions” (Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004, p. 483) in 
which the predecessor CEO supports the transition process to seamlessly indoctrinate the 
successor CEO for future service. Although evidence reviewed for each firm was not 
detailed to confirm this, succession planning in general incorporates this approach, as 
also implicated by Bower (2007).  
Leadership and governance researchers (e.g., Dahya, Lonie, & Power, 1998) have 
opined the potential conflicts of interest present if the CEO is also simultaneously 
permitted to hold the position of Chairman of the Board. Within the sampled history of 
the eleven entities comprising the census for the study herein, it was observed that for 
88.6 % of the 360 firm years under observation, CEOs concomitantly held the position of 




pervasively affected by governance inquiries and resultant financial restatements was 
Fannie Mae. For approximately four percent of the entire interval under study for Fannie 
Mae, or one single firm year of the sampled interval, the CEO position was not held by 
the same individual who assumed the Chairman of the Board position. 
Discussion of Hypothesis 2  
Regarding Hypothesis 2, the magnitude of stockholder reaction was measured 
through observation of the Tobin’s q metric for the sample under investigation during the 
time-series interval t-2 and the period t+3 where t represents the year of CEO change. 
The test was also performed for the entire tenure of the CEO in addition to the interval 
circumscribing the succession event. Of 29 succession events observed across 11 firms in 
the sample for the time-series interval surrounding the succession event, a statistically 
significant variance as measured through application of an F-test for the Tobin’s q metric 
at the 95% confidence level was ascertained for three occurrences or 10.34 % of the 
succession events sampled. Of the 29 succession events observed across the eleven firms 
in the sample for the time-series interval extending throughout the entire tenure of the 
executive, nine occurrences or 31.04 % of events demonstrated a statistically significant 
variance. 
As Conyon and Florou (2002) hypothesized: “in an efficient market...stock prices 
anticipate the future benefits of the possibility of CEO dismissal and therefore tend to 
increase as the capital market becomes aware of new avenues for management 
improvement” (p. 214). In addition, they asserted that “accounting-based measures…are 




accounting information is based on historical financial reporting and actual results rather 
than the heuristic conjecture of investors. Therefore, reaction among market participants, 
i.e., investors, aligns with the tenets asserted through the efficient markets hypothesis. 
The results of Conyon and Florou’s observation of the correlation between stock prices 
and non-forced turnover for the period 1991-1993 and 1994-1997 yielded non-significant 
results for the initial interval and significant results for the latter interval (p. 220).  There 
is marginal evidence through the observation of the results of the F-tests of significance 
of the Tobin’s q metric that the brief interval surrounding the event may be too succinct 
in certain instances for investors to form an opinion of the outcome of the event. 
However, it is acknowledged that the frequency of observation of statistically significant 
reaction among investors increases by treble in consideration of the entire period of 
tenure for predecessor versus successor. This general result provided further evidence of 
whether the perceived equity valuation on the part of investors, through observation of 
the conversions of accrual income and realization of cash flows, supports a post facto 
observation following the initial assessment. The evidence derived supported updates in 
assessments by market participants in periods beyond the initial succession event.  
Whether these perceptible assessments of investors were warranted and pervasive 
was further edified through the observation of the statistical significance of the variance 
of other accounting metrics. Such information is espoused to be impounded in the 
informational content of the stock price as the event (in this case CEO turnover) 
transpires, through application of the efficient markets hypothesis. However, investors 




for the full inflection to be realized through the stock price. Whether the majority of 
investors are able to perform such assessments given the present level of GAAP 
disclosure with appropriate perspicuity has been the subject of debate among those 
advocates of the existence of post-earnings-announcement drift and similar market 
anomalies (e.g., Brown, 1999). 
Discussion of Hypothesis 3  
Results for market based metrics herein (i.e., Tobin’s q, beta, and MVA), provide 
a measure of confirmative evidence on the part of investors to discern the long term 
effects of succession events given prolonged tenure, in comparison to the initial and 
fundamental perception of market participants for the initial t-2 / t+3 interval surrounding 
the event. Researchers have indicated the observance of limited perception of market 
participants through the pursuit of empirical research on event studies, particularly with 
respect to post-earnings-announcement drift (Jegadeesh & Livnat, 2006). In addition the 
contrary outcome, that investors are highly perceptive in their assessments, and their 
responses accurate however, potentially tardy, has also been observed (Brown, 1999). 
Given these conflicting observations, it may be noted that with respect to the variances 
within the initial interval surrounding the succession event, the reactions of market 
investors resulted in significant changes in beta for three events of 29 events sampled. Of 
those three events, two (i.e., Kroger, 1989 and Pitney Bowes, 1996) resulted in sustained 
beta volatility when comparing the variance of the beta recorded during the entire tenure 




 In consideration of the comparison for events and the entire interval of CEO 
tenure pre to post turnover for the Collins (2001) firm sample, the frequency of statistical 
significance of pre-vs-post beta comparison was eight of 24, or 33.33 % of turnover 
events. Clayton et al. (2005) indicated that volatility was higher for the time-series 
interval immediately surrounding the event, “the 2-year period following a turnover” (p. 
1791), and decreased thereafter. This would presumably be attributable to the 
pervasiveness and occurrence of transformational change following the event, which 
tends toward stability (i.e., mean reversion) as tenure increases. However, given 
consideration of the results of the entire tenure for the census of Collins (2001) firms, the 
results for highly performing firms contradicted these findings. The occurrence of more 
statistically significant volatility as measured by beta was more pervasive as the tenure 
interval was lengthened.  
The study of Clayton et al. (2005) included the financial results of all firms that 
experienced chief executive turnover as indicated in the Forbes Annual Survey of 
Compensation from 1979 through 1995. Evidenced were equity “volatility changes from 
pre to post event” which were “statistically significant” (p. 1791). The results of the more 
limited census of Collins’s sample for the same interval implicated that, unlike the array 
of firms sampled by Clayton et al. (2005), the selected firms of Collins’s (2001) research 
exhibited less equity volatility within the interval surrounding the turnover event. Merely 
three of 24 events, or 12.5 % of turnover events, resulted in statistically significant pre-
to-post comparisons with respect to changes in beta; this outcome is not dominant. 




analysis of an interval more confined to firms comprising Collins’s (2001) sample 
demonstrated that investors were less likely to ascertain a change in firm value to 
potentially correlate with the occurrence of CEO turnover.  
 Notably, the statistical non-significance for the beta metric among the firms may 
have been limited by the accessibility to stock prices for certain of the events. However, 
this is less likely to be a contributing factor to the t-2 / t+3 interval comparison in contrast 
to the entire tenure comparison. Dynamics noted with respect to beta revealed varying 
levels of performance-related risk for different firms at various times. At best, beta is an 
archival rather than a contemporaneous or prospective indicator of observable risk. 
However, in most analytical contexts it is utilized as a valuation tool (e.g., cost of capital, 
etc.).  
Clayton et al. (2005) asserted: “in an efficient market, the volatility we observe 
should be associated with new information being incorporated into prices” (p. 1800). 
Hence, any significant volatility observed through the recognition of variance in the beta 
metric for an extended sample may be interpreted as the effect of semi-strong form 
market participants reacting not to the turnover event, but to the sustained performance of 
one chief executive versus another, as measured through stock prices realized during the 
executives’ entire tenure. This would implicate that stock price and tendency of the firm’s 
equity returns to mirror general market returns during a particular CEO’s tenure was 
significantly more (or less) volatile than the predecessor.  
The importance of observing results emerging from the expansion of the interval 




Farrell (2000): “when there is greater uncertainty about a new CEO’s ability, [the board] 
will be more lenient regarding poor performance that deviates from the expected level” 
(p. 374). Investors, as well as boards, were more likely to similarly apply this 
performance litmus.  Investor perception of firm value and market risk demonstrated 
through the observation of Tobin’s q and beta were more often significantly different in 
terms of variance for pre-and-post turnover comparisons given an observation of the 
entire tenure of the executive. Allgood and Farrell (2000) also noted the prevalence of 
entrenchment increases with the source of successor and length of tenure. As educed 
previously, the rate of insider succession among the firms under Collins’s (2001) research 
was over 96 %, which would correspond with a higher level of entrenchment among 
sampled firm CEOs. 
Discussion of Hypothesis 4  
The results of Hypothesis 4 eminently contrasted with those of prior researchers 
who also utilized the return on assets ratio as a performance litmus. Allgood and Farrell 
(2003) focalized a research effort upon comparison of pre-to-post turnover ROA for firms 
sampled form the Forbes Annual Survey of Executive Compensation for the “period 
1981-93” (p. 324), and summarily noted: “the average ROA of the previous CEO is about 
the same as the average ROA of the current CEO” (p. 327). Allgood and Farrell also 
acquiesced that “ROA has a negative and significant effect on the probability of forced 
turnover for new and old [outside hire] CEOs” (p. 388). However, they conceded that 
relative performance of inside hires is inversely related to ROA (p. 387). Farrell also 




forced versus non-forced CEO turnovers for 66 matched sample firms from the period 
1982-1992 (p. 604). 
  Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001) observed financial reporting relating to an 
expanded interval of turnover events reported in the same Forbes Annual Survey of 
Executive Compensation source, for the period 1971-94 (p. 2284). These researchers 
evidenced that ROA, as defined by the ratio of EBIT to “beginning of period book assets 
less the median value…for all firms in the same two-digit Standard Industry 
Classification,” was significant as an indicator of the “performance-turnover relation” (p. 
2284) and varied inversely with ROA (p. 2286). However, other ROA independent 
variables noted of stratified samples indicative of six year subperiod observation 
intervals, as well as the change in ROA, were not statistically significant. Results were 
mixed when a second regression model, “turnover outcome”, was developed which 
dichotomized data between voluntary and forced turnovers. For the interval 1977-1982, 
statistical significance was shown to exist characterizing the inverse relationship between 
ROA and the change in ROA for forced turnovers (p. 2288). Although operationalized 
from differently within this study, the incidence of variation as compared to prior ROA 
experience was significant for a majority of turnover events, for full tenure intervals of 
firms within Collins’ (2001) sample. The data provided an indication that ROA 
performance variation was statistically significant for approximately half of the events. 
However, the direction of the performance subsequent to change was fairly mixed as, of 




improved performance, six resulted in significantly deteriorated performance, and one 
resulted in mixed performance overall. 
Shen and Cannella Jr. (2002) espoused that “financial event studies have 
generally used market indicators to examine immediate investor reactions to succession 
announcements rather than actual cash flows generated by the firms over the first two or 
three years of the new CEOs’ tenures” (p. 719). As investors react with fervor to firm 
circumstances perceived as salient events and estimate changes in cash flows resulting 
from these dynamics, forecasting accuracy is questionable. Post-earnings-announcement 
drift and other market anomalies have been documented in various event studies as 
researchers have noted that investors are often inaccurate in their projections which lead 
to market reactions through purchase and sale of equities (Mendenhall, 2002). Clayton et 
al. (2005) acknowledged similar effects in response to CEO turnover and inferred a 
regression model to estimate the significance of the independent variables of quarterly 
earnings on the dependent variable CAR, or cumulative abnormal returns, given the 
presence of CEO turnover. Shen and Cannella Jr. (2002) empirically tested accounting 
metrics as determinants to measure the impact of CEO successors on firm performance. 
They developed a regression model featuring post-succession ROA as a dependent 
variable, and conveyed that pre-succession firm ROA was a positive, statistically 
significant factor relative to post-succession ROA (p. 726). The results in Table 5 
concorded with these findings, as the most prominent statistically significant outcome 




Discussion of Hypothesis 5  
 As EVA® is an accounting measure of incremental value achieved within a 
particular reporting period based on the accrual method of measuring GAAP income for 
the firms under study, any potential manipulation in accounting policies may influence 
the magnitude of calculated EVA®. Among firms employing EVA® as the basis of 
incentive compensation, the potential for management manipulation of accrual based 
income should be considered from a behavioral perspective as a potential source of 
volatility.  
 In recounting the results offered in Table 6, statistical F-tests of the variance of 
EVA® for the intervals surrounding the event demonstrated a lesser incidence rate of 
significance than extended full tenure intervals of CEOs for firms in the sample. The 
probability of statistically significant volatility increased more than four times, from four 
of 29 events, or 13.8 %, to 17 of 29 events, or 58.6 %, in comparison of the two sets of 
intervals for sampled firms. Since EVA® is derived from accrual-based GAAP income 
measures and the applicable weighted average cost of capital, factors contributing to 
variation may include attrition in operating earnings as well as capital structure changes. 
Earnings management or increased levels of compensation as the CEO’s tenure lengthens 
may also be contributing factors.  
 With respect to the relevance of the sample under study, it is notable that among 
the results as presented in Table 6, Fannie Mae’s results for full tenure revealed 
statistically significant volatility for all three CEO turnover events occurring within the 




documented in the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight or OFHEO (2004) 
Report, there is potential that the earnings management divulged in 2004 and occurring 
prior to that point contributed to the statistically significant difference in EVA® for this 
firm. 
 Earnings management may be a confounding factor in the increased volatility of 
EVA®. However, such changes are also attributable to a variant level of net operating 
profit after tax as a result of various performance factors affecting the firm’s earnings, 
whether exogenous or endogenous. Deliberate strategic change may intentionally 
precipitate a positive change in EVA®. For a given firm it may also be attributable to 
changes in the total dollar amount of weighted average cost of capital. Coles, 
McWilliams, and Sen (2001) postulated:  
The EVA® measure, which contains a weighted average cost of 
capital, explicitly controls for the riskiness of the firm. The MVA 
measure only accounts for the actual accumulated value of the 
firm, but the risk factor borne by investors to obtain this value is 
not explicitly reflected in the MVA measure. (p. 43)  
 As weighted average cost of capital is influenced not only by capital structure but 
also by the relevant beta assessed at the time of the calculation, volatility and/or an 
increasing trend in beta typically would signify an increase in the calculated relevant total 
dollar amount of weighted average cost of capital. Six of the eight full tenure 




statistically significant EVA® variance for the period under scrutiny. Firms affected were 
Fannie Mae, Kimberly Clark, Kroger, Philip Morris and Walgreen Company.   
Discussion of Hypothesis 6  
Although EVA® is essentially derived from accrual-based GAAP financial 
reporting (as applicable for these US-based firms through the 2008 reporting year) and a 
market based calculation of weighted average cost of capital, in contrast MVA is a litmus 
of changes in market value supported primarily by equity price dynamics. For companies 
included in the sample, the most material change in the metric for a particular period is 
comprised of changes in the market price of total equity financing.  
Essentially, the incidence rate of statistical significance of Hypothesis 6 aligned 
with the incidence rate of significance of Hypothesis 5. Four of 29 intervals surrounding 
the succession events exhibited a statistically significant variance in pre (t-2) versus post 
(t+3) EVA® and MVA. For the extended tenure calculation, seven of the eleven firms in 
the sample exhibited statistical significance in the variance of EVA® in addition to 
statistical significance in the variance of MVA. These occurrences were pervasive as 
evidenced in the two far right columns of Table 10. Note that the F-test exhibited 
statistical significance for both metrics for the full tenure intervals for 17 events. For four 
entities -- Abbott Laboratories, Fannie Mae, Nucor Steel, and Wells Fargo -- the 
concurrence of the statistical significance of the variance of both metrics occurred 
multiple times. 
Convergence of the statistical significance of the results of financial market 




perception among investors to assess the effectiveness of the CEO over tenure. In 
addition, investors align the negotiable market price of the firm’s capital with a change in 
reported income dynamics which affect cash flow. An underlying assumption is that the 
informational content of historical financial reporting is effectively utilized in developing 
fair market pricing of equity. In order for this to be achieved, financial statements should 
primarily be characterized, qualitatively, by the substantiation of relevancy and predictive 
value of information, which is integral to the financial calculation of equity value. In the 
longer term, investors responded via a market-based reaction measured through 
observation of direct price changes in relation to other assets in the market (beta), the 
difference between the book value of assets/capital structure and the market value of 
same (MVA), and the relationship between the book value of assets and the market price 
of equity (Tobin’s q), especially over the full tenure of the executive. Apparently, the 
higher level of incidence of statistical significance of the longer tenure intervals for all 
five ratios tested implicated that over time, executive performance was more subject to 
volatility as tenure increased and the observation intervals expanded. The prominent 
increase and convergence in the incidence rate of significance was noted for both 
financial (market based) and accounting (historically based) metrics.  
Discussion of Hypothesis 7  
Subsequent to the observation of the results of Hypothesis 7 presented in Table 8, 
a conclusion may be asserted: a stable relationship amid pre-and-post financial and 
accounting metrics existed for the sampled firms exhibiting limited statistical significance 




succession events had minimal influence on changes in financial performance for the 
firm. The leadership and strategic approaches established by predecessors pervaded, 
particularly over the initial interval prior to and following the change in command, t-2 vs. 
t+3. Hence, the sampled firms’ leaders were able to navigate and sustain performance 
through periods of economic instability. Results similar to those established during the 
period of assessment as a high-performing firm by Collins (2001) were essentially 
maintained throughout the course of personnel changes in top executive positions, at least 
within the interval limited to a five year span surrounding the succession event. These 
results were indicative of the establishment of a leadership legacy for the periods 
indicated, which was maintained through the leadership transition period. In addition, 
these results comported with those of Zhang and Rajagopalan (2004), for which 
performance relative pre-and-post to relay succession events evidenced minimal change 
and stable yet slightly increased performance in firms experiencing minimal strategic 
instability (p. 495). This may be expected for firms experiencing a non-forced turnover 
(due to a retirement) of an incumbent who has exhibited Level 5 leadership qualities 
(Collins, 2001) during tenure. These results also corroborate with the fact that few of the 
CEO turnover events under observation in the sample were forced. 
Of the firm variables that were characterized by statistical significance for the 
time-series surrounding the successions, seven individual ratio calculations (which 
exclude the consideration of the constant) were significant at the 20 % level for three 
firms. These were Tobin’s q, beta, and EVA® for Abbott Laboratories and Fannie Mae, 




greater for market based metrics over the time-series than for accounting metrics. These 
occurrences provide evidence of investor perception in the pre-and-post assessments 
surrounding the succession event, resulting price changes and volatility in the beta metric 
as well as Tobin’s q. Indeed, the semi-strong form of the EMH may be applicable, and 
the potential to imbue stock prices with informational content may be noted within this 
analysis. The signage of the independent variables was negative for Fannie Mae, 
indicating that financial performance was inversely related to the post succession interval. 
Thus, there was a tendency for financial performance to decline in the interval subsequent 
to succession as compared to the interval prior to succession. 
The results of the extended tenure binary logistic regressions conflicted with the 
prior results of observations of the intervals immediately surrounding the CEO turnover 
events. Given the succinct interval surrounding the turnover, stability in terms of 
accounting and financial results was fairly well maintained for the transition period 
immediately surrounding the turnover event. As tenure lengthened, the incidence rate of 
significance of metrics for pre-and-post succession events throughout the observation 
period to the 2008 reporting year became pronounced and frequent. Table 9 presents the 
results of regressions for the extended samples by firm for full tenure. Exclusive of the 
results of constants, the results of Nucor Steel for Tobin’s q, ROA, and MVA were all 
statistically significant at the five percent level. Pitney Bowes also sustained statistical 
significance of MVA at the five percent level. The financial reporting of these two firms 
was characterized by significantly different pre-and-post succession results in these 




the ten percent level, as well as MVA significant at the twenty percent level. Philip 
Morris/Altria also experienced both ROA and MVA significant at the twenty percent 
level. Both Gillette and Kimberly Clark experienced MVA significant at the ten percent 
level. Of these ten statistically significant incidences (exclusive of the constant), four 
were inversely related to the dependent variable. As an example, Nucor Steel’s Tobin’s q 
and ROA were both inversely related to post succession performance; Fannie Mae’s 
EVA® was also inversely related to post succession performance.   
From these results, there is supportive evidence that the independent variables 
considered, financial and accounting ratios and metrics, were significant. These results 
also imply that a leadership legacy, long-term, was not established for some of these 
firms demonstrating statistical significance for metrics prior and post comparison, as 
defined by overall stability of financial and accounting ratios and metrics, or statistically 
non-significant levels (i.e., greater than five percent level) of performance pre-and-post 
succession. Hence, results are generally mixed, as one firm experiencing bankruptcy 
(Circuit City), both exhibited statistical non-significance within the analysis. However, 
the analysis of one firm experiencing high financial reporting instability (Fannie Mae) 
resulted in statistical significance to an extent for both analyses.  Therefore, 
approximately half of the leaders of highly performing firms (i.e., six of eleven firms or 
54.5 %) overall differentiated long-term performance (either improved or deteriorated) 
for some of the metrics at a statistically significant level. However, as stability of risk and 
return is to define the establishment of a leadership legacy, approximately 45.5 % of the 




Discussion of Hypotheses Test Results   
Hypotheses tests substantiated the increased probability of statistically significant 
variation in financial metrics as the time-series under observation encompassed the entire 
tenure of the executive. This was in contrast to the probability of statistically significant 
variation for the interval espoused by Clayton et al. (2005), which was characterized by a 
five year interval immediately circumscribing the succession event. Clayton et al. noted 
perceptible and augmented risk within the interval immediately surrounding the 
succession of the CEO, consistent with empirical results indicative of event studies. 
However, risk noted among the sample specifically limited to firms within Collins’s 
(2001) analysis, and tested herein, were not overly indicative of increased risk in 
consideration of the census for this same interval. As noted in a regression analysis of 
pertinent variables, further inquiry culminated in the observation that approximately 55 % 
of firms realized some significant variation in pre-versus-post succession performance 
metrics when the time-series under investigation covered the entire tenure of the 
executive. Forty-five percent of firms sampled, did not experience significant variation in 
pre-versus-post succession financial performance and risk, defined as the presence of a 
leadership legacy. 
These findings also imply that overall financial riskiness increases more 
pervasively as tenure increases. Conversely, Allgood and Farrell (2000) noted diminished 
standard deviations in stock returns as tenure increased. Results herein with respect to 
volatility of the beta index conflict with this prior finding for sampled firms. In addition, 




study, from the expansion of the interval, a moderating factor did not emerge delimiting 
significant statistical change in financial metrics for the sampled firms. This outcome 
indicates less sensitivity among investors overall the results for Collins’s (2001) selected 
firms as compared to outcomes typically characterized of an empirical event study. 
Furthermore, a salient corollary may emerge from the contemplation of these 
consequences: as CEO tenure increases, executive approaches to achieving sustained 
exceptional financial performance continue to mirror past approaches, and may not fully 
address risk as it increases by identifying novel approaches toward mitigation. However, 
Puffer and Weintrop (2001) articulated that “inconsistent findings [in empirical research 
on turnover events] may be due to insufficient attention to the performance indicators 
used by the individuals responsible for CEO turnover decisions, namely, the board of 
directors” (p. 1). These findings are miscible as well as explanatory in that there is less 
attention directed to indicators of financial performance, sustainability of results, and 
mitigating risk as tenure increases. In addition, more pervasive entrenchment, 
complacency, compensation levels, and agency effects also play a role in the realization 
of a greater increase in financial risk as tenure increases. This consequence substantiates 
a general theory of organizational inertia as delineated by Shen and Canella Jr. (2002), as 
well as Shen and Cho (2005). A further consequential inference may be deduced: 
executive skill defies portability to an extent, and despite the auspice and prescience of 
deliberate succession planning, ubiquitous amongst the firms under study (i.e., under the 




aleatory domain of exogenous financial and operational influences is not viable within a 
continuum.  
Collins (2001) codified a taxonomy, utilizing qualitative and quantitative 
assessments, to measure the effectiveness of leaders within the entity. The limitation of 
the analysis herein, and indeed Collins’s analyses (2001, 2009) are that such analyses are 
demonstrative of a post hoc appraisal. However, greater sensitivity was evidenced 
through longer time intervals as experience of the CEO is assessed, particularly with 
respect to market-based measures of performance. This finding provides additional 
edification that fundamental analysis is an effective indicator of performance; accuracy 
translates not only into market based, but also accounting based metrics. Additionally, 
echoing the conclusions of Cannella, Jr. and Lubatkin (1993), Allgood and Farrell (2000, 
2003), and Bower (2007), Collins (2009) acknowledged the potential source of 
comparative change in performance:  
…one of the most significant indicators of decline is the relocation 
of power into the hands of leaders who fail to comprehend and/or 
lack the will to do what must be done—and equally, what must not 
be done—to sustain greatness…A domineering leader fails to 
develop strong successors (or drives successors away) and thereby 
creates a leadership vacuum when he or she steps away…Or 
perhaps legendary leaders pick successors less capable in a 
subconscious (or maybe even conscious) strategy to increase their 




The outcomes of this research endeavor must be carefully interpreted to 
acknowledge limitations of generalizability. The highly performing firms as detailed by 
Collins (2001) were selected as of a point in time, and acknowledgement of unsustained 
performance was offered by Collins (2009) in a future work. However, the evaluative 
framework provided in the original selection process (2001) was of robust derivation, and 
offered extensive revelations regarding firm performance and effective leadership. 
Additional factors are offered for consideration below, which may enhance qualitative 
evaluation offered by Collins with respect to Level 5 Leadership; expansion of this 
approach to a prosaic and quantitative inclusion of governance and leadership variables 
noted through validated empirical instruments may prove instrumental in screening the 
future performance of firms and their leaders. Collins (2009) later elaborated on a more 
comprehensive approach to developing a litmus of evaluation for leadership, which may 
also be complemented by analysis of governance variables. 
Recommendations for Future Study 
Collins (2001, p. 238) utilized stock returns and other accounting metrics such as 
profitability, liquidity, and activity ratios which contributed to a litmus of leadership 
performance; had some of the metrics been expanded to include certain market-based 
financial metrics, research outcomes may have differed. Within the analysis prescribed, 
some of the sampled comparison firms were dismissed due to non-sustainability of 
performance (p. 8; pp. 237-238).  As the population of years under scrutiny was increased 




performance through the extended interval, which included the 2008 financial reporting 
year for each firm.  
Although some of the pre-and-post interval test results were indicative of 
statistical insignificance with respect to the regression analysis conducted, individual 
tests of variance yielded a pivotal incidence of tests of significance for extended intervals 
as compared to intervals suggested by Clayton et al. (2005) surrounding the CEO 
turnover event. This was evidenced through the observation of all five financial metrics 
(i.e., Tobin’s q, beta, ROA, EVA®, and MVA) conducted within this study. Certain 
qualitative factors have been observed with respect to this analysis, for example, the 
incidence of the CEO/Chairman position held by the same individual among the sampled 
firms. Other qualitative governance assessments such as those implicated by Anderson et 
al. (2000) and DeFond and Hung (2004) – e.g., diversification and investor protection, 
respectively – provided further evidence that such qualitative variables may be 
effectively considered to enhance the predictability of occurrence between changes in 
qualitative governance variables and deteriorating performance, ultimately related to 
CEO turnover or dismissal. Suggested is consideration of the inclusion of such variables 
among highly performing firms as a benchmark to test performance of firms potentially 
exhibiting decline. Coles et al. (2001) pursued a similar model, but confined the 
financials under investigation to EVA® and MVA. 
Governance Ratings and CEO Turnover 
Recommendations for future study include the development of a fundamental 




financial performance given executive departure. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) 
constructed a factor model on the premise of a shareholder-return linked governance 
index which was a departure from prior studies as, commonly, the inherent methodology 
applied by past authors was that of event studies. Gompers et al. argued that event study 
methodology is inappropriately applied in the measurement of governance effectiveness, 
especially in corporate takeovers and proxy fights (p. 108). Hence, these authors 
“combine[d] a large set of governance provisions into an index which proxies for the 
strength of shareholder rights, and then stu[died] the empirical relationship between this 
index and corporate performance” (p. 108).  
After attributing firm leadership and governance style with a “Democracy” rating 
versus a “Dictatorship” rating, which included observations of “compensation 
plans…bylaws…charter…cumulative voting…pension parachutes…poison 
pill…antigreenmail law” (p. 112) relating to state of incorporation, Gompers et al. (2003) 
concluded that portfolios constructed of equities of firms characterized by Democratic 
governance ratings outperformed those characterized by Dictatorship ratings by 8.5 % per 
year (p. 109). Additionally,  the authors conveyed: “by 1999, a one-point difference in the 
index was negatively associated with an 11.4 percentage difference in Tobin’s Q…firms 
with weak shareholders rights were less profitable…than other firms in their industry,” 
(p. 110); they further noted and elucidated this linkage as correlation between “weak 
shareholder rights…[and] additional agency costs” (p. 110). None of the firms which 
comprised Collins’s (2001) esteemed group of highly performing firms were part of 




 The research model proposed by Gompers et al. (2003) may be extended to 
incorporate a time-series analysis of similar dynamics with respect to the devised 
governance rating system, applied prior and subsequent to an executive turnover event. In 
addition, a qualitative dummy variable indicating replacement by an insider or outsider 
may also be incorporated to reflect the source perspective of the successor, aligning with 
the assertions of Bower (2007). This approach may be applied to the census identified in 
Collins’s (2001) original analysis. In turn, a portfolio constructed of various firms’ equity 
held during the time-series interval aligning with executive tenure would indicate the 
presence of higher of lower stock returns achievable under a particular CEO’s term. As 
an extension of the measurement of risk and return relevant during a CEO’s tenure, an 
examination of the Sharpe ratio (i.e., the return on the portfolio less the risk free rate 
divided by the portfolio standard deviation) of this constructed portfolio will provide a 
relative measure of the standard deviation of the return per unit of risk identified. The 
greater level of return achieved under each respective CEO given the level of risk may 
then be identified. This approach aligns with a development of a return specific 
measurement which would incorporate the effect of governance changes as well as the 
assertions of Gordon et al. (2000) with respect to strategic organizational change. 
 An integral portion of features traceable to a successful governance framework 
would presumably include whether the presence of an active succession plan exists 
within the context of the firm; conceptually, this would support the posits of Bower 
(2007): “we are assessing people who have developed an intellectual framework for 




environment…a ‘cognitive groove’…” (p. 132). A variable developed to capture the 
degree to which a particular succession plan was supportive to an organization may be 
one of the qualitative variables integrated into a model which would determine a degree 
of sustainability among those firms implementing such plans. Gompers’ et al. (2003) 
model included the tracking of “classified board[s]…[and] directors’ duties…” (pp. 147-
148); this approach did not specifically acknowledge succession planning. Gompers et al. 
(2003) did not include an independent dummy variable capturing the effect upon 
governance, if any, derived from firms employing CEOs to simultaneously assume the 
role of Chairman. Within Collins’s (2001) sample extended through 2008 for all 
reporting years as indicated within the census population, across all firms, for 
approximately 88.45 % of firm years, the same executive simultaneously occupied both 
CEO and Chairman position.  
 Following the work of Gompers et al. (2003), Bauer, Guenster, and Otter (2004) 
analyzed the relationship between governance ratings for European firms, originating 
from Deminor (p. 92), net profit margin, and return on equity. Deminor’s governance 
ratings include the consideration of “300 different governance criteria per firm” (p. 92). 
Utilizing the Deminor governance rating as an independent variable to test its relationship 
to other financial variables, Bauer et al. noted a significant relationship between 
governance ratings and the Tobin’s q metric for European firms from the years 2000-
2001 (p. 99). The examination of other metrics in addition to the incidence of turnover 




performance and assist in the identification and comprehension of factors contributing to 
a culmination of the ethical creation of increased shareholder value. 
Leadership Assessment Criteria and Qualitative Variables 
 
As an epilogue to prior work, Collins (2009) suggested an improved, indexed 
classification schema indicating the robustness of company policy leading to “success-
contrast selection criteria” (p. 135). This approach was primarily instituted to determine 
intrasector competitor vantage point which differentiated performance from that of peer 
firms; SIC codes were utilized to aid classification of diversified firms. The observation 
and classification resulted in a “quantitative scoring framework built around six criteria” 
(p. 136). These were identified as: “business fit, size fit, age fit, performance divergence, 
and greatness test” (pp. 136-138). 
 The “greatness test” (Collins, 2009, p. 138) was based on continued 
“perform[ance] from the contrast-selection year to ten years out” (p. 158). This resulted 
in a scoring methodology which, when applied, provided indexed comparability for firm 
performance in years subsequent to the development of the original sampling process 
employed for the Good to Great (2001) research endeavor. Collins (2009) identified the 
need to continue tracking those firms which and leaders who sustained high performance 
beyond the original observation period. This effort hence captured the essence of tracking 
performance of the highly performing firms in the Good to Great (2001) census, 
however, the differentiation in financial results correlating with an executive turnover 




schematic approach devised may also be measured pre-and post-turnover to determine 
whether there is a statistically significant difference in the results achieved under tenure.  
 With respect to leader performance, however, Collins (2001) took a qualitative 
approach and assessed CEO commitment to an organization through observation of 
evidence of a level of “professional will [and] personal humility” (p. 36). Documentation 
of these qualitative leader behavioral characteristics of leaders was evidenced through a 
blend of field research techniques, primarily interviews, and archival research techniques, 
which included observations of news articles. Incorporating a documentable and more 
objective assessment of leadership success and/or suitability may be achieved with the 
addition of a qualitative leadership index, which would optimally result in the assessment 
of a correlation between excellence in firm financial performance and leader commitment 
to individuals within an organization. Further, incorporating a governance variable would 
provide evidence, within a single discriminant model, of the effectiveness of the leader to 
influence qualitative ethical compliance, financial performance outcomes, and leadership 
behavior. The incidence of turnover as compared to the level of governance ratings of 
ethical organizations combined with leadership behavior surveys and financial 
performance may further edify executive effectiveness.   
Although Waldman et al. (2001) completed a survey which indicated the 
perception of transactional leadership and charisma, and delineated a correlation between 
firm financial performance and leadership, the survey instrument was condensed and not 
as comprehensive as other validated survey instruments. An assessment model from the 




devised by Halpin (1957, as cited in Szilagyi & Keller, 1976) may be instrumental in 
assessing leader effectiveness within the organization, as well as documenting personal 
and behavioral traits. “Two of the dimensions inherent…are leader consideration and 
leader initiating structure” (Szilagyi & Keller, 1976, p. 642). LBDQ questionnaires are 
typically completed by subordinates and are perception based, resulting in an indexed 
score computed on a Likert-type scale. Accuracy of the assessment is enhanced by the 
prior demonstrated validity of the instrument as compared to field research methods (e.g., 
interviews, etc.) which may be subject to carrying degrees of validity and result in more 
subjective assessments when applied.  
 A limitation to this approach may be one of privacy. As the effectiveness of 
performance and indeed aspects of behavior are often assessed, administered, and 
retained through the efforts of the human resources department of an organization, such 
information is typically not disseminated. However, such information would edify the 
assessments of Collins (2001) with respect to distinguishing Level 5 leader traits.  
 
Consideration of Financial Restatements and CEO Turnover 
Consideration of accounting restatements may provide further evidence of leader 
ethical behavior, and may be indicative of the effectiveness of the governance structure of 
an organization, and the accuracy of the governance rating as pertaining to financial 
reporting. The inclusion of a qualitative variable indicating the presence of an accounting 
restatement and assessing the strength of the correlation to leadership behavior and 




with respect to the accuracy of reported performance, the presence of errors in reporting, 
whether aberrations or intentional misstatements, and the pre-and-post turnover 
performance of CEOs. Hennes, Leone, and Miller (2008) reported that the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) database “does not contain a variable that differentiates 
between errors and irregularities” (p. 1488); consequently, it is difficult to discern 
whether restatements are the result of egregious intent or random error. An examination 
conducted by Hennes et al. revealed that, utilizing SEC 8-K filings as support of observed 
restatements occurring between 2002 and 2005, 76 % of accounting restatements were 
errors in application of GAAP, while 24 % were intentional misstatements (p. 1489). 
Hennes et al. further hypothesized that the incidence rate of CEO turnover would be 
higher for firms experiencing restatements; upon completing empirical research to 
support this conjecture, they imparted that “both CEO and CFO turnover are significantly 
more likely if the restatement relates to an irregularity rather than to an error” (p. 1490). 
Provided was empirical substantiation of a near 50 % CEO turnover rate within two years 
subsequent to an intentional misstatement (p. 1506). 
Notably, a sample firm of Collins’s (2001) census, Fannie Mae, experienced an 
investigation in 2004 resulting in a significant financial restatement (OHFEO, 2004) and 
subsequent CEO turnover within a year of the inception of the investigation and 
restatement, although the organization “neither admitted or denied any wrongdoing” 
(Collins, 2009, p. 146). Optimally, a correlation may be established between the 
incidence rate of restatements, deterioration in financial metrics, leader behavior, and 




firms. Correlation between financial restatements and governance ratings would 
optimally be minimal or negative. 
Implications for Practice 
This research project was endeavored to determine the extent of an applicable 
leadership legacy among firms comprising the group of highly performing entities 
analyzed in Collins’s (2001) work, as defined by statistical non-significance of the 
variance of financial market and accounting based metrics. Although Collins (2001,2009) 
presented constructs regarding leadership primarily rooted in content analysis, this study 
departed from that approach by operationalizing the observation of financial performance 
consequences correlated with executive change through quantitative financial analysis.  
Practitioners of financial analysis, particularly managers of investment portfolios 
adhering to a particular style, will find this research endeavor informative. Consideration 
is typically given to financial performance dynamics which correlate to style strategies 
such as value or growth. As executive succession may lead, as demonstrated within, to 
statistically significant volatility in beta, rebalancing and/or asset reallocation may be 
required as a response tactic. Such corollaries are also true of individual investors 
managing their own portfolios.  
Volatility of beta, utilized as an input for the calculation of the weighted average 
cost of capital, may be incorporated into the assessment of risk with respect to 
endeavoring capital investment projects. A risk adjustment may be applied to beta in 




are also relevant to the employment of EVA® as a decision analysis litmus for capital 
investment.  
Executives following their predecessors perhaps do not provide focused 
consideration to the implications of financial volatility of risk-based market metrics 
derived from the stock price at the point of succession, especially if the succession is 
forced or unexpected. However, executives should acknowledge the potential effect of 
amplified risk, earnings volatility, and heightened cost of capital that may be applicable 
as the entity becomes a conduit for unique strategic style dynamics applicable to the firm 
given the advent of a successor. 
Implications for Social Change 
Investors, depending on their personal investment objective, often entrust assets to 
entities with the provision that individuals in executive leadership positions will 
instinctively spearhead the growth of selected organizations to eventually produce 
superior returns. The assurance that the firm will be a maintained as a viable going 
concern inherently is built upon this premise. If superior profitability, or profitability in 
general, occurs merely for an ephemeral interval, has the CEO identified a sustainable 
framework that will likely produce future profitable returns, as investors anticipate?  
This research endeavor has revealed that among the firms comprising Collins’s 
(2001) analytical framework that were highly performing, the passage of time and 
succession of chief executives has been invariably associated with greater return and risk 
volatility as measured through both accounting and financial metrics. For each metric 




volatility was greater for the extended interval of measurement under full tenure than for 
the five year interval surrounding the event. The expansion herein of the framework 
proposed by Collins enhanced transparency of firm accounting and financial performance 
and risk for market participants invested in the firm. Investors are able to ascertain the 
incidence of volatility relative to CEO change, and generally associate executive turnover 
among highly performing firms with less volatility at the onset of the event, and greater 
volatility of financial performance metrics as tenure persists. This finding may be applied 
to an investment selection process or portfolio construction strategy. Mitigated or 
intercepted volatility through active intervention, rebalancing, and diversification will 
affect investors’ realization of expected return. The resultant implication for social 
change is the preservation of investor capital; social change implications regarding 
preservation of capital are the optimal realignment and redistribution of wealth to 
investors who in turn fund other deserving corporate entities, remit appropriate levied 
taxes, and hence contribute to the stability of the economy. 
Firms’ leaders may seek diversification for the purpose of competitive advantage 
or bootstrapping earnings. However, sound financial and investment practice is 
frequently exemplified by opposite actions. Seeking orthogonalized diversification does 
not necessarily enhance earnings potential for every firm. If diversification occurs for the 
sake of earnings enhancement alone rather than strategic change, then it is potentially 
more optimally left to investors to develop a personalized portfolio strategy. In addition, 





The efficient market hypothesis applied is predictive in that if a firm is not valued 
by the market as a standalone entity, unless there is surety in finding further value that the 
management team will extricate through the exploitation of potential synergies, the 
diversification sought in the combination of two firms in disparate sectors may be less 
than likely optimal. A review of qualitative views which affect perception of external 
stakeholders and therefore through the EMH affect market share price—all are drivers of 
externally (validated) valuation.  
In establishing an investment objective, market participants may utilize a 
performance litmus or index with respect to the outcome of a CEO leadership/financial 
performance rating in order to select equities for inclusion in a portfolio of their own 
construction. The investor criteria for inclusion may be specific based on a tolerance 
scale of their own choosing, which would indicate the level of ethical or competent 
leadership within the organization. A potential portfolio construction may be tested 
through application of the Sharpe ratio, which denotes the level of return associated with 
the level of risk; the higher the level of the Sharpe ratio, the greater the return per unit of 
risk endeavored. 
The problem statement and sample addressed the findings of authors of prior 
studies (i.e., Dahya, Lonie, & Power, 2001) who sampled groups which are 
heterogeneous in terms of return; the problem of variability of returns as CEO transitions 
occur will potentially be solved if the observed approaches and metrics indicative of 
superior management performance are modeled. Firms may mirror this performance and 




performance disclosures based on the results and suggestions herein may be utilized as a 
litmus by investors and creditors, resulting in more equitable resource allocations among 
firms vying for capital in global financial markets. The equitable distribution of investor-
supplied capital in financial markets is integral to optimal market functioning. Thus, a 
social change implication for fair distribution of capital among firms vying for equity 
within financial markets is the augmentation of returns for companies that are well 
managed, and the resultant return of wealth to the entities’ shareholders. As mentioned, 
these shareholders in turn may reinvest in the firm, or seek to provide capital to other 
firms, enhancing financial and economic growth for society.  
In an equity market characterized by amplified volatility of returns, investor 
capital is invariably subject to risk of loss; market participants may accept this risk as a 
requisite of investing. However, investor demographics may affect the preference to 
maintain a particular tolerance level of risk in order to support the investor’s life cycle. 
Although higher levels of volatility may be associated with increased levels of return in 
some instances, less predictable returns may significantly impact the safety of investor 
capital as well as security of investors’ financial futures. Investors may, in response, be 
reticent to provide capital to firms. Pervasive equity volatility also has the potential to 
significantly impact domestic economic stability as well as market financial stability 
when investor reaction is pronounced. To the extent that corporate executives have the 
ability to mitigate short and long term risk as a result of assessments of endogenous and 
exogenous effects on the firm and decisively react, such actions bode favorably for 




perspective, successor CEOs maintain a continuous focus toward strategy when 
warranted and feasible. 
The market sensitivity of investor perception of changes in value which align with 
equity volatility is evident. Executive succession may augur strategic change, the 
outcomes of which are reflected in the amplitude of financial metrics indicative of 
performance dynamics. The auspice of firm performance is exemplified through leaders 
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